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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(4) and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-103(2)0'). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue #1: Whether the trial court erred when it denied Chris' motion for attorney fees after 
it denied UTOPIA'S request for a preHminary injunction and found that UTOPIA had 
brought an invalid request for declaratory relief. 
1. Standard of Review: "Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a 
question of law, wliich is reviewed for correctness." IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. Crook, 2000 
UT App 217, H 9, 6 P.3d 1143 (quotations and citations omitted); Miller v. Martineau <& Co., 
1999 UT App 217, \ 28, 983 P.2d 1107. 
2. Determinative Law: 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules:1 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 (2008); Utah R Gv. P. 
65A(c)(2); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-102 (2008); Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-103(11) 
(2010); Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-201 (2010); Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-301 (2009). 
Case Law: 
Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, 44 P.3d 781; Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40, 178 P.3d 
922; IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. Crook, 2000 UT App 217, 6 P.3d 1143; Tholen v. Sandy City, 
849 P.2d 592 (Utah Q. App. 1993); see also Deseret News Vublg Co. v. Salt hake County, 2008 
Copies are provided in the addendum. 
1 
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UT 26, 182 P.3d 372; Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. <& Mrs. R, 321 F.3d 9 (1st Or. 
2003); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad Sys., Inc., 752 E2d 16 (2d Or. 1984). 
3. Statement of Preservation: This issue was preserved at R 129-40; 186-222; 427-33; 
453-60; 466A-66B; 482:13-25. 
Issue #2: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to hold UTOPIA in 
contempt of court for disclosing sealed records from this case to the media. 
1. Standard of Review: Although this Court reviews a trial court's decision whether to 
hold a party in contempt for abuse of discretion, Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App. 14, ^ 8, 973 
P.2d 988, when the denial of a contempt sanction is due to an error of law, this Court should 
review it for correctness. See State v. Henriod, 2006 UT 11, fflj 4, 19,131 P.3d 232 (an error of 
law is an abuse of discretion); State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ^  26, 127 P.3d 682. 
2. Determinative Law: 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules:2 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-102 (2008); Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-103(21) (2010); Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-2-701 (2008); Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-801(l)(a) (2008); Utah Cbde Ann. 
§ 78B-6-301(5) (2008); Utah Code Jud. Admin. R 4-202.02; Utah Code Jud. Admin. R 4-
202.03; Utah Code Jud. Admin. R 4-202.04. 
Cases: 
Crowther v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 54 R2d 243 (Utah 1936). 
3. Statement of Preservation: This issue was preserved at R 221-24; 250-316; 414-18; 
466A-66B; 482:2-13. 
2
 Copies are provided in the addendum. 
2 
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Issue #3: Whether Chris is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
1. Standard of Review: Granting attorney fees on appeal is a determination for this 
Court to make rather than the trial court. Thus, no standard of review exists. 
2. Determinative Law: Golden Meadows Props., LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App 258, 241 
P.3d 371; Kimball IK Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, 217 P.3d 733 Shinkoskey IK Shinkoskey, 2001 
UT App 44, 19 P.3d 1005; Williamson IK Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, 983 P.2d 1103. 
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE 
Procedural History 
The Utah Telecommunication Open Infrastructure Agency ("UTOPIA") filed this 
lawsuit in Utah's Third District Court on April 18, 2011. It sought a preliminaiy injunction 
and declaratory relief based on a contract it had with Chris Hogan. Judge Joseph C Fratto, 
Jr. presided. 
On April 19, 2011, the trial court held a hearing during which it issued a temporary 
restraining order which prohibited Chris Hogan ("Chris") from disclosing any of UTOPIA'S 
confidential information and set a hearing on UTOPIA'S request for a preliminaiy injunction 
for April 26, 2011. Hie trial court also granted UTOPIA's request for an order sealing the 
records in this case and signed an order sealing the case. 
After the hearing on April 26, 2011, the trial court determined orally from the bench 
that UTOPIA was not entitled to a preliminary injunction in part because it had not brought 
a valid cause of action in this lawsuit. The temporary restraining order against Chris expired 
on its own terms. The trial court reserved other issues, including whether to unseal the file in 
this case. 
3 
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On April 27, 2011, UTOPIA filed a notice of dismissal of the lawsuit and a notice of 
its intent to withdraw its motion sealing the records in this case. On May 6, 2011, Chris filed 
a motion for attorney fees with a supporting memorandum. 
On May 9, 2011, Chris filed a motion for UTOPIA to show cause why it should not 
be held in contempt of court and pay Chris' attorney fees for disclosing sealed documents to 
a third party. 
On June 23, 2011, the trial court entered an order denying Chris' motion for attorney 
fees and withdrawing its order to show cause: without a finding of contempt. 
On July 19, 2011, Chris filed a timely notice of appeal. The Utah Supreme Court had 
original jurisdiction over this matter but transferred it to this Court on August 10,2011. 
On December 12, 2011, the trial court signed the order denying Plaintiffs request for 
a preliminary injunction. 
On December 28, 2011, Chris filed a timely Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. Appellee, UTOPIA, is an inter-local cooperative entity and political subdivision of 
the State of Utah whose purpose is to build telecommunications infrastructures within its 
sixteen member cities. R. 23; 480:60. Todd Marriott ("Marriott") currently serves as 
UTOPIA'S executive director. R. 480:107. 
4 
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2. Chris worked for UTOPIA and was designated as an independent contractor. R 24; 
89. On May 9, 2009, Chris entered into a contract with UTOPIA to provide it services until 
May, 2011 ("the Contract").3 R 32-38; Exhibit P-l. 
3. Early in 2011, UTOPIA began working on a five year plan to install infrastructure in 
the streets of its member cities and connect it to homes and businesses. & 480:60-61. 
Federal stimulus money would fund part of the plan, and $65,000,000 in taxpayer funded 
bonds would fund the remainder. Id. at :59-61. UTOPIA issued a Request for Proposals 
("RFP") for bids on a contract to lay infrastructure in the streets and another RFP for bids 
on a contract to connect it to homes and businesses. Id. at :59. 
4. After the RFPs were issued, Tetra Tech, a company that UTOPIA disfavored, made a 
presentation to secure one of the RFP contracts. Id. at :53-54, :59, :115. When it was 
suggested that Tetra Tech should be involved widi UTOPIA, members of UTOPIA'S board 
laughed out loud. Id. at :53-54. 
5. However, Tetra Tech's representative to UTOPIA was Ryan Marriott—Marriott's 
brother. Id. at :53-54, :57-59. Ryan Marriott was not working for Tetra Tech when it fell out 
of favor with UTOPIA See id. In fact, he worked with UTOPIA to secure a sale contract in 
Clearfield before he started working for Tetra Tech as its Utah manager. Id. 
6. After Tetra Tech made its presentation on the RFP, UTOPIA decided to consolidate 
the two RFPs into one RFP. Id. at :59-60. UTOPIA intended to award the new RFP to a 
general contractor who would oversee the entire project. Id. Corning, Inc. ("Corning") 
expressed interest in the consolidated RFP. Id. at :54-55, :59-60. Corning had just completed 
3
 See Addendum 
5 
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< 
a project in Brigham Gty for UTOPIA Id. at :54-55. So, it was anticipated that Corning 
would work as the general contractor on the consolidated RFP. Id. at :54-55, :59--60. Even 
though it had used a different subcontractor, B Jackson, in Brigham City, Coming intended 
to use Tetra Tech as a subcontractor. Id. Individuals within Corning questioned why Tetra 
Tech should replace B Jackson. Id. at :54-55. 
7. Before and after the consolidation of the RFPs, there were efforts to ensure that 
Tetra Tech receive a contract with UTOPIA. Again, Ryan Marriott, Tetra Tech's manager 
and Marriott's brother, made a presentation to UTOPIA to secure a contract for Tetra Tech. 
Id. at :59. He emailed Jarrod Pander ("Pander"), UTOPIA'S Outside Plant Manager and the 
person in charge of the consolidated RFP, about why B Jackson had received the contract in 
Brigham City. Id. at :70-71, :79-80. In the emails to Pantier, Ryan Marriott blind copied 
Marriott. Id. at :79-80, :133-34. Further, Ryan Marriott, Marriott, and Joseph Rose, a Coming 
representative, had lunch together. Id. at :133-34. After that lunch, Mr. Rose spoke with 
Chris and told him that the reason why the RFPs were consolidated was to hide Tetra Tech's 
involvement from UTOPIA'S board. Id. at :30-31, :54-55, :59-60, :71, :79. 
8. When Chris learned of Ryan Marriott's job with Tetra Tech, Tetra Tech's potential 
involvement with UTOPIA, and the efforts to hide its involvement from UTOPIA'S board, 
he was concerned. Id. He did not want Tetra Tech's involvement in a UTOPIA project to 
betray the public trust or destroy UTOPIA and could not, in good conscience, stand by and 
let UTOPIA receive $65,000,000 of taxpayer money knowing that UTOPIA, through 
Marriott, was possibly engaging in improper conduct. Id. at :32, :54-60. David Shaw 
("Shaw"), general counsel for UTOPIA, appeared to share Chris' concerns. See id. at :105, 
6 
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: 127-28. Marriott, Shaw, and Chris were eating together when Tetra Tech's involvement with 
UTOPIA came up. See id. Shaw advised Marriott to be transparent about his brother's 
involvement with Tetra Tech. Id. at :105, :127-28. 
9. After he learned from Mr. Rose that the purpose of the consolidated RFP was to hide 
Tetra Tech's involvement, Chris called Pantier to make sure that the consolidated RFP 
process remained as transparent as possible. Id. at :55. He outlined the various options that 
he believed Pantier had and warned, based on statements by Marriott, that Pander's job 
could be in danger. Id. at :55-56,: 179-80. 
10. On March 16, 2011, Pantier told Marriott about his discussion with Chris concerning 
Tetra Tech. Id. at :110. The next day, Marriott called a meeting and confronted Chris about 
the conversation. Id. at :110-11. After the meeting, Marriott and Shaw presented Chris with a 
termination agreement and informed him that his day-to-day involvement with UTOPIA 
was over. Id. at :98. Shaw then escorted Chris to the airport. Id. at :181. Marriott locked Chris 
out of UTOPIA's offices, locked him out of the systems he had used when he worked for 
UTOPIA, cut off his access to anyone within UTOPIA, attempted to evict him from the 
apartment UTOPIA was renting for him, and texted Chris' wife's cell phone the day after he 
was fired to warn Chris to keep quiet about his involvement with UTOPIA R 51; 480:36, 
:136-37. 
11. Chris began seeking redress for the wrongful termination of the Contract. R 45-91. 
He served a draft complaint on UTOPIA, sent letters outlining his concerns, demands, and 
proposed resolution of the termination, and offered to enter formal mediation with 
UTOPIA. R 87. He indicated that if UTOPIA refused to meet his demands or to negotiate, 
7 
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he would have no other choice except to file a lawsuit. & 45-57, 64-68, 87-91. He also 
expressed concern about the effect negative publicity from a lawsuit would have on 
UTOPIA. Id. 
12. In his final letter to UTOPIA, Chris advised UTOPIA that he intended to bring more 
causes of action than those asserted in his draft complaint, including a claim that his 
wrongful termination violated his First Amendment rights. R. 89. 
13. In response, UTOPIA denied all of Chris' requests, accused him of blackmail and 
extortion, and filed this lawsuit; on April 18, 2011 to prohibit Chris from "disclosing any 
information obtained during the course of rendering sendees under the [Contract]." R. 23-
30, 59-61,71-73. UTOPIA also sought declaratory judgment asking the trial court to declare 
that (a) the [Contract] expires on May 13, 2011, (b) UTOPIA has no legal duty 
to renew the [Contract], (c) UTOPIA has no legal duty to compensate above 
and beyond that compensation specified in the [Contract], and (d) UTOPIA 
owes no other legal duty to Hogan with respect to the services provided by 
Hogan to UTOPIA 
K 2 9 . 
14. In its pleadings, UTOPIA did not allege specific information which it sought to keep 
confidential or a specific threat of disclosure of information by Chris. R 1-30. Indeed, Chris 
had never threatened to disclose UTOPIA's information to a third party. See & 45-57, 64-68, 
87-91. Instead, he said that if UTOPIA was not willing to remedy his wrongful termination 
by meeting his demands or negotiating a mutually acceptable resolution, he would have no 
other choice but to file a lawsuit. Id. 
15. UTOPIA based its requests on a provision within the Contract: "[Chris] understands 
that the Services performed for UTOPIA are confidential and [Chris] agrees to maintain 
8 
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such confidentiality. This ARTICLE IV. [sic] shall survive the termination of this 
Agreement." Exhibit P-l. The Contract defines "Sendees" as "sales, marketing, business 
development, operations, IT, and engineering efforts regarding the UTOPIA network." Id. 
Chris inserted this boilerplate language into the Contract. R 480:21-23, :108-09. It was not 
reviewed by an attorney for UTOPIA or by Chris' attorney. Id. 
16. On April 19, 2011, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether a temporary 
restraining order ("TRO") should issue and whether to seal the records in this case. See R 
94-98. It issued the TRO, sealed the records, and set an evidentiary hearing for April 26, 
2011 to determine whether the TRO should be converted to a preliminary injunction. Id. 
17. UTOPIA'S purpose for requesting the TRO and preliminary injunction was to 
prevent Chris from filing a lawsuit against UTOPIA in federal court. See R 480:149-61, 
:194.4 After the issuance of the TRO but before the hearing on April 26, 2011, Chris filed a 
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Utah against UTOPIA. 
Exhibit P-9. UTOPIA argued that filing the complaint violated the TRO. R 480:149-61, 
194. 
18. Even though it wanted Chris to keep quiet about it, UTOPIA does not keep the vast 
majority of its information confidential. R 480:124-25.5 Indeed, UTOPIA is required to be a 
"transparent organization," and its information is a matter of public record because it is 
subject to the Government Records Access and Management Act ("GRAMA"). Id. Further, 
before UTOPIA can proceed with or receive funding for its projects, each city council of its 
4
 See Addendum 
5
 See Addendum 
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member cities must approve its proposed actions. Id. at :173. To obtain this approval, 
UTOPIA makes presentations to each city council during public city council meetings. Id. 
19. UTOPIA'S representatives, including Marriott and Chris, have made many 
presentations during which they disclose minute details about UTOPIA to government 
entities and private businesses. Id. a t : 172-74. Marriott and Chris have been interviewed and 
quoted by various media outlets, including the Salt Lake Tribune, explaining many details of 
UTOPIA Id. An example of UTOPIA's interaction with the media can be found at 
http://www.sltrib.com/ sltrib/money/50559763-79/utopia-network-uia^ R 
188. UTOPIA also encouraged Chris to discuss the minute details of UTOPIA'S sales, 
marketing, business development, operations, IT, and engineering efforts with everyone 
interested. R 480:172-74.* 
20. At a hearing on April 26, 2011, the trial court determined that UTOPIA was not 
entitled to a preliminary injunction and found that UTOPIA had not alleged or proved a 
specific threat of disclosure of information by Chris and that none of the information Chris 
said could harm UTOPIA was confidential. Id. at :209-117 It also concluded that Rule 65A 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not create an independent cause of action, that 
UTOPIA'S request for declaratory relief was not valid, and that UTOPIA had not brought a 
valid cause of action that would support an injunction under the rule. Id. at :206-07. 
However, it reserved whether or not to unseal the record in this case. Id. at :211-13.. 
21. On April 27, 2011, UTOPIA filed a notice to dismiss this case and a notice of 
withdrawal of Motion to Seal the Records, even though the trial court had already entered an 
6
 See Addendum 
7
 See Addendum 
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order sealing the case. R 123. It then employed its public relations firm to handle any 
negative publicity from Chris5 federal lawsuit by providing sealed court documents to 
authors who would later write defamatory articles about Chris that cast him in a false light. 
R 251-54; 482:6-7. UTOPIA admitted that it immediately disclosed documents in the court 
file to its stakeholders. This admission is not in the record, but Chris respectfully requests 
that this Court take judicial notice of it under Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. A 
news article containing the admission is attached in the addendum. 
22. On Sunday, May 1, 2011, KSL.com published an article by Richard Burwash (the 
KSL article) tided "Former UTOPIA contractor accused of extortion."8 R 251, 258-59. The 
article claims its source is "court documents that were unsealed in Utah's 3rd District Court 
on Wednesday, [April 27, 2011]." Id. On Monday, May 2, 2011, wwwiiercetelecom.com 
published an article by Sean Buckley (the fiercetelecom article) called, "UTOPIA contractor 
faces extortion charges."9 R 252, 261-62. Both articles misrepresent facts, inaccurately 
attribute statements to Chris, and misquote statements made in documents which were filed 
with UTOPIAs pleadings. R 251-53, 258-62. But they do not mention that this case was 
filed to enjoin Chris from disclosing information about UTOPIA to the public or that 
UTOPIA was not entided to the injunction. Id. 
23. The KSL article and fiercetelecom article imply that in this lawsuit Chris faces civil or 
criminal charges of extortion and blackmail. Id. The intended or expected effect of the 
articles was to defame Chris, taint public opinion of him, and destroy his reputation in the 
marketing industry in which he had worked for 25 years. Id. 
8
 See Addendum 
9
 See Addendum 
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24. Mayor Michael Winder, whose city, West Valley Qty,10 is the largest UTOPIA 
stakeholder, accessed the sealed court documents. On November 11, 2011, he revealed that 
he is the "Richard Burwash" who wrote the KSL article. Chris respectfully requests that this 
Court take judicial notice of these facts under Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
25. Despite the assertions in. the articles, the records in this case remained sealed. R 126. 
In fact, Hugh Matheson went to the Matheson Courthouse on May 5, 2011 to review a copy 
of the complaint in this case. K 125-26. When he spoke with a court clerk, the clerk said that 
the records were sealed and that he would need a judge's order to see them. R. 126. 
26. On May 5, 2011, Chris was on the internet and found a website called Crime Jungle 
that provided a link to the KSL article. R. 252. Crime Jungle purports to report "Crime news 
from thousands of newspapers, magazines, web portals and blogs." Id. Crime Jungle reprints 
the KSL article's headline, "Former UTOPIA contractor accused of extortion." R. 265-66. It 
then quotes the first line of the KSL article, "Chris Hogan, a Colorado man retained by 
UTOPIA as a contractor to provide consulting services, is being accused of extoition in 
court documents that were unsealed in..."11 R 266. At least fourteen other websites repeat 
the false allegation that Chris faced extortion or blackmail charges. R 275-316.12 
27. Chris filed a motion for an order to show cause on May 9, 2011, which would require 
UTOPIA to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for distributing sealed 
records in this case and why it should not pay Chris' attorney fees that he incurred in 
10
 West Valley Qty is a member of the UTOPIA network R 47 
11
 See Addendum 
12
 Notably, the court file contains no reference to allegations that Chris was facing extortion 
charges. 
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bringing the order to show cause. R 223-24. The trial court issued an order to show cause 
and set a hearing date. See R 354. 
28. Chris also moved for the trial court to award him the significant attorney fees he 
incurred in defending against this lawsuit under Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Qvil 
Procedure ("Rule 65A) and Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 ("Section 825")- R 129-140; 186-
203; 427-33; 453-54. 
29. On May 16, 2011, the trial court unsealed the records in this case. R 467-68; 483:28. 
However, before doing so, the trial court struck from the file certain language. Id. 
30. On June 13, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on Chris' motion for attorney fees 
and on its order to show cause. R 482:2. On the motion for attorney fees, the trial court 
concluded that Chris was the prevailing party in the lawsuit but, nevertheless, was not 
entitled to attorney fe^s under Rule 65A or Section 825. R 466B; 482:22-25.13 The trial court 
did not explain why it denied Chris' motion for attorney fees under Section 825 but reasoned 
that under Rule 65A, a prevailing party is not entitled to attorney fees. R 482:23. Rather, it 
concluded that to receive attorney fees under Rule 65A, a party must show that he was 
restrained by a wrongful order and that a wrongful order only results when a request for a 
TRO or preliminary injunction is frivolous or brought in bad faith. Id. Finally, it did not find 
frivolousness or bad faith because the Contract had a confidentiality agreement. Id. at :24-25. 
See Addendum 
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31. The trial court also held that the order to show cause became moot when the trial 
court unsealed the records in the case and that an order sealing records only prohibits court 
clerks, not parties, from disclosing records to a third party. & 466B; 482:12-13.14 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I: Chris is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees under Rule 65A of the Utah 
Rules of Qvil Procedure ("Rule 65A"). Under Rule 65A, a party restrained by a temporary 
restraining order ("TRO5') who successfully defends against the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction is entitled to an award of attorney fees. A party is wrongfully restrained by a TRO 
if it is later determined that the applicant was not entitled to it. Under Rule 65A, the award 
of attorney fees must be limited to those fees that would not have been incurred but for the 
application for, and issuance of, an injunction.. 
Chris was wrongfully restrained. The trial court issued a TRO against Chris on April 
19, 2011. On April 26, 2011, it held a hearing to determine whether the TRO should be 
converted to a preliminary injunction. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded 
that UTOPIA (the applicant) was not entitled to an injunction. Therefore, Chris is entitled to 
an award of the expenses and attorney fees he incurred to defend against the issuance of the 
TRO and a preliminary injunction. 
Additionally, Chris is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-5-825 (2008) ("Section 825"). There are three requirements for a party to receive 
attorney fees under Section 82,5: (1) The party must be a prevailing party, (2) the lawsuit 
must be without merit, and (3) the lawsuit must have been brought in bad faith. 
14
 See id. 
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First, Chris was the prevailing party because he prevailed under UTOPIA's first cause 
of action on its merits. The first cause of action requested a preliminary injunction. And the 
trial court denied the request for a preliminary injunction.15 
Second, both causes of action in this lawsuit lacked merit because UTOPIA did not 
bring a valid underlying cause of action. The first cause of action was its request for a 
preliminary injunction. The trial court found that a request for a preliminary injunction is not 
a valid cause of action in a complaint. Even if a request for a preliminary injunction were a 
valid cause of action, UTOPIA's request for a preliminary injunction was, nevertheless, 
meritless for four reasons: UTOPIA's purpose in requesting the preliminary injunction was 
to prevent Chris, in violation of his constitutionally protected rights, from filing a lawsuit; 
the information UTOPIA sought to restrain Chris from disclosing was contained in public 
records; the confidentiality clause was unenforceable, and Chris never made any threats to 
disclose confidential information. 
UTOPIA's second cause of action was a request for declaratory relief. This too was 
meritless. First, the request that the trial court declare that the parties' Contract expired on 
May 13, 2011 is of little weight or importance and clearly lacks a legal basis for recovery. 
Second, other than its first request for declaratory relief, none of UTOPIA's requests for 
declaratory relief asked for a declaration of rights "arising under" the Contract Instead, 
UTOPIA asked the trial court to look beyond the Contract to declare that Chris was not 
allowed to bring any causes of action other than breach of contract. 
15
 Although the court expressed the opinion that UTOPIA could not prevail on the second 
cause of action for declaratory relief in the context of the factors of the preliminary 
injunction, the court did not specifically dismiss the second cause of action on its merits. 
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Third, UTOPIA brought the first cause of action in this lawsuit in bad faith. 
UTOPIA brought this lawsuit to silence Chris contrary to the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution and to Utah public policy. Plaintiff failed to identify in its complaint or in the 
hearing before the trial court either any information which it considered to be confidential or 
any information which Chris had threatened to disclose. UTOPIA is a governmental 
cooperative subject to GRAMA 
The second cause of action was also brought in bad faith. UTOPIA knew that it 
could not enforce the confidentiality clause of the contract and had never attempted to 
enforce it against Chris until after it fired him for talking to Pantier about Tetra Tech's 
potential involvement with UTOPIA Next, and most importantly, UTOPIA never wanted 
Chris to keep its information confidential until it fired him for raising his concerns about the 
propriety of Tetra Tech's involvement with UTOPIA. UTOPIA'S motivation to bring this 
lawsuit was to hinder Chris' ability to file a lawsuit in the United States District Court. It 
claimed that when he filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court after the trial court 
issued a TRO, Chris violated the TRO. Fuither, after the trial court denied the preliminary 
injunction, UTOPIA disclosed records that had been sealed in this case with the apparent 
intent of misrepresenting the actions of Chris to the public and cast him in a false light. 
Issue II: UTOPIA acted in contempt of court when it distributed sealed records in 
this case. The trial court made an error of lawr, thus abusing its discretion, by concluding that 
an order sealing court records does not prohibit represented parties from disclosing sealed 
documents to third parties. Using the canons of construction reveals that an order sealing 
records in a case applies to everyone, not just court clerks. Reading Chapter 4, Article 2 of 
16 
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the Utah Code of Judicial Administration ("Article 2") in harmony with the Governmental 
Records Access and Management Act ("GRAMA") reveals that an order sealing records 
applies to everyone with lawful access to sealed records. Article 2 was promulgated under the 
authority granted to it under GRAMA Under GRAMA, any person with lawful access to 
non-public court records cannot intentionally disclose, provide a copy of, or improperly use 
the non-pubKc court records. UTOPIA intentionally disclosed non-public, court records in 
this case to third parties. Additionally, case law from other jurisdictions reveals that a court 
may hold any person who violates an order in contempt, even if the order was not directed 
at him. Therefore, UTOPIA acted in contempt of court. 
Further, when it unsealed the records in this case, the trial court did not moot the 
order to show cause. An issue is moot if the court cannot grant the relief requested. Chris 
requested that the trial court hold UTOPIA in contempt of court and impose sanctions 
against it, including but not limited to requiring it to pay Chris' attorney fees. The trial court 
still had the ability to hold UTOPIA in contempt and impose sanctions against it for 
violating its order sealing the records. If the trial court's meaning was that the unsealing of 
the records was inevitable so there was no prejudice, the trial court is in error. In fact, the 
trial court itself determined that a section of the documents would be prejudicial to include 
in the court file when it struck that language before unsealing the file. 
Issue III: This Court should award Chris the attorney fees he has incurred on 
appeal. A party who is entitled to attorney fees and costs on the trial court level is also 
entitled to attorney fees when he prevails on appeal. Chris is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees and costs on the trial court level under Rule 65A and Section 825. Chris is also entitled 
17 
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to attorney fees incurred on the trial court level because of UTOPIA's contempt. Therefore, 
Chris is also entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred when it denied Chris' request for attorney fees. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it refused to award Chris attorney fees. 
This Court reviews the denial of attorney fees for correctness. IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. 
Crook, 2000 UT App 217, \ 9, 6 P.3d 1143. This Court should reverse the trial court's denial 
of Chris' motion for attorney fees and remand this case for a determination of the proper 
award of costs and attorney fees. 
A. Chris was wrongfully restrained and is entitled to the award of costs and 
attorney fees. 
Chris is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees under Rule 65A of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 65A"). Under Rule 65A, a party restrained by a temporary 
restraining order (£CTRO") who successfully defends against the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction is entitled to an award of attorney fees. IKON Office Solutions, Inc., 2000 UT App 
217, \ 13; see also Mountain States Tel. <& Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright (& Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 
1258, 1262 (Utah 1984) superseded in part by U.&GP. 65A(c)(2); Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d 
592, 597 (Utah App. 1993). To obtain attorney fees under Rule 65A, a party must have been 
wrongfully restrained; further, the award of attorney fees must be limited to those fees that 
would not have been incurred "but for the application for, and issuance of, [an] injunction." 
Tholen, 849 P.2d at 597; see also Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co., 681 P.2d at 1262; IKON Office 
Solutions, Inc., 2000 UT App 217, ffi| 13, 17. 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that a person is not 
wrongfully restrained unless the request for a TRO or preliminary injunction under Rule 65A 
is frivolous or brought in bad faith. Wrongful restraint does not require frivolousness or bad 
faith. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 681 P.2d at 1262. Rather, a party is wrongfully restrained 
if, after the issuance of a TRO, it is later determined that the TRO should not have been 
issued. Id. Chris was wrongfully restrained because UTOPIA could not prove a basis for the 
restraint. Because the motion for preliminary injunction was dismissed, the court was 
required as a matter of law to award attorneys fees to Chris. 
In Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company ("Mountain States") had been 
wrongfully restrained by a non-frivolous, good faith application for a TRO and preliminary 
injunction. Id. at 1262. Mountain States mistakenly listed the telephone number of two 
competing law firms as the same number. Id. at 1260. When Mountain States learned of the 
error, it placed a mechanical device that intercepted phone calls to the number and informed 
callers about the correct telephone numbers for the firms. Id. The law firm that had been 
receiving all of the phone calls (and presumptively all of the business) applied for and 
obtained a TRO and preliminary injunction requiring Mountain States to stop intercepting 
the firm's phone calls. Id. at 1260-61. The injunction was later vacated, and Mountain States 
brought an action to recover the costs and attorney fees it had incurred. Id. at 1261. The trial 
court denied the request for attorney fees because it concluded that "there was no evidence 
of wrongful restraint". Id. at 1261-62. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court because 
""Wrongful' does not necessarily connote bad faith or connivance." Id. at 1262. It concluded, 
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"[a]n injunction is wrongfully issued ... if it is finally determined that the applicant was not 
entitled to the injunction/' Id. 
Like the trial court in Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, the trial court in 
this case incorrectly defined "wrongfully restrained." It concluded that ''wrongful restraint" 
requires frivolousness or bad faith. Its conclusion was contrary to precedent and wrong. 
If it had followed precedent, the trial court would have concluded that Chris was 
wrongfully restrained. The trial court issued a TRO against Chris on April 19, 2011. On 
April 26, 2011, it held a hearing to determine whether the TRO should be converted to a 
preliminary injunction. After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that UTOPIA 
(the applicant) was not entitled to an injunction. Thus, Chris was entitled to the attorney fees 
he incurred to defend against the TRO and preliminary injunction. 
. A wrongfully restrained person is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees that 
he would not have been incurred "but for the application for, and issuance o f an injunction 
under Rule 65A Tholen, 849 P.2d at 597; see also Mountain States Tel, & Tel. Co., 681 P.2d at 
1262; IKON Office Solutions, Inc., 2000 UT App 217, ffij 13, 17. The trial court did not award 
any attorneys fees to Chris. It did not determine the amount of attorney fees that Chris 
would not have incurred but for the application for and issuance of an injunction under Rule 
65A. Because the trial court applied an erroneous standard for "wrongful restraint", this 
Court should remand this case to the trial court for it to determine the amount of attorney 
fees Chris should receive under Rule 65A 
B. Chris is entitled to attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 (2008). 
In addition to being entitled to attorney fees under Rule 65A, Chris is entitled to 
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attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 (2008) ("Section 825")- The trial court 
erred as a matter of law when it failed to award Chris all of the attorney fees he incurred in 
this lawsuit. This Court should reverse the trial court's decision not to award attorney fees 
and remand this case for the determination of the amount of costs and attorney fees Chris is 
entitled to receive under Section 825. 
There are three requirements for a party to receive attorney fees under Section 825: 
(1) The party must be a prevailing party; (2) the lawsuit must be without merit, and (3) the 
lawsuit must have been brought in bad faith. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825; Gallegos v. Lloyd, 
2008 UT App 40, f 9, 178 P.3d 922. 
1. Chris is a prevailing party in this lawsuit. 
Chris is a prevailing party under section 825. To qualify as a prevailing party, the party 
"must obtain at least some relief on the merits." Ault v. Ho/den, 2002 UT 33, f 48, 44 P.3d 
781. A party who defeats the imposition of an injunction is a prevailing party. Me. Sch. 
Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. & Mrs. R, 321 F.3d 9, 15-17 (1st Or. 2003). Chris defeated the 
imposition of an injunction against him. Indeed, the trial court expressly found that Chris 
prevailed in this lawsuit. Therefore, Chris is a prevailing party under Section 825. 
2. UTOPIA'S lawsuit is without merit. 
UTOPIA'S lawsuit against Chris is meridess. Lawsuits are without merit if they are 
"frivolous,16 [are] of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact, or clearly [lack 
a] legal basis for recovery." Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, \ 30, 61 
16
 Frivolous means, "Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably 
purposeful." Black's Law Dictionary 692 (8th ed. 2004). Thus, "frivolous" and without 
merit" are synonymous. 
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P.3d 1009 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also In re Olympus Constr., L.C, 2009 
UT 29, TJ 30, 215 P.3d 129. The trial court concluded that this lawsuit was not meritless 
because there was a confidentiality clause in the Contract. While this finding of fact is 
correct, the trial court erred when it concluded that it prevented UTOPIA'S lawsuit from 
being meritless for the reasons described below. 
a. UTOPIA'S claim for a preliminary injunction is 
meritless. 
UTOPIA's request for a preliminary injunction under Rule 65A is meritless., Rule 65A 
does not create an independent cause of action. See U.RCP. 65A. Indeed, to obtain a 
preliminary injunction under Rule 65A, a party must have an underlying cause of action. See 
id. at 65A(e)(4). UTOPIA, as found by the trial court and as discussed below, did not bring a 
valid underlying cause of action that would sustain its request for a preliminary injunction. 
Rather the request for the preliminary injunction was pled as the cause of action itself. 
Even if a request for preliminary injunction could constitute a valid cause of action, 
UTOPIA's request for a preliminary injunction is, nevertheless, meritless for at least four 
reasons: UTOPIA's purpose in requesting the preliminary injunction was to prevent Chris, 
in violation of his constitutionally protected rights, from filing a lawsuit; the information 
UTOPIA sought to restrain Chris from disclosing was contained in public records;17 the 
confidentiality clause was unenforceable; and UTOPIA could not identify any facts 
supporting a claim that Chris made any threats to disclose confidential information. 
1. This lawsuit violated constitutional protections. 
17
 UTOPIA did not plead or identify to the court at trial any information which it considered 
to be confidential. 
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UTOPIA'S purpose in seeking a preliminary injunction was to prevent Chris, in 
violation of his constitutionally protected rights, from filing a lawsuit. See R 480:149-61, 194. 
The Utah Constitution guarantees every person the right to redress injuries suffered to "his 
person, property or reputation" through the judicial process and prohibits a person from 
being "barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State ... any civil 
cause to which he is a party." Utah Const art. I, § 11. Chris gave notice to UTOPIA that he 
intended to file a suit for wrongful termination. Chris warned the director of outside plant 
operations, Jarrod Pantier, that UTOPIA was considering a contract that would secredy 
benefit Marriott's brother. He said this would appear to be bid rigging if it was not disclosed 
to the board ahead of time. The expression of this concern to Pantier resulted in Marriott 
firing Chris. These facts are essential to prove that Chris was wrongfully terminated. Any 
injunction that could be construed to prohibit Chris from bringing a lawsuit for wrongful 
termination would violate his constitutional rights. 
Nevertheless, by UTOPIA'S own admission, the purpose of the TRO and preliminary 
injunction was to prohibit Chris from filing a lawsuit to redress the injuries he suffered after 
UTOPIA terminated the contract. R 480:149-61, 194. Indeed, UTOPIA alleged that when 
he filed the lawsuit in federal court, Chris had violated the TRO the trial court entered in this 
case. Id. Therefore, UTOPIA's purpose in seeking the TRO and preliminary injunction was 
to violate Chris' constitutionally protected rights, and such a purpose "clearly [lacks a] legal 
basis for recovery." Wardley 'better Homes <& Gardens, 2002 UT 99, f 30. 
2. UTOPIA's information was public 
There was no factual basis for recovery because there was no information about 
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UTOPIA that it could claim was confidential. UTOPIA is subject to GRAMA Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-2-103(ll) (2010). The purpose of GRAMA is to provide the public access to 
government information while protecting the private information of Utah's citizens. Id. § 
63G-2-102 (2008). With a few exceptions;, all information about UTOPIA and in its 
possession is public record that must be disclosed upon request to anyone who wants it. Id. § 
63G-2-301 (2009). In fact, all of the information about UTOPIA and all information in its 
possession is presumptively public, and UTOPIA would bear the burden to prove that it is 
not. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-201(2) (2010); Deseret News Publ'g Co. v. Salt Lake County, 
2008 UT 26,1j 53, 182 P.3d 372. Among other information that UTOPIA must disclose to 
the public upon request are "records documenting the sendees provided by a contractor or a 
private provider," "contracts entered into by a governmental entity;" and "any account, 
voucher, or contract that deals with the receipt or expenditure of funds by a governmental 
entity." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-301(3) (2009). That is, all of the records—with the 
exception of Chris' personal information—that relate to Chris5 contract with UTOPIA and 
the performance of it are all public record. Further, UTOPIA was unable to identify for the 
trial court any confidential information which it could have protected from the public. K 
480:209-11. 
Additionally, all of the information related to UTOPLVs sales, marketing, business 
development, operations, IT, and engineering efforts have been disclosed in public city 
council meetings. Before UTOPIA can move forward on any of its projects, each of the city 
councils of UTOPIA'S member cities must approve of UTOPIA'S proposed actions. City 
council meetings are open to the public, and their details must be disclosed under GRAMA 
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Any information that Chris included in his notice to UTOPIA in the form of a draft 
complaint was not and never was confidential. GRAMA mandates that UTOPIA disclose 
information related to its dealings with Chris to anyone who requests it. UTOPIA has 
revealed its details in public and private meetings and to the media. And it has encouraged 
Chris to speak openly about UTOPIA operations with everyone who wanted to know about 
UTOPIA Therefore, UTOPIA cannot claim that any of the information contained in Chris' 
complaint was confidential. UTOPIA should have known that its attempt to protect 
information was without merit when it filed this case. 
3. The confidentiality clause in Chris' contract was 
not enforceable. 
There was no legal basis for the preliminary injunction because the confidentiality 
clause is unenforceable. Contractual provisions in violation of public policy are 
unenforceable. See Dmffner v. Mrs. Fields, 828 P.2d 1075, 1080 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Public 
policy prohibits a government entity from entering into "enforceable promises of 
confidentiality regarding public records." Tribune-Review PubFg Co. v. Westmoreland County Hous. 
Auth., 833 A.2d 112, 120 (Pa. 2003). In Tribune-Review Pub. Co., a government housmg 
agency's employee sued it in federal court for gender discrimination and fostering a hostile 
work environment. Id. at 114. The housing agency settled with the employee, and the two 
entered into a non-disclosure agreement. Id. A local newspaper wanted to review the 
setdement documents and made a request under Pennsylvania laws that are similar to Utah's 
GRAMA laws. Tribune-Review Puk Co., 833 Au2d at 114; compare also Pa. Cons. Stat § 67.101 et 
seq & Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-101 et seq. The housing agency claimed that the settlement 
agreement could not be disclosed because it was subject to a confidentiality agreement, 
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which agreement was "material to the setdement and should not be abrogated." Tribune-
Review Pub. Co., 833 A2d at 114-15. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered that the 
settlement agreement be disclosed because it was a public record and it was contrary to 
public policy to allow government entities to enter into confidentiality agreements about 
public records. Id. at 117,120. 
Like Pennsylvania, Utah's statutes require governmental entities to disclose all public 
records. As discussed, under GRAMA, all of the information UTOPIA sought to keep 
confidential is public record. It is against public policy for government entities to enter into 
confidentiality agreements about public records. Therefore, UTOPIA, a government entity, 
could not enter into an enforceable confidentiality agreement with Chris. 
Even if it did not violate public policy, UTOPIA could not enforce the confidentiality 
clause because UTOPIA waived it. A party waives a contractual provision by intentionally 
relinquishing it. Watkins v. Ford, 2010 UT App 243, % 17, 239 P.3d 526. There are three 
elements to prove waiver of a contractual right: (1) the existence of a "right, benefit, or 
advantage," (2) "knowledge of its existence," and (3) "an intention to relinquish it." Id. A 
party manifests its intention to relinquish a known right by acting "in a manner inconsistent 
with its contractual rights." Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. State Dep't of Tramp., 2011 UT 35, 
H 45, Utah Adv. Rep. 32. First, the Contract contained a confidentiality clause that purported 
to restrict Chris from disclosing UTOPIA'S information related to sales, marketing, business 
development, operations, IT, and engineering efforts. Second, UTOPIA knew about the 
confidentiality clause because Marriott signed the Contract and UTOPIA later tried to 
enforce it. 
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Moreover, third, UTOPIA intentionally relinquished its rights under the 
confidentiality clause by acting in a manner inconsistent with it. Chris worked for UTOPIA 
for several years. During that time, Chris disclosed UTOPIA'S minute details during his 
many presentations to government entities and private businesses. K 480:172-74. Various 
media outlets interviewed and quoted Chris about UTOPIA In fact, UTOPIA encouraged 
Chris to discuss the minute details of UTOPIA'S sales, marketing, business development, 
operations, IT, and engineering efforts with everyone interested. That is, UTOPIA 
encouraged Chris to violate the confidentiality clause. Therefore, UTOPIA waived the 
confidentiality clause. 
4. There were no threats to disclose confidential 
information. 
There was no factual basis for recovery because Chris has never threatened to 
disclose confidential information of UTOPIA. He only stated that if he and UTOPIA could 
not resolve his wrongful termination then he would file a lawsuit. He did not make any 
threats to disclose confidential information to the media or anyone else. Throughout his 
dealings with UTOPIA, Chris promoted ideas to protect the public trust, including making 
its operations transparent to the public which it served. None of these suggestions 
constituted a threat to reveal confidential information. 
Because UTOPIA should have known that it could not prevent Chris from filing a 
lawsuit—as it intended, it did not have any information that could be deemed confidential, 
the confidentiality clause was unenforceable, and Chris never threatened to disclose 
confidential information, this lawsuit is frivolous. It is of little weight or importance having 
no basis in law or fact, or clearly lacking a legal basis for recovery. Therefore, even if a 
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request for a preliminary injunction is a valid claim, UTOPIA'S request for a preliminary 
injunction is meritless. 
b . UTOPIA'S request for declaratory relief is merit less. 
Like its request for a preliminary injunction, UTOPIA'S request for declaratory relief 
is meritless. A party may seek declaratory relief under a contract, but that relief is limited to 
determining the "construction or validity" of the contract and "obtaining] a declaration of 
rights, status, or other legal relations" "arising under" the contract. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-
408 (2008). UTOPIA asked for the trial court to make four declarations: (1) that the 
Contract "expires on May 13, 2011," (2) that "UTOPIA has no legal duty to renew die 
[Contract]," (3) that "UTOPIA has no legal duty to compensate above and beyond that 
compensation specified in the [Contract]," and (4) that "UTOPIA owes no other legal duty 
to [Chris] with respect to the sendees provided by [Chris] to UTOPIA." R. 29. 
There are two problems with UTOPIA'S requests for declaratory relief First, its 
request that the trial court declare that the Contract expired on May 13, 2011 is of little 
weight or importance and clearly lacks a legal basis for recovery. It is undisputed that the 
Contract expired on its own terms on May 13, 2011, and Chris never requested to recover 
under the express contract beyond May 13, 2011. See R 49-50, 56-57. Indeed, he limited his 
claims under the Contract only to the compensation he would have received under it. Id. 
Therefore, the declaration that the Contract expired on May 13, 2011 is of liule weight or 
importance and would not affect any disputed rights under the Contract. 
Second, other than its first request for declaratory relief, none of UTOPIA'S requests 
for declaratory relief asked for a declaration of rights "arising under" the Contract. A request 
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for declaratory relief arises under a contract if it "contemplates the application of the 
contract" or requires "evaluating] the terms of the contract as well as the rights and duties 
of the parties under the contract" Peterson & Simpson v. IRC Health Servs., Inc., 2009 UT 54, f 
20, 217 P.3d 716. UTOPIA'S requests that the trial court declare that UTOPIA had no legal 
duty to renew the Contract, had no legal duty to compensate above and beyond that 
compensation specified in the Contract, and owed no other legal duty to Chris with respect 
to the services provided by Chris to UTOPIA would require the trial court to look beyond 
the Contract. 
In the employment context, contracts are not the exclusive source of duties an 
employer owes its employees or contractors. For example, employers are liable to employees 
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel for a promise to renew an employment contract 
even when the employment contract does guarantee its renewal. See Parnigoni v. St. Co lumbal 
Nursery School, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24-26 (D.D.C 2010). Indeed, promissory estoppel is a 
cause of action that arises when "no formal contract exists." YounMood v. Auto-Owners Ins. 
Co., 2007 UT 28, \ 18, 158 P.3d 1088 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Furthermore, government employers have additional duties to their employees and 
those that contract with them. For example, government employers have a duty not to take 
adverse action against an employee or contractor for exercising his First-amendment rights. 
Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1996). They also have a duty not to 
take adverse action against a person working for them under an express or implied contract 
for hire if the person reports that the government employer is engaging in waste, violations 
of the law, or attempted violations of the law. Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-2, -3 (2007 & 2010). 
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They also have a duty not to terminate employees in violation of public policy. Touchard v. 
La-Z-Boy Inc., 2006 UT 71, f 4, 148 P.3d 945. These claims do not depend on the terms of a 
contract. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 685-86; Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-2, -3; Touchard, 2006 UT 
71, K 4. Therefore, any claim for promissory estoppel, taking adverse action for exercising 
First-amendment rights, taking adverse action for reporting government waste, violations of 
the law, or attempted violations of the law, and wrongfully terminating an employee in 
violation of public policy would arise under duties independent of an employment contract. 
UTOPIA'S declaratory action seeks to prevent Chris from bringing claims that did 
not arise under the Contract. When it filed its lawsuit, UTOPIA knew that Chris intended to 
bring a First-amendment claim and a claim for promissory estoppel.18 It was under these two 
claims that Chris asserted damages beyond those which resulted from UTOPIA'S breach of 
contract. In its declaratory relief action, UTOPIA was asking the trial court to state that 
Chris could not bring the First-amendment claim, promissory estoppel claim, wrongful 
termination claim, claim that he was terminated for reporting suspected government waste 
or violations of the law, or any other claim that did not arise under the Contract. But the trial 
court could not do so because these claims do not arise under the Contract. 
Therefore, UTOPIA'S requests for declaratory relief are meridess. The request for the 
trial court to declare that the Contract expired on May 13, 2011 is of little weight or 
importance and would not affect UTOPIA's rights under the contract And declaratory relief 
was not available for matters outside of die parties' contract. 
18
 Chris had not asserted a claim under Utah Code. Ann. § 67-21-3 when UTOPIA filed 
this case, but the claim was included in the actual complaint filed in federal court. See 
Exhibit P-9. 
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3. UTOPIA brought this lawsuit in bad faith. 
Further, UTOPIA brought this meritless action in bad faith. A party brings a lawsuit 
in bad faith if the trial court finds sufficient evidence of any one of the following facts: "(i) 
[t]he party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party 
intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted 
with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others." 
Gallegos, 2008 UT App 40, If 15 (internal citations and quotations omitted); Still Standing 
Stable, "LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, \ 13, 122 P.3d 556. 
a. Evidence in support of the trial court's finding that 
UTOPIA did not act in bad faith. 
Bad faith is a finding of fact. Gallegos, 2008 UT App 40, f^ 15. Therefore, to challenge 
the trial court's finding that UTOPIA did not act in bad faith, Chris must first marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's finding that UTOPIA did not act in bad faith. 
U R A P . 24(a)(9). 
Chris hereby incorporates by reference the evidence in his statement of facts as if set 
forth in full herein to meet his burden to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
finding. Chris emphasizes the following evidence inasmuch as it especially supports the trial 
court's finding: Chris and UTOPIA entered into a contract containing a confidentiality 
clause. Exhibit P-l. Id. UTOPIA requested a TRO and preliminary injunction to prevent 
Chris "from disclosing any information obtained during the course of rendering sendees 
under the [Contract]." R. 29. Chris served UTOPIA with a draft complaint and several 
letters that informed UTOPIA that he intended to file a lawsuit which included information 
he obtained while working for UTOPIA. Exhibits P-2, P-6; R. 64-68, 87-91. Chris expressed 
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concerns about the appearance of bid rigging and his concern that the media would destroy 
UTOPIA after he filed a lawsuit. See Exhibit P-6; R 64-68, 87-91. UTOPIA is a quasi 
governmental entity which subjects it to public scrutiny and UTOPIA perceived as a threat 
Chris5 expressed concerns about the media attacking UTOPIA after he filed a lawsuit. See R 
23-29. Chris asked for $219,000 to settle his claims against UTOPIA Exhibits P-2, P-6; R 
64-68,87-91. 
b. UTOPIA lacked an honest belief in the propriety of 
requesting the trial court to restrain Chris from 
disclosing confidential information. 
UTOPIA lacked an honest belief in the propriety of its actions. It could not enforce 
the confidentiality clause of the contract. In fact, it had never attempted to enforce it against 
Chris until after if fired him for talking to Pantier about Tetra Tech's potential involvement 
with UTOPIA 
First, UTOPIA knew that it could not enforce the confidentiality clause of the 
contract. As discussed above, the confidentiality clause violates public policy and GRAMA 
UTOPIA knows that it is subject to GRAMA Further, UTOPIA knew that throughout the 
entire time that Chris worked for it, it intentionally acted in a manner contrary to its rights 
under the confidentiality clause by encouraging Chris to discuss the minute details of 
UTOPIA'S sales, marketing, business development, operations, IT, and engineering efforts 
with everyone interested. 
Second, and most importantly, UTOPIA never wanted Chris to keep its information 
confidential until it fired him for raising his concerns about the propriety of Tetra Tech's 
involvement with UTOPIA. When it fired him for raising his concerns about Tetra Tech's 
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proposed involvement with it, UTOPIA attempted to silence Chris. On March 18, 2011, 
Marriott sent Chris a text: 
Chris, FYI under article 4, the services you have performed are confidential 
and you have agreed to maintain the confidentiaelity [sic] of the same. 
Discussion of your internal knowledge of Utopia as result of the Services you 
have performed with any person or entity is in violation, of article 4. You are 
directed to cease and desist all such activities. 
Exhibit P-2, p. 6. Then, when Chris announced his intention to file a lawsuit for bemg 
wrongfully terminated, UTOPIA wrongfully restrained him with a TRO and attempted to 
obtain a preliminary injunction to prevent him from filing a lawsuit. 
UTOPIA'S actions related to the confidentiality clause in the Contract are simply 
dishonest. UTOPIA, through Marriott, signed the Contract. Knowing that it had a 
confidentiality clause about the services he was performing for it, UTOPIA allowed and 
encouraged Chris to discuss minute details about those services with anyone who wanted to 
know. Then, after it fired him, it tried to prevent Chris from discussing those same details 
with anyone. One simply must wonder how UTOPIA could ask for a TRO and preliminary 
injunction to enforce the confidentiality clause with an honest belief in the propriety of its 
actions when it knew that during the years it employed Chris it had encouraged him to 
violate the confidentiality clause again and again. 
c. UTOPIA brought this lawsuit to hinder Chris5 ability to 
file a lawsuit in the United States District Court. 
UTOPIA also acted in bad faith because the purpose of the injunction was to hinder 
Chris' ability to file a lawsuit. "Hinder" means "to delay, impede, or prevent action." 
Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/hinder (last visited Nov. 7, 2011); see also Petrovit^ky v. Brigham, 47 P. 666, 667 
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(Utah 1897); Purkey v. Green, 28 Fed. Appx. 736, 747 (10th Or. 2001) 0udge Henry 
concurring and dissenting). As already discussed, the Utah Constitution guarantees every 
person the right to redress injuries suffered to "his person, property or reputation" through 
the judicial process and prohibits a person from being "barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State ... any civil cause to which he is a party/' Utah 
Const, art. I, § 11. That is, every person within the State of Utah has the right to file a 
lawsuit. Id, 
Nevertheless, UTOPIA's purpose in seeking a preliminary injunction was to prevent 
Chris from filing a lawsuit. By UTOPIA's own admission during the -preliminary injunction 
hearing, the purpose of the TRO and preliminary injunction was to prohibit Chris from 
filing a lawsuit to redress the injuries he suffered after UTOPIA terminated its contract with 
him. Indeed, UTOPIA alleged that when he filed the lawsuit in federal court, Chris had 
violated the TRO the trial court entered in this case. That is, UTOPIA intended to impede 
or prevent Chris from filing a lawsuit against it by obtaining a TRO and preliminary 
injunction against him. Therefore, UTOPIA acted in bad faith because it intended to hinder 
Chris' ability to file a lawsuit against it. 
d. UTOPIA's actions subsequent to the preliminary 
injunction hearing revealed that it was motivated by 
bad faith. 
Even though it sought and obtained an order sealing the records in this case, 
UTOPIA disclosed the sealed records to third parties with the apparent intent of publishing 
defamatory information to misrepresent the actions of Chris to the public. On the weekend 
after the trial court determined that UTOPIA was not entitled to an injunction against Chris, 
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two articles about this lawsuit were published. In fact, Mayor Mike Winder, the mayor of 
UTOPIA'S largest member city, wrote the KSL article. Both the KSL article and the 
fiercetelecom article, published on May 1, 2011 and May 2, 2011 respectively, claimed that 
they were based on documents that were "unsealed" by the trial court. At a later hearing, 
counsel for UTOPIA did not deny that UTOPIA had disclosed the sealed documents to 
third parties. 
Each news article about this case referred to above implied that Chris is currently 
facing charges of extortion and blackmail. To do so, each article quotes letters exchanged 
between counsel for UTOPIA and Chris. The articles say that Chris threatened to subject 
UTOPIA to "unfavorable public scrutiny' if UTOPIA did not pay him $219,000. As 
discussed, Chris never threatened to subject UTOPIA to unfavorable public scrutiny 
Instead, he warned UTOPIA that if it did not remedy his wrongful termination, he would 
have no other choice except to file a lawsuit. He also warned that such a lawsuit would likely 
result in the media destroying UTOPIA 
More importantly, the documents relied on in the articles remained under seal of the 
trial court from April 19, 2011 to May 16, 2011. Moreover, before the trial court unsealed 
the records, it struck the language the articles relied on. The stricken language included the 
accusation from Shaw that Chris was trying to extort or blackmail UTOPIA The KSL 
article also quotes one of UTOPIA's employees and an unnamed vendor of UTOPIA 
Neither author attempted to speak with Chris or get his side of the story Conspicuously 
absent from both articles is the fact that UTOPIA is not entitled to an injunction and that 
this case would be dismissed. 
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UTOPIA was behind these articles. It provided the sealed documents to third parties 
and made its employees and vendors available for interviews. Indeed, the mayor of one of 
UTOPIA'S member cities wrote the KSL article. And the articles spread like wildfire through 
social media. In fact, the website Crime Jungle provided a link to the KSL article, and anyone 
who does an online search for Chris Hogan will find the Crime Jungle link and conclude that 
Chris is currently charged with the crime of extortion. 
These articles reveal that UTOPIA lacked an honest belief in the propriety of filing 
this lawsuit or with the intent to hinder Chris. The information UTOPIA disclosed to the 
articles' authors is the same information that from April 18, 2011 to April 26, 2011 it argued 
would cause UTOPIA irreparable harm. One is left to wonder how UTOPIA could argue in 
good faith that the disclosure of the information would cause it irreparable harm only to 
disclose that same information within one week after the trial court ruled that UTOPIA was 
not entitled to an injunction. It would seem, then, that UTOPIA brought this lawsuit either 
to bully Chris or to force him to incur legal expenses, knowing that he is unemployed and 
unlikely to be able to sustain legal fees, which would ultimately impede his ability to 
prosecute his lawsuit. 
In summary Chris is a prevailing party and UTOPIA brought this meritless lawsuit in 
bad faith. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to award him 
attorney fees under Section 825, and this Court should order that UTOPIA pay Chris for the 
costs and attorney fees he incurred while defending against this lawsuit and remand this case 
for the trial court to determine the amount of attorney fees Chris should receive. 
II. The Trial Court Applied an Erroneous Legal Standard and thus Abused Its 
Discretion by Refusing to Hold UTOPIA in Contempt. 
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UTOPIA acted in contempt of court when it violated the order sealing the records in 
this case, but the trial court did not hold UTOPIA in contempt because it concluded that 
Chris' motion for UTOPIA to be held in contempt was moot and that an order sealing 
records only restricts court employees, not parties, from disclosing sealed documents to third 
parties. This Court reviews a trial court's decision not to hold a party in contempt for abuse 
of discretion. Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App. 14, U 8, 973 P.2d 988. However, an error of law 
is an abuse of discretion. State v. Henriod, 2006 UT 11, ffi| 4, 19, 131 P.3d 232; State v. Barrett, 
2005 UT 88, % 26, 127 P.3d 682. The conclusion that an order sealing records is only 
directed at the court clerk is an error of law. In addition, the determination of mootness by 
the trial court was also an error of law. This Court should reverse the trial court's decision to 
withdraw its order to show cause due to mootness and the affect of the order sealing the file. 
It should then remand this matter for the trial court to determine again the order to show 
cause under a proper legal standard. On remand, the trial court should also order UTOPIA 
to pay Chris' attorney fees for prosecuting the order to show cause. 
a. The order to show cause was not moot. 
When it unsealed the records in this case, the trial court did not moot the order to 
show cause. "An issue is moot if the court cannot grant the relief requested." Maero v. 
Bunker, 2009 UT App 300, \ 4, 221 P.3d 860 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Chris requested that the trial court hold UTOPIA in contempt of court and impose 
sanctions against it, including but not limited to requiring it to pay Chris' attorney fees. 
Even though it had unsealed the records in this case, the trial court still had the ability 
to hold UTOPIA in contempt and impose sanctions against it for violating its order sealing 
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the records. The violation of any order, even an erroneous order, constitutes contempt of 
court. Crowther v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 54 P.2d 243, 246 (1936). There is no 
dispute that UTOPIA disclosed documents which it identified as court filings while the 
order sealing the documents remained in effect. UTOPIA was in contempt. The fact that the 
trial court later determined that the order sealing the records was in error does not make 
UTOPIA's actions any less contemptuous. 
In fact, UTOPIA's contempt justified sanctions because its purpose was to defame 
Chris, discredit him, and cast him in a false light. When it violated the trial court's order, 
UTOPIA represented to the authors that the records came from a filing which had just been 
unsealed. This allowed the authors to clothe Shaw's unfounded and unofficial accusations 
against Chris in the garb of a meritorious claim. Had UTOPIA given the authors copies of 
the letters without disclosing that they were part of UTOPIA's complaint in the court file, 
UTOPIA would not be in contempt. But UTOPIA's intent to publicly defame and discredit 
Chris would not have been accomplished by merely publishing an attorneys accusations in 
private correspondence. The authors would only have been able to report that, in private 
correspondence, UTOPIA's general counsel accused Chris of extortion and blackmail. 
Moreover, the trial court remained capable of holding UTOPIA in contempt because 
it did not unseal the language the authors of the KSL and fiercetelecom articles used to 
imply that Chris faced criminal charges of extortion and blackmail. At the same hearing and 
in the same order that it unsealed the records in this case, the trial court struck the language 
used in the articles. Thus, the trial court remained able to hold UTOPIA in contempt for 
disclosing language that was never unsealed. 
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b. The trial court abused its discretion by erroneously concluding that the 
order to seal the records in this case did not apply to UTOPIA. 
1. The canons of construction reveal that an order sealing 
records applies to everyone. 
The trial court made an error of law, thus abusing its discretion, by concluding diat 
an order sealing court records does not prohibit represented parties from disclosing sealed 
documents to third parties. A party acts in contempt of court when it disobeys a court's 
order. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301(5) (2008). And using the canons of construction reveals 
that an order sealing records in a case applies to everyone, not just court clerks. See Ahrogast 
Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLQ 2010 UT 4 0 , \ 1 8 , 238 P.3d 1035 (noting that the canons 
of statutory construction apply to statutes, administrative rules, and rules of procedure). To 
interpret it, a rule must be read "as a whole" and "in harmony" with related provisions. State 
v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, % 10, 203 P.3d 1000. 
Reading Chapter 4, Article 2 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration ("Article 
2") in harmony with GRAMA reveals that UTOPIA acted in contempt of court The 
purpose of GRAMA is to provide the public access to government information while 
protecting the private information of Utah's citizens. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-102 (2008). 
GRAMA separates government records into two general categories, public and records that 
are not public. See id, § 63 G-2-201(2) (3). It then categorizes records that are not public into 
four subcategories: private, controlled, protected, and a record to which "access is restricted 
pursuant to court rule, another state statute, federal statute, or federal regulation." Id. 
GRAMA applies to Utah's judiciary. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-702(4)(a) (2008). It 
audiorizes the judiciary to "make rules governing requests for access, fees, classification, 
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designation, segregation, management, retention, denials and appeals of requests for access 
and retention, and amendment of judicial records." Id. Under that authority, Utah's judiciary 
promulgated Article 2. See Utah Code of Jud. Adm. R 4-202. The purpose of Article 2 is to 
provide the public access to judicial information while protecting the private information of 
Utah's citizens. See id. Article 2 separates court records into two general categories, public 
and non-public. Id. R 4-202.02. It then categorizes non-public records into five 
subcategories: sealed, private, protected, juvenile court social records, and juvenile court legal 
records. Id. 
Article 2 restricts access to sealed court records. Under Article 2, judges have the 
authority to seal case records. Utah Code Jud. Admin. R 4-202.02(4)(BB), 4-202.04(2)(Q. 
Article 2 limits access to sealed records. See id. R 4-202.03(2). In fact, with the exception of 
adoption cases, "no one may access a sealed court record except by order of the court" Id. 
By its own language, this limitation applies to everyone, not just court clerks. That is, without 
a court order, no one can access sealed court records. 
Additionally, GRAMA restricts access to sealed court records. If anyone with lawful 
access to any documents that are not public record under GRAMA "intentionally discloses, 
provides a copy of, or improperly uses a private, controlled, or protected record knowing 
that the disclosure or use is prohibited," he is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-2-801(1)(a) (2008). This provision would also apply to those who intentionally 
disclose, provide a copy of, or improperly use sealed court documents. See id. § 63G-2-201(6) 
(2010). Access to records that are restricted pursuant to court rule are governed by the court 
rule and GRAMA unless GRAMA is inconsistent with the rule. Id. § 63G-2-201(6). 
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Imposing criminal penalties on those who disclose, provide copies of, or improperly use 
non-public court rules is not inconsistent with Ardcle 2. See Utah Code Jud. Admin. 4-201 et 
seq. In fact, there is no provision in Article 2 that exempts those who unlawfully disclose, 
provide a copy of, or improperly use non-public court records from criminal liability. See id. 
Therefore, anyone—not just court clerks—with lawful zccess to any judicial records that are 
not public record who "intentionally discloses, provides a copy of, or improperly uses" the 
non-public judicial records is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-
801(l)(a) (2008). 
2. Case law from other jurisdictions reveals that a court may 
hold any person who violates an order in contempt, even if the 
order was not directed at him. 
Furthermore, whether the order sealing records in this case applies only to court 
clerks or to the parties is a red herring. A court has the inherent authority to enforce its own 
orders. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, 159 P. 541, 544 (Utah 1916). Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court said, 
[T]he power of a court to make an order carries with it the equal power to 
punish for a disobedience of that order, and the inquiry as to the question of 
disobedience has been, from time immemorial, the special function of the 
court. And this is no technical rule. In order that a court may compel 
obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has 
been any disobedience thereof. 
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594-95 (1895), abrogated on other grounds as recognised by United States v. 
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). A person who knows of a court's order that is not directed at 
him can still act in contempt of court for violating the order. See Regal Knitwear Co, v. 
N.L.RB., 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945); Goya Foods, Inc. v. Wallack Mgmt Co., 290 R3d 63, 75-76 (1st 
Or. 2002); New York v. Operation Rescue Nafl, 80 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 1996); Marshak v. 
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Treadwell, 595 F.3d 478, 486-87 (3d Or. 2009); Savarese v. Agnss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1209 (3d Or. 
1989); Whitcraft v. Brown, 570 F.3d 268, 272 (5th Or. 2009); S.E.C v. Homa, 514 F.3d 661, 
673-75 (7th Or. 2008); Indep. Fedn of Flight Attendants v. Cooper, 134 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Or. 
1998); Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1323-24 (9th Or. 1998); CleafOne 
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Bowers, 651 R3d 1200, 1214-16 (10th Gr. 2011); In re LopeZ, 109 P.3d 1021, 
1023-24 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Vastmn Invs., Ltd. v. Aquarius Media Corp., 743 N.Y.S.2d 492, 
493 (App. Div. 2002); Planned Parenthood Assn. of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Project Jericho, 556 N.E.2d 
157, 162-63 (Ohio 1990); Stella Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 985 P.2d 391, 398 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). 
The underlying rationale for this principle is that a person who knows of a court's 
order cannot engage in conduct with the intent to cause the same effect that conduct 
prohibited by the order would have had. See id. For example, in S.E.C v. Homa, people to 
whom an order was not directed were held in contempt for violating the order. 514 F.2d at 
673-75. The S.E.C brought a civil enforcement lawsuit against Homa for operating a Ponzi 
scheme. Id. at 664-65. The trial court issued two orders that froze Homa's assets. Id. at 665. 
The order prohibited Homa from selling, transferring, assigning, encumbering, pledging, 
dissipating, concealing, or disposing of any of the assets obtained through the Ponzi scheme. 
Id. at 665 n.5. After entry of the freeze orders, two men who lived outside of the United 
States, Mr. Pollock and Mr. Jones, transferred, sold, dissipated, and concealed assets subject 
to the freeze order with the intent to circumvent it. Id. at 668-71. Mr. Jones' and Mr. 
Pollock's conduct resulted in the same effect that conduct prohibited by the trial court 
would have had. Id. at 673-75. The trial court held them in contempt and ordered them to 
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return more than $7,000,000 of assets. Id. at 671-72. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
die trial court's decision. Id. at 678. 
Therefore, a person with knowledge of an order who engages in conduct with the 
intent to cause the same effect that conduct prohibited by the order would have had acts in 
contempt of court, regardless of whether the order is directed at him. 
There is no Utah case that outlines the elements to hold a person to whom an order 
is not directed in contempt for violation of the order. However, there are three elements that 
generally govern holding a person in contempt: A person acts in contempt of court if he (1) 
had actual knowledge of a court order, (2) "had the ability to comply" with the order, and (3) 
"intentionally failed or refused to [comply with the order]." Homeyer v. Stagg & Assocs., 2006 
UT App 89, f 6,132 P.3d 684. This test can be modified easily to apply to a person to whom 
an order is not directed: A person acts in contempt of court if he (1) had actual knowledge 
of a court order, (2) "had the ability to comply" with the order, and (3) engages in conduct 
with the intent to cause the same effect that conduct prohibited by the order would have. 
Applying these elements to UTOPIA'S conduct, UTOPIA acted in contempt of court 
even if the order sealing the records was not directed at them. First, UTOPIA knew what the 
order required. On April 18, 2011, this Court, at UTOPIA's request signed an order granting 
UTOPIA'S motion to seal and designating "[tjhe Verified Complaint and all other 
documents filed, or to filed, in this litigation, are hereby designated as SEALED 
DOCUMENTS." Order Sealing Records p.2. The order also mandated that any documents 
that "do not contain or reference confidential information" could only be unsealed after 
judicial review. Id. pp. 2-3. There is no ambiguity in the order. It prohibited disclosure of all 
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records in this case without first obtaining judicial permission. Second, UTOPIA had the 
ability to comply with the order. In fact, it is the party that requested the order. In order to 
disclose documents under seal in this case to third parties, UTOPIA took voluntary 
affirmative acts. 
Third, UTOPIA engaged in conduct with the intent to cause the same effect that 
conduct prohibited by the order would have had. Even if it was only directed to court clerks, 
the order forbade disclosure of any of the records in this case without a court order. If a 
court clerk violated the order, the effect would be that third parties would have received 
sealed court documents. This is the same effect of UTOPIA's conduct. That is, UTOPIA 
engaged in conduct with the intent to give third parties access to sealed court documents 
(the effect that conduct prohibited by the order sealing the records would have had). 
Therefore, UTOPIA acted in contempt of the trial court's order sealing the records in 
this case. The intent of the order was to prevent third parties from accessing the records in 
this case. UTOPIA knew of the order, had the ability to comply with it, and violated it by 
disclosing sealed documents in this case to third parties. 
III. Chris is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
In addition to the attorney fees that Chris incurred while defending against this 
lawsuit, this Court should award Chris the attorney fees he has incurred on appeal. A party 
who is entitled to attorney fees on the trial court level is also entitled to attorney fees when 
he prevails on appeal. Golden Meadows Props., LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App 258, \ 13, 241 P.3d 
371 (internal citations and quotations omitted); Kimball v. 'Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, \ 52, 
217 P.3d 733 Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, \ 20, 19 P.3d 1005; Williamson v. 
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Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, \ 13, 983 P.2d 1103. As discussed at length above, Chris is 
entitled to an award of attorney fees on the trial court level under Rule 65A and Section 825. 
Therefore, Chris is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal related to his claims under 
Rule 65 A and Section 825. 
Chris is also entitled to attorney fees on appeal based on the trial court's abuse of 
discretion in not holding UTOPIA in contempt. A trial court may require a party who acts in 
contempt of court to pay the expenses, including attorney fees, to the injured party who 
brought the contempt proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311 (2008); Envirotech Corp. v. 
Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 499-500 (Utah 1994). As discussed above, the trial court should have 
held UTOPIA in contempt of court. The trial court should also have required UTOPIA to 
pay the attorney fees that he incurred in bringing contempt proceedings on the trial court 
level. Therefore, Chris is entitled to attorney fees on appeal related to his claims that the trial 
court abused its discretion by failing to hold UTOPIA in contempt. 
Therefore, this Court should remand this matter to the trial court for it to determine 
the amount of attorney fees Chris is entitled to receive for prevailing in this appeal. See 
Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, \ 13. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Chris' motion for attorney fees 
and its denial of the order to show cause and award Chris the attorney fees he incurred at the 
trial court level. Chris is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees under Rule 65A 
because he was restrained by a TRO that should not have been issued. Additionally, Chris is 
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entided to an award of attorney fees under Section 825 because he prevailed against this 
meritless lawsuit that was brought in bad faith. 
Further, UTOPIA acted in contempt of court when it violated the order sealing the 
records in this case, and the trial court abused its discretion when it withdrew its order to 
show cause. When it unsealed the records in this case, the trial court did not moot the order 
to show cause. Moreover, the trial court made an error of law, thus abusing its discretion, by 
concluding that an order sealing court records does not prohibit represented parties from 
disclosing sealed documents to third parties. 
Finally, this Court should award Chris the attorney fees he has incurred on appeal. A 
party who is entitled to attorney fees and costs on the trial court level is also entitled to 
attorney fees when he prevails on appeal. 'Chris is entitled to an award of attorney fees and 
costs on the trial court level and, therefore, is also entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this /,7 day of January, 2012. 
CHRISTENSEN THORNTON, PLLC 
Steve S/Christensen 
Craig L. Pankratz 
Samuel J. Sorensen 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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Legislative intent. 
63G-2-102. Legislative intent. 
(1) In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes two constitutional rights: 
(a) the public's right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's business; and 
(b) the right of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities. 
(2) The Legislature also recognizes a public policy interest in allowing a government to restrict access to certain 
records, as specified in this chapter, for the public good. 
(3) It is the intent of the Legislature to: 
(a) promote the public's right of easy and reasonable access to unrestricted public records; 
(b) specify those conditions under which the public interest in allowing restrictions on access to records may outweigh 
the public's interest in access; 
(c) prevent abuse of confidentiality by governmental entities by permitting confidential treatment of records only as 
provided in this chapter; 
(d) provide guidelines for both disclosure and restrictions on access to government records, which are based on the 
equitable weighing of the pertinent interests and which are consistent with nationwide standards of information practices; 
(e) favor public access when, in the application of this act, countervailing interests are of equal weight; and 
(f) establish fair and reasonable records management practices. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session 
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Definitions. 
63G-2-103. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Audit" means: 
(a) a systematic examination of financial, management, program, and related records for the purpose of detemiining the 
fair presentation of financial statements, adequacy of internal controls, or compliance with laws and regulations; or 
(b) a systematic examination of program procedures and operations for the purpose of determining their effectiveness, 
economy, efficiency, and compliance with statutes and regulations. 
(2) "Chronological logs" mean the regular and customary summary records of law enforcement agencies and other 
public safety agencies that show: 
(a) the time and general nature of police, fire, and paramedic calls made to the agency; and 
(b) any arrests or jail bookings made by the agency. 
(3) "Classification," "classify," and their derivative forms mean determining whether a record series, record, or 
information within a record is public, private, controlled, protected, or exempt from disclosure under Subsection 63G-2-
201(3)(b). 
(4) (a) "Computer program" means: 
(i) a series of instructions or statements that permit the functioning of a computer system in a manner designed to 
provide storage, retrieval, and manipulation of data from the computer system; and 
(ii) any associated documentation and source material that explain how7 to operate the computer program. 
(b) "Computer program" does not mean: 
(i) the original data, including numbers, text, voice, graphics, and images; 
(ii) analysis, compilation, and other manipulated forms of the original data produced by use of the program; or 
(iii) the mathematical or statistical formulas, excluding the underlying mathematical algorithms contained in the program, 
that would be used if the manipulated forms of the original data were to be produced manually. 
(5) (a) "Contractor" means: 
(i) any person who contacts with a governmental entity to provide goods or services directly to a governmental entity; 
or 
(ii) any private, nonprofit organization that receives funds from a governmental entity, 
(b) "Contractor" does not mean a private provider. 
(6) "Controlled record" means a record containing data on individuals that is controlled as provided by Section 63G-2-
304. 
(7) "Designation," "designate," and their derivative forms mean indicating, based on a governmental entity's familiarity 
with a record series or based on a governmental entity's review of a reasonable sample of a record series, the primary 
classification that a majority of records in a record series would be given if classified and the classification that other 
records typically present in the record series would be given if classified. 
(8) 'Elected official" means each person elected to a state office, county office, municipal office, school board or 
school district office, local district office, or special service district office, but does not include judges. 
(9) '"Explosive" means a chemical compound, device, or mixture: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(a) commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an explosion; and 
(b) that contains oxidizing or combustive units or other ingredients in proportions, quantities, or packing so that: 
(i) an ignition by fire, friction, concussion, percussion, or detonator of any part of the compound or mixture may cause 
a sudden generation of highly heated gases; and 
(ii) the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of: 
(A) producing destructive effects on contiguous objects; or 
(B) causing death or serious bodily injury. 
(10) "Government audit agency" means any governmental entity that conducts an audit. 
(11) (a) "Governmental entity" means: 
(i) executive department agencies of the state, the offices of the governor, lieutenant governor, state auditor, attorney 
general, and state treasurer, the Board of Pardons and Parole, the Board of Examiners, the National Guard, the Career 
Service Review Board, the State Board of Education, the State Board of Regents, and the State Archives; 
(ii) the Office of the Legislative Auditor General, Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst, Office of Legislative Research 
and General Counsel, the Legislature, and legislative committees, except any political party, group, caucus, or rules or 
sifting committee of the Legislature; 
(iii) courts, the Judicial Council, the Office of the Court Administrator, and similar administrative units in the judicial 
branch; 
(iv) any state-funded institution of higher education or public education; or 
(v) any political subdivision of the state, but, if a political subdivision lias adopted an ordinance or a policy relating to 
information practices pursuant to Section 63G-2-701. this chapter shall apply to the political subdivision to the extent 
specified in Section 63G-2-701 or as specified in any other section of this chapter that specifically refers to political 
subdivisions. 
(b) "Governmental entity" also means every office, agency, board, bureau, committee, department, advisory board, or 
commission of an entity listed in Subsection (1 l)(a) that is funded or established by the government to carry out the 
public's business. 
(c) "Governmental entity" does not include the Utah Educational Savings Plan created in Section 53B-8a-103. 
(12) "Gross compensation" means every form of remuneration payable for a given period to an individual for services 
provided including salaries, commissions, vacation pay, severance pay, bonuses, and any board, rent, housing, lodging, 
payments in kind, and any similar benefit received from trie individual's employer. 
(13) 'Individual" means a human being. 
(14) (a) "Initial contact report" means an initial written or recorded report, however titled, prepared by peace officers 
engaged in public patrol or response duties describing official actions initially taken in response to either a public conplaint 
about or the discovery of an apparent violation of law, which report may describe: 
(i) the date, time, location, and nature of the conplaint, the incident, or offense; 
(ii) names of victims; 
(iii) the nature or general scope of the agency's initial actions taken in response to the incident; 
(iv) the general nature of any injuries or estimate of dsimages sustained in the incident; 
(v) the name, address, and other identifying information about any person arrested or charged in connection with the 
incident; or 
(vi) the identity of the public safety personnel, except undercover personnel, or prosecuting attorney involved in 
responding to the initial incident. 
(b) Initial contact reports do not include follow-up or investigative reports prepared after the initial contact report. 
However, if the infonnation specified in Subsection (14)(a) appears in follow-up or investigative reports, it may only be 
treated confidentially if it is private, controlled, protected, or exempt from disclosure under Subsection 63G-2-20K3W). 
(15) "Legislative body" means the Legislature. 
(16) "Notice of compliance" means a statement confirming that a governmental entity has complied with a records 
committee order. 
(17) "Person" means: 
(a) an individual; 
(b) a nonprofit or profit corporation; 
(c) a partnership; 
(d) a sole proprietorship; Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(e) other type of business organization; or 
(f) any combination acting in concert with one another. 
(18) 'Private provider" means any person who contacts with a governmental entity to provide services.directly to the 
public. 
(19) 'Private record" means a record containing data on individuals that is private as provided by Section 63G-2-302. 
(20) "Protected record" means a record that is classified protected as provided by Section 63G-2-305. 
(21) 'Public record" means a record that is not private, controlled, or protected and that is not exempt from disclosure 
as provided in Subsection 63G-2-201(3)(b). 
(22) (a) "Record" means a book, letter, document, paper, map, plan, photograph, film, card, tape, recording, 
electronic data, or other documentary material regardless of physical form or characteristics: 
(i) that is prepared, owned, received, or retained by a governmental entity or political subdivision; and 
(ii) where all of the information in the original is reproducible by photocopy or other mechanical or electronic means. 
(b) "Record" does not mean: 
(i) a personal note or personal communication prepared or received by an employee or officer of a governmental entity 
in the employee's or officer's private capacity; 
(ii) a temporary draft or similar material prepared for the originator's personal use or prepared by the originator for the 
personal use of an individual for whom the originator is working; 
(iii) material that is legally owned by an individual in the individual's private capacity; 
(iv) material to which access is limited by the laws of copyright or patent unless the copyright or patent is owned by a 
governmental entity or political subdivision; 
(v) proprietary software; 
(vi) junk mail or a commercial publication received by a governmental entity or an official or employee of a 
governmental entity; 
(vii) a book that is cataloged, indexed, or inventoried and contained in the collections of a library open to the public; 
(viii) material that is cataloged, indexed, or inventoried and contained in the collections of a library open to the public, 
regardless of physical form or characteristics of the material; 
(ix) a daily calendar or other personal note prepared by the originator for the originator's personal use or for the 
personal use of an individual for whom the originator is working; 
(x) a computer program that is developed or purchased by or for any governmental entity for its own use; 
(xi) a note or internal memorandum prepared as part of the deliberative process by: 
(A) a member of the judiciary; 
(B) an administrative law judge; 
(C) a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole; or 
(D) a member of any other body charged by law with performing a quasi-judicial function; 
(xii) a telephone number or similar code used to access a mobile communication device that is used by an employee or 
officer of a governmental entity, provided that the employee or officer of the governmental entity has designated at least 
one business telephone number that is a public record as provided in Section 63G-2-301; 
(xiii) information provided by the Public Employees' Benefit and Insurance Program, created in Section 49-20-103. to 
a county to enable the county to calculate the amount to be paid to a health care provider under Subsection 17-50-319(2) 
(e)(iQ; or 
(xiv) information that an owner of unimproved property provides to a local entity as provided in Section 11-42-205. 
(23) "Record series" means a group of records that may be treated as a unit for purposes of designation, description, 
management, or disposition. 
(24) "Records committee" means the State Records Committee created in Section 63G-2-501. 
(25) "Records officer" means the individual appointed by the chief administrative officer of each governmental entity, or 
the political subdivision to work with state archives in the care, maintenance, scheduling, designation, classification, 
disposal, and preservation of records. 
(26) "Schedule," "scheduling," and then- derivative forms mean the process of specifying the length of time each record 
series should be retained by a governmental entity for administrative, legal, fiscal, or historical purposes and when each 
record series should be transferred to the state archives or destroyed. 
(27) "Sponsored research" means research, training, and other sponsored activities as defined by the federal Executive 
Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget: 
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(a) conducted: 
(i) by an institution within the state system of liiglier education defined in Section 536-1 -102: and 
(ii) through an office responsible for sponsored projects or programs; and 
(b) funded or otherwise supported by an external: 
(i) person that is not created or controlled by the institution within the state system of higher education; or 
(ii) federal, state, or local governmental entity. 
(28) "State archives" means the Division of Archives and Records Service created in 
Section 63A-12-101. 
(29) "State archivist" means the director of the state archives. 
(30) "Summary data" means statistical records and compilations that contain data denved from private, controlled, or 
protected information but that do not disclose private, controlled, or protected information. 
Amended by Chapter 46, 2011 General Session 
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Right to inspect records and receive copies of records. 
63G-2-201. Right to inspect records and receive copies of records. 
(1) Every person has the right to inspect a public record free of charge, and the right to take a copy of a public record 
during normal working hours, subject to Sections 63G-2-203 and 63G-2-204. 
(2) A record is public unless otherwise expressly provided by statute. 
(3) The following records are not public: 
(a) a record that is private, controlled, or protected under Sections 63G-2-302, 63G-2-303. 63G-2-304, and 63G-2-
305; and 
(b) a record to which access is restricted pursuant to court rule, another state statute, federal statute, or federal 
regulation, including records for which access is governed or restricted as a condition of participation in. a state or federal 
program or for receiving state or federal funds. 
(4) Only a record specified in Section 63G-2-302, 63G-2-303. 63G-2-304. or 63G-2-305 may be classified private, 
controlled, or protected. 
(5) (a) A governmental entity may not disclose a record that is private, controlled, or protected to any person except 
as provided in Subsection .(5)(b), Subsection (5)(c), Section 63G-2-202. 63G-2-2Q6, or 63G-2-303. 
(b) A governmental entity may disclose a record that is private under Subsection 63G-2~302(2) or protected under 
Section 63G-2-305 to persons other than those specified in Section 63G-2-202 or 63G-2-206 if the head of a 
governmental entity, or a designee, determines that: 
(i) there is no interest in restricting access to the record; or 
(ii) the interests favoring access outweighs the interest iavoring restriction of access. 
(c) In addition to the disclosure under Subsection (5)(b), a governmental entity may disclose a record that is protected 
under Subsection 63G-2-305(51) if 
(i) the head of the governmental entity, or a designee, determines that the disclosure: 
(A) is mutually beneficial to: 
(I) the subject of the record; 
(II) the governmental entity; and 
(III) the public; and 
(B) serves a public purpose related to: 
(I) public safety; or 
(II) consumer protection; and 
(ii) the person who receives the record from the governmental entity agrees not to use or allow the use of the record 
for advertising or solicitation purposes. 
(6) (a) The disclosure of a record to which access is governed or limited pursuant to court rule, another state statute, 
federal statute, or federal regulation, including a record for which access is governed or limited as a condition of 
participation in a state or federal program or for receiving state or federal funds, is governed by the specific provisions of 
that statute, rule, or regulation. 
(b) This chapter applies to records described in Subsection (6)(a) insofar as this chapter is not inconsistent with the 
statute, rule, or regulation. 
(7) A governmental entity shall provide a person with a certified copy of a record if: Digitized by the Howard W. Hu ter Law Lib ary, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(a) the person requesting the record has a right to inspect it; 
(b) the person identifies the record with reasonable specificity; and 
(c) the person pays the lawful fees. 
(8) (a) In response to a request, a governmental entity is not required to: 
(i) create a record; 
(ii) compile, format, manipulate, package, summarize, or tailor information; 
(iii) provide a record in a particular format, medium, or program not currently maintained by the governmental entity; 
(iv) fulfill a person's records request if the request unreasonably duplicates prior records requests from that person; or 
(v) fill a person's records request if 
(A) the record requested is accessible in the identical physical form and content in a public publication or product 
produced by the governmental entity receiving the request; 
(B) the governmental entity provides the person requesting the record with the public publication or product; and 
(C) the governmental entity specifies where the record can be found in the public publication or product. 
(b) Upon request, a governmental entity may provide a record in a particular form under Subsection (8)(a)(ii) or (iii) if. 
(i) the governmental entity determines it is able to do so without unreasonably interfering with the governmental entity's 
duties and responsibilities; and 
(ii) the requester agrees to pay the governmental entity for providing the record in the requested form in accordance 
with Section 63G-2-203. 
(9) (a) A governmental entity may allow a person requesting more than 50 pages of records to copy the records if 
(i) the records are contained in files that do not contain records that are exempt from disclosure, or the records may be 
segregated to remove private, protected, or controlled information from disclosure; and 
(ii) the governmental entity provides reasonable safeguards to protect the public from the potential for loss of a public 
record. 
(b) When the requirements of Subsection (9)(a) are met, the governmental entity may: 
(i) provide the requester with the facilities for copying the requested records and require that the requester make the 
copies; or 
(if) allow the requester to provide the requester's own copying facilities and personnel to make the copies at the 
governmental entity's offices and waive the fees for copying the records. 
(10) (a) A governmental entity that owns an intellectual property right and that offers the intellectual property right for 
sale or license may control by ordinance or policy the duplication and distribution of the material based on terms the 
governmental entity considers to be in the public interest. 
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the rights or protections granted to the governmental 
entity under federal copyright or patent law as a result of its ownership of the intellectual property right. 
(11) A governmental entity may not use the physical form, electronic or otherwise, in which a record is stored to deny, 
or unreasonably hinder the rights of a person to inspect and receive a copy of a record under this chapter. 
(12) Subject to the requirements of Subsection (8), a governmental entity shall provide access to an electronic copy of 
a record in lieu of providing access to its paper equivalent if. 
(a) the person making the request requests or states a preference for an electronic copy; 
(b) the governmental entity currently maintains the record in an electronic format that is reproducible and may be 
provided without reformatting or conversion; and 
(c) the electronic copy of the record: 
(i) does not disclose other records that are exempt from disclosure; or 
(ii) may be segregated to protect private, protected, or controlled information from disclosure without the undue 
expenditure of public resources or funds. 
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63G-2-702. Applicability to the judiciary. 
(1) The judiciary is subject to the provisions of this chapter except as provided in this section. 
(2) (a) The judiciary is not subject to Part 4, Appeals, except as provided in Subsection (5). 
(b) The judiciary is not subject to Parts 5, State Records Committee, and 6, Collection of Information and Accuracy . 
of Records. 
(c) The judiciary is subject to only the following sections in Part 9, Archives and Records Service: Sections 63A-12-
105 and 63A-12-106. 
(3} The Judicial Council, the Administrative Office of the Courts, the courts, and other administrative units in the 
judicial branch shall designate and classify their records in accordance with Sections 63G-2-301 through 63G-2-3Q5. 
(4) Substantially consistent with the provisions of this chapter, the Judicial Council shall: 
(a) make rules governing requests for access, fees, classification, designation, segregation, management, retention, 
denials and appeals of requests for access and retention, and amendment of judicial records; 
(b) establish an appellate board to handle appeals from denials of requests for access and provide that a requester who 
is denied access by the appellate board may file a lawsuit in district court; and 
(c) provide standards for the management and retention of judicial records substantially consistent with Section 63 A-
12-103. 
(5) Rules governing appeals from denials of requests for access shall substantially comply with the time limits provided 
in Section 63G-2-204 and Part 4, Appeals. 
(6) Upon request, the state archivist shall: 
(a) assist with and advise concerning the establishment of a records management program in the judicial branch; and 
(b) as required by the judiciary, provide program services similar to those available to the executive and legislative 
branches of government as provided in this chapter and Title 63 A, Chapter 12, Part 1, Archives and Records Service. 
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63G-2-801. Criminal penalties. 
(1) (a) A public enployee or other person who has lawful access to any private, controlled, or protected record under 
this chapter, and who intentionally discloses, provides a copy o£ or improperly uses a private, controlled, or protected 
record knowing that the disclosure or use is prohibited under this chapter, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (l)(a) that the actor used or released private, controlled, or 
protected information in the reasonable belief that the use or disclosure of the information was necessary to expose a 
violation of law involving government corruption, abuse of office, or misappropriation of public funds or property. 
(c) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (l)(a) that the record could have lawfully been released to the 
recipient if it had been properly classified. 
(2) (a) A person who by false pretenses, bribery, or theft, gains access to or obtains a copy of any private, controlled, 
or protected record to which the person is not legally entitled is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) No person shall be guilty under Subsection (2)(a) who receives the record, information, or copy after the feet and 
without prior knowledge of or participation in the false pretenses, bribery, or theft. 
(3) A public enployee who intentionally refuses to release a record the disclosure of which the enployee knows is 
required by law or by final uiiappealed order from a governmental entity, the records committee, or a court, is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session 
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78B-6-301. Acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
Tlie following acts or omissions in respect to a court or its proceedings are contempts of the authority of the court: 
(1) disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court, tending to interrupt the 
course of a trial or other judicial proceeding; 
(2) breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, tending to intemipt the due course of a trial or 
other judicial proceeding; 
(3) misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff or other 
person appointed or elected to perform a judicial or ministerial service; 
(4) deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a party to an action or special proceeding; 
(5) disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court; 
(6) acting as an officer, attorney or counselor, of a court without authority; 
(7) rescuing any person or property that is in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of the court; 
(8) unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining at, or returning from, the court where 
the action is on the calendar for trial; 
(9) any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court; 
(10) disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or to answer as a witness; 
(11) when summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or serve, or improperly conversing with a party to an 
action to be tried at the court, or with any other person, concerning the merits of an action, or receiving a communication 
from a party or other person in respect to it, without immediately disclosing the communication to the court; and 
(12) disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of the lawful judgment, order or process of a superior 
comt, or proceeding in an action or special proceeding contrary to law, after the action or special proceeding is removed 
from the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the lawfiil orders or process of a judicial 
officer is also a contempt of the authority of the officer. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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Rule 4-202.02. Records classification. 
Intent: 
To classify court records as public or non-public. 
Applicability: 
This rule applies to the judicial branch. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Court records are public unless otherwise classified by this rule. 
(2) Public court records include but are not limited to: 
(2)(A) abstract of a citation that redacts all non-public information; 
(2)(B) aggregate records without non-public information and without personal identifying 
nformation; 
(2)(C) arrest warrants, but a court may restrict access before service; 
(2)(D) audit reports; 
(2)(E) case files; 
(2)(F) committee reports after release by the Judicial Council or the court that requested the 
study; 
(2)(G) contracts entered into by the judicial branch and records of compliance with the terms of 
3 contract; 
(2)(H) drafts that were never finalized but were relied upon in carrying out an action or policy; 
(2)(l) exhibits, but the judge may regulate or deny access to ensure the integrity of the exhibit, a 
:air trial or interests favoring closure; 
(2)(J) financial records; 
(2)(K) indexes approved by the Management Committee of the Judicial Council, including the 
rollowing, in courts other than the juvenile court; an index may contain any other index information: 
(2)(K)(i) amount in controversy; 
(2)(K)(ii) attorney name; 
(2)(K)(iii) case number; 
(2)(K)(iv) case status; 
(2)(K)(v) civil case type or criminal violation; 
(2)(K)(vi) civil judgment or criminal disposition; 
(2)(K)(vii) daily calendar; 
(2)(K)(viii) file date; 
(2)(K)(ix) party name; 
(2)(L) name, business address, business telephone number, and business email address of an 
adult person or business entity other than a party, but the name of a juror or prospective juror is 
private until released by the judge; Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(2)(M) name, address, telephone number, email address, date of birth, and last four digits of 
e following: driver's license number; social security number; or account number of a party; 
(2)(N) name, business address, business telephone number, and business email address of a 
wyer appearing in a case; 
(2)(0) name, business address, business telephone number, and business email address of 
)urt personnel other than judges; 
(2)(P) name, business address, and business telephone number of judges; 
(2)(Q) name, gender, gross salary and benefits, job title and description, number of hours 
orked per pay period, dates of employment, and relevant qualifications of a current or former 
)urt personnel; 
(2)(R) opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, and orders entered in open 
tarings; 
(2)(S) order or decision classifying a record as not public; 
(2)(T) private record if the subject of the record has given written permission to make the record 
jblic; 
(2)(U) publications of the administrative office of the courts; 
(2)(V) record in which the judicial branch determines or states an opinion on the rights of the 
ate, a political subdivision, the public, or a person; 
(2)(W) record of the receipt or expenditure of public funds; 
(2)(X) record or minutes of an open meeting or hearing and the transcript of them; 
(2)(Y) record of formal discipline of current or former court personnel or of a person regulated 
y the judicial branch if the disciplinary action has been completed, and all time periods for 
dministrative appeal have expired, and the disciplinary action was sustained; 
(2)(Z) record of a request for a record; 
(2)(AA) reports used by the judiciary if all of the data in the report is public or the Judicial 
Council designates the report as a public record; 
(2)(BB) rules of the Supreme Court and Judicial Council; 
(2)(CC) search warrants, the application and all affidavits or other recorded testimony on which 
warrant is based are public after they are unsealed under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 40; 
(2)(DD) statistical data derived from public and non-public records but that disclose only public 
lata; 
(2)(EE) Notwithstanding subsections (6) and (7), if a petition, indictment, or information is filed 
harging a person 14 years of age or older with a felony or an offense that would be a felony if 
;ommitted by an adult, the petition, indictment or information, the adjudication order, the 
lisposition order, and the delinquency history summary of the person are public records. The 
lelinquency history summary shall contain the name of the person, a listing of the offenses for 
vhich the person was adjudged to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and the disposition 
)f the court in each of those offenses. 
(3) The following court records are sealed: 
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(3)(A) adoption records, which are private until sealed; 
(3)(B) expunged records; 
(3)(C) orders authorizing installation of pen register or trap and trace device under Utah Code 
Section 77-23a-15; 
(3)(D) records showing the identity of a confidential informant; 
(3)(E) records relating to the possession of a financial institution by the commissioner of 
financial institutions under Utah Code Section 7-2-6; 
(3)(F) wills deposited for safe keeping under Utah Code Section 75-2-901; 
(3)(G) records designated as sealed by rule of the Supreme Court; 
(3)(H) record of a Children's Justice Center investigative interview after the conclusion of any 
egal proceedings; and 
(3)(l) other records as ordered by the court under Rule 4-202.04. 
(4) The following court records are private: 
(4)(A) adoption records until sealed; 
(4)(B) aggregate records other than public aggregate records under subsection (2); 
(4)(C) alternative dispute resolution records; 
(4)(D) applications for accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act; 
(4)(E) citation, but an abstract of a citation that redacts all non-public information is public; 
(4)(F) custody evaluations; 
(4)(G) eligibility for benefits or services or the determination of the benefit level; 
(4)(H) home studies; 
(4)(l) judgment information statement; 
(4)(J) judicial review of final agency action under Utah Code Section 62A-4a-1009; 
(4)(K) the following personal identifying information about a party: driver's license number, 
social security number, account description and number, password, identification number, maiden 
name and mother's maiden name, and similar personal identifying information; 
(4)(L) the following personal identifying information about a person other than a party: 
residential address, personal email address, personal telephone number; date of birth, driver's 
license number, social security number, account description and number, password, identification 
number, maiden name, mother's maiden name, and similar personal identifying information; 
(4)(M) guardianship cases and conservatorship cases, except the order of appointment and 
letter of appointment, which are public; 
(4)(N) medical, psychiatric, or psychological records; 
(4)(0) name of a minor, except that the name of a minor party is public in the following district 
and justice court proceedings: 
(4)(0)(i) name change of a minor; 
(4)(0)(ii) guardianship or conservatorship for a minor; and Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(4)(0)(iii) felony, misdemeanor or infraction; 
(4)(P) personnel file of a current or former court personnel or applicant for employment; 
(4)(Q) photograph, film or video of a crime victim or of the petitioner in a cohabitant abuse 
Dtion or civil stalking action; 
(4)(R) presentence investigation report; 
(4)(S) record classified as private or controlled by a governmental entity and shared with the 
Durt under the Government Records Access and Management Act; 
(4)(T) non-public record provided by a governmental entity of a state or the United States; 
(4)(U) record regarding the character or competence of an individual; 
(4)(V) record containing information the disclosure of which constitutes an unwarranted 
ivasion of personal privacy; 
(4)(W) record involving the commitment of a person under Title 62A, Chapter 15, Substance 
buse and Mental Health Act; 
(4)(X) record of a court hearing closed to the public or of a child's testimony taken under 
RCrP15.5: 
(4)(X)(i) permanently if the hearing is not traditionally open to the public and public access does 
Dt play a significant positive role in the process; or 
(4)(X)(ii) if the hearing is traditionally open to the public, until the judge determines it is possible 
) release the record without prejudice to the interests that justified the closure; 
(4)(Y) record of a delinquency proceeding against an insurer under Utah Code Section 31a-27-
03; 
(4)(Z) record submitted by a senior judge or court commissioner regarding performance 
valuation and certification; 
(4)(AA) record submitted for in camera review until its public availability is determined; 
(4)(BB) other records as ordered by the court under Rule 4-202.04. 
(5) The following court records are protected: 
(5)(A) attorney's work product, including the mental impressions or legal theories of an attorney 
»r other representative of the courts concerning litigation, privileged communication between the 
:ourts and an attorney representing, retained, or employed by the courts, and records prepared 
solely in anticipation of litigation and not subject to discovery; 
(5)(B) bids or proposals until the deadline for submitting them has closed; 
(5)(C) budget analyses, revenue estimates, and fiscal notes of proposed legislation before 
ssuance of the final recommendations in these areas; 
(5)(D) budget recommendations, legislative proposals, and policy statements, that if disclosed 
vould reveal the court's contemplated policies or contemplated courses of action; 
(5)(E) court security plans; 
(5)(F) investigation and analysis of loss covered by the risk management fund; 
(5)(G) investigative subpoenas under Utah Code Section 77-22-2; 
• — - - 4/6 
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(5)(H) memorandum prepared by staff for a member of any body charged by law with 
performing a judicial function and used in the decision-making process; 
(5)(l) confidential business records under Utah Code Section 63G-2-309; 
(5)(J) a record classified as protected by a governmental entity and shared with the court under 
Jtah Code Section 63G-2-206; 
(5)(K) record created or maintained for civil, criminal, or administrative enforcement purposes, 
audit or discipline purposes, or licensing, certification or registration purposes, if the record 
easonably could be expected to: 
(5)(K)(i) interfere with an investigation; 
(5)(K)(ii) interfere with a fair hearing or trial; or 
(5)(K)(iii) disclose the identity of a confidential source; 
(5)(L) record identifying property under consideration for sale or acquisition by the court or its 
appraised or estimated value unless the information has been disclosed to someone not under a 
Juty of confidentiality to the courts; 
(5)(M) record that would reveal the contents of settlement negotiations other than the final 
settlement agreement; 
(5)(N) record the disclosure of which would impair governmental procurement or give an unfair 
advantage to any person; 
(5)(0) record the disclosure of which would interfere with supervision of an offender's 
ncarceration, probation or parole; 
(5)(P) record the disclosure of which would jeopardize life, safety or property; 
(5)(Q) search warrants and search warrant affidavits before the filing of the return; 
(5)(R) strategy about collective bargaining or pending litigation; 
(5)(S) test questions and answers; 
(5)(T) trade secrets as defined in Utah Code Section 13-24-2; 
(5)(U) record of a Children's Justice Center investigative interview before the conclusion of any 
egal proceedings; and 
(5)(V) other records as ordered by the court under Rule 4-202.04 
(6) The following are juvenile court social records: 
(6)(A) correspondence relating to juvenile social records; 
(6)(B) custody evaluations, parent-time evaluations, parental fitness evaluations, substance 
abuse evaluations, domestic violence evaluations; 
(6)(C) medical, psychological, psychiatric evaluations; 
(6)(D) pre-disposition and social summary reports; 
(6)(E) probation agency and institutional reports or evaluations; 
(6)(F) referral reports; 
(6)(G) report of preliminary inquiries; and 
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(6)(H) treatment or service plans. 
(7) The following are juvenile court legal records: 
(7)(A) accounting records; 
(7)(B) discovery filed with the court; 
(7)(C) pleadings, summonses, subpoenas, motions, affidavits, calendars, minutes, findings, 
ders, decrees; 
(7)(D) name of a party or minor; 
(7)(E) record of a court hearing; 
(7)(F) referral and offense histories 
(7)(G) and any other juvenile court record regarding a minor that is not designated as a social 
cord. 
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Rule 4-202.03. Records access. 
Intent: 
To identify who may access court records. 
Applicability: 
This rule applies to the judicial branch. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Any person may access a public court record. 
(2) An adoptive parent or adult adoptee may obtain a certified copy of the adoption decree 
jpon request and presentation of positive identification. Otherwise, no one may access a sealed 
court record except by order of the court. A judge may review a sealed record when the 
circumstances warrant. 
(3) The following may access a private court record: 
(3)(A) the subject of the record; 
(3)(B)the attorney for the subject of the record or an individual who has a power of attorney 
rom the subject of the record; 
(3)(C)the parent or guardian of the subject of the record if the subject is an unemancipated 
ninor or under a legal incapacity; 
(3)(D) a person with a notarized release from the subject of the record or the subject's legal 
•epresentative dated no more than 90 days before the date the request is made; 
(3)(E) a party or attorney for a party to litigation in which the record is filed; 
(3)(F) an interested person to an action under the Uniform Probate Code; 
(3)(G) the person who submitted the record; 
(3)(H) anyone by court order; 
(3)(l) court personnel, but only to achieve the purpose for which the record was submitted; 
(3)(J) a person provided the record under Rule 4-202.04 or Rule 4-202.05; and 
(3)(K) a governmental entity with which the record is shared under Rule 4-202.10. 
(4) The following may access a protected court record: 
(4)(A) the person or governmental entity whose interests are protected by closure; 
(4)(B) the attorney for the person or governmental entity whose interests are protected by 
closure or an individual who has a power of attorney from such person or governmental entity; 
(4)(C)the parent or guardian of the person whose interests are protected by closure if the 
person is an unemancipated minor or under a legal incapacity; 
(4)(D) a person with a notarized release from the person or governmental entity whose interests 
are protected by closure or their legal representative dated no more than 90 days before the date 
the request is made; 
(4)(E)a party or attorney for a party to litigation in which the record is filed; 
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Rule 4-202.04. Request to access a record associated with a case; request to classify a record associated with a 
case. 
Intent: 
To establish the process for accessing a court record associated with a case. 
Applicability: 
This rule applies to court records associated with a case. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) A request to access a public court record shall be presented in writing to the clerk of the court unless the clerk 
waives the requirement. A request to access a non-public court record to which a person is authorized access shall be 
presented in writing to the clerk of the court. A written request shall contain the requester's name, mailing address, 
daytime telephone number and a description of the record requested. If the record is a non-public record, the 
person making the request shall present identification. 
(2)(A) If a written request to access a court: record is denied by the clerk of court, the person making the request 
may file a motion to access the record. 
(2)(B) A person not authorized to access a non-public court record may file a motion to access the record. If the 
court allows access, the court may impose any reasonable conditions to protect the interests favoring closure. 
(2)(C) A person with an interest in a court record may file a motion to classify the record as private, protected or 
sealed. The court shall deny access to the record until the order is entered. 
(2)(D) Motions shall be filed under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 and served under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5. 
The person filing the motion shall serve any representative of the press who has requested notice in the case. The 
court shall conduct a closure hearing when a motion to close a record is contested, when the press has requested 
notice of closure motions in the particular case or when the judge decides public interest in the record warrants a 
hearing. 
(3) In deciding whether to allow access to a court record or whether to classify a court record as private, protected or 
sealed, the court may consider any relevant factor, interest or policy presented by the parties, including but not 
limited to the interests described in Rule 4-202. In ruling on a motion under this rule the judge shall: 
(3)(A) make findings and conclusions about specific records; 
(3)(B) identify and balance the interests favoring opening and closing the record; and 
(3)(C) if the record is ordered closed, determine there are no reasonable alternatives to closure sufficient to protect 
the interests favoring closure. 
(4) A request under this rule is governed also by Rule 4-202.06. A motion under this rule is not governed by Rule 4-
202.06 or Rule 4-202.07. 
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(a) commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an explosion; and 
(b) that contains oxidizing or combustive units or other ingredients in proportions, quantities, or packing so that: 
(i) an ignition by fire, friction, concussion, percussion, or detonator of any part of the compound or mixture may cause 
a sudden generation of highly heated gases; and 
(if) the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of 
(A) producing destructive eflFects on contiguous objects; or 
(B) causing death or serious bodily injury. 
(10) "Government audit agency" means any governmental entity that conducts an audit. 
(11) (a) "Governmental entity" means: 
(i) executive department agencies of the state, the offices of the governor, lieutenant governor, state auditor, attorney 
general, and state treasurer, the Board of Pardons and Parole, the Board of Examiners, the National Guard, the Career 
Service Review Board, the State Board of Education, the State Board of Regents, and the State Archives; 
(ii) the Office of the Legislative Auditor General, Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst, Office of Legislative Research 
and General Counsel, the Legislature, and legislative committees, except any political party, group, caucus, or rules or 
sifting committee of the Legislature; 
(iii) courts, the Judicial Council, the Office of the Court Administrator, and similar administrative units in the judicial 
branch; 
(iv) any state-fimded institution of higher education or public education; or 
(v) any political subdivision of the state, but, if a political subdivision has adopted an ordinance or a policy relating to 
infonnation practices pursuant to Section 63G-2-701. this chapter shall apply to the political subdivision to the extent 
specified in Section 63G-2-701 or as specified in any other section of this chapter that specifically refers to political 
subdivisions. 
(b) "Governmental entity" also means every office, agency, board, bureau, committee, department, advisory board, or 
commission of an entity listed in Subsection (1 l)(a) that is funded or established by the government to carry out the 
public's business. 
(c) "Governmental entity" does not include the Utah Educational Savings Plan created in Section 53B-8a-103. 
(12) "Gross compensation" means every form of remuneration payable for a given period to an individual for services 
provided including salaries, commissions, vacation pay, severance pay, bonuses, and any board, rent, housing, lodging, 
payments in kind, and any similar benefit received from the individual's employer. 
(13) "Individual" means a human being. 
(14) (a) "Initial contact report" means an initial written or recorded report, however titled, prepared by peace officers 
engaged in public patrol or response duties describing official actions initially taken in response to either a public complaint 
about or the discovery of an apparent violation of law, which report may describe: 
(i) the date, time, location, and nature of the complaint, the incident, or offense; 
(ii) names of victims; 
(iii) the nature or general scope of the agency's initial actions taken in response to the incident; 
(iv) the general nature of any injuries or estimate of damages sustained in the incident; 
(v) the name, address, and other identifying infonnation about any person arrested or charged in connection with the 
incident; or 
(vi) the identity of the public safety personnel, except, undercover personnel, or prosecuting attorney involved in 
responding to the initial incident. 
(b) Initial contact reports do not include follow-up or investigative reports prepared after the initial contact report. 
However, if the information specified in Subsection (14)(a) appears in follow-up or investigative reports, it may only be 
treated confidentially if it is private, controlled, protected, or exempt from disclosure under Subsection 63G-2-201(3)(b). 
(15) 'Legislative body" means the Legislature. 
(16) "Notice of compliance" means a statement confirming that a governmental entity has complied with a records 
committee order. 
(17) 'Person" means: 
(a) an individual; 
(b) a nonprofit or profit corporation; 
(c) a partnership; 
(d) a sole proprietorship; 
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Records that must be disclosed. 
63G-2-301. Records that must be disclosed. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) 'Business address" means a single address of a governmental agency designated for the public to contact an 
employee or officer of the governmental agency. 
(b) 'Business email address" means a single email address of a governmental agency designated for the public to 
contact an employee or officer of the governmental agency. 
(c) 'Business telephone number" means a single telephone number of a governmental agency designated for the public 
to contact an employee or officer of the governmental agency. 
(2) The following records are public except to the extent they contain infomiation expressly permitted to be treated 
confidentially under the provisions of Subsections 63G-2~201(3)(b) and (6)(a): 
(a) laws; 
(b) the name, gender, gross compensation, job title, job description, business address, business email address, 
business telephone number, number of hours worked per pay period, dates of enployment, and relevant education, 
previous enployment, and similar job qualifications of a current or former enployee or officer of the governmental entity, 
excluding: 
(i) undercover law enforcement personnel; and 
(ii) investigative personnel if disclosure could reasonably be expected to impair the effectiveness of investigations or 
endanger any individual's safety; 
(c) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, and orders that are made by a governmental entity in an 
administrative, adjudicative, or judicial proceeding except that if the proceedings were properly closed to the public, the 
opinion and order may be withheld to the extent that the)/ contain information that is private, controlled, or protected; 
(d) final interpretations of statutes or rules by a governmental entity unless classified as protected as provided in 
Subsections 630-2-3050 6\ (17), and (18); 
(e) information contained in or compiled from a transcript, minutes, or report of the open portions of a meeting of a 
governmental entity as provided by Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act, including the records of all votes 
of each member of the governmental entity; 
(f) judicial records unless a court orders the records to be restricted under the rules of civil or criminal procedure or 
unless the records are private under this chapter; 
(g) unless otherwise classified as private under Section 63G-2-303, records or parts of records filed with or 
maintained by county recorders, clerks, treasurers, surveyors, zoning commissions, the Division of Forestry, Fire, and 
State Lands, the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining, the Division of 
Water Rights, or other governmental entities that give public notice of: 
(i) titles or encumbrances to real property; 
(ii) restrictions on the use of real property; 
(iii) the capacity of persons to take or convey title to real property; or 
(iv) tax status for real and personal property; - • 
(h) records of the Department of Commerce that evidence incorporations, mergers, name changes, and uniform 
commercial code filings; 
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(i) data on individuals that would otherwise be private under this chapter if the individual who is the subject of the 
record lias given the governmental entity written permission to make the records available to the public; 
(j) documentation of the compensation that a governmental entity pays to a contractor or private provider; 
(k) summary data; 
(1) voter registration records, including an individual's voting history, except for those parts of the record that are 
classified as private in Subsection 63G-2-302(l)(i); 
(m) for an elected official, as defined in Section 11-47-102, a telephone number, if available, and email address, if 
available, where that elected official may be reached as required in Title 11, Chapter 47, Access to Elected Officials; 
(n) for a school community council member, a telephone number, if available, and email address, if available, where 
that elected official may be reached directly as required in Section 53A-la-108: and 
(o) annual audited financial statements of the Utah Educational Savings Plan described in Section 53B-8a-.Hl. 
(3) The following records are normally public, but to the extent that a record is expressly exempt from disclosure, 
access maybe restricted under Subsection 63G-2-201(3)(b). Section 63G-2-302, 63G-2-304L or 63G-2-305: 
(a) administrative staff manuals, instructions to staff; and statements of policy; 
(b) records documenting a contractor's or private provider's compliance with the terms of a contract with a 
governmental entity; 
(c) records documenting the services provided by a contractor or a private provider to the extent the records would be 
public if prepared by the govemmental entity; 
(d) contracts entered into by a governmental entity; 
(e) any account, voucher, or contract that deals with the receipt or expenditure of funds by a govemmental entity; 
(f) records relating to government assistance or incentives publicly disclosed, contracted for, or given by a 
governmental entity, encouraging a person to expand or relocate a business in Utah, except as provided in Subsection 
63G-2-305(35): 
(g) chronological logs and initial contact reports; 
(h) correspondence by and with a governmental entity in which the governmental entity determines or states an opinion 
upon the rights of the state, a political subdivision, the public, or any person; 
(i) empirical data contained in drafts if: 
(i) the empirical data is not reasonably available to the requester elsewhere in similar form; and 
(ii) the governmental entity is given a reasonable opportunity to correct any errors or make nonsubstantive changes 
before release; 
(j) drafts that are circulated to anyone other than: 
(i) a governmental entity; 
(ii) a political subdivision; 
(iii) a federal agency if the governmental entity and the federal agency are jointly responsible for implementation of a 
program or project that has been legislatively approved; 
(iv) a government-managed corporation; or 
(v) a contactor or private provider; 
(k) drafts that have never been finalized but were relied upon by the governmental entity in carrying out action or 
policy; 
(1) original data in a computer program if the governmental entity chooses not to disclose the program; 
(m) arrest warrants after issuance, except that, for good cause, a court may order restricted access to arrest warrants 
prior to service; 
(n) search warrants after execution and filing of the return, except that a court, for good cause, may order restricted 
access to search warrants prior to trial; 
(o) records that would disclose information relating to formal charges or disciplinary actions against a past or present 
governmental entity employee if: 
(i) the disciplinary action has been completed and all time periods for administrative appeal have expired; and 
(ii) the charges on which the disciplinary action was based were sustained; 
(p) records maintained by the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration, or the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining that evidence mineral production on government lands; 
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(q) final audit reports; 
(r) occupational and professional licenses; 
(s) business licenses; and 
(t) a notice of violation, a notice of agency action under Section 63G-4-201, or similar records used to initiate 
proceedings for discipline or sanctions against persons regulated by a governmental entity, but not including records that 
initiate employee discipline. 
(4) The list of public records in this section is not exhaustive and should not be used to limit access to records. 
Amended by Chapter 45, 2011 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 46, 2011 General Session 
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Definitions. 
63G-2-103. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Audit" means: 
(a) a systematic examination of financial, management, program, and related records for the purpose of detennining the 
fair presentation of financial statements, adequacy of internal controls, or compliance with laws and regulations; or 
(b) a systematic examination of program procedures and operations for the purpose of detennining their effectiveness, 
economy, efficiency, and compliance with statutes and regulations. 
(2) "Chronological logs" mean the regular and customary summary records of law enforcement agencies and other 
public safety agencies that show: 
(a) the time and general nature of police, fire, and paramedic calls made to the agency; and 
(b) any arrests or jail bookings made by the agency. 
(3) "Classification," "classify," and their derivative fonns mean detennining whether a record series, record, or 
infonnation within a record is public, private, controlled, protected, or exeixpt from disclosure under Subsection 63G-2-
201(3)(b). 
(4) (a) "Computer program" means: 
(i) a series of instructions or statements that pemut the functioning of a computer system in a manner designed to 
provide storage, retrieval, and manipulation of data from the computer system; and 
(ii) any associated documentation and source material that explain how to operate the computer program 
(b) "Computer program" does not mean: 
(i) the original data, including numbers, text, voice, graphics, and images; 
(ii) analysis, compilation, and other manipulated forms of the original data produced by use of the program; or 
(iii) the mathematical or statistical fomiulas, excluding the underlying mathematical algorithms contained in the program, 
that would be used if the manipulated forms of the original data were to be produced manually. 
(5) (a) "Contactor" means: 
(i) any person who contracts with a governmental entity to provide goods or services directly to a governmental entity; 
or 
(ii) any private, nonprofit organization that receives funds from a governmental entity, 
(b) "Contractor" does not mean a private provider. 
(6) "Controlled record" means a record containing data on individuals that is controlled as provided by Section 63G-2-
304. 
(7) 'Designation," "designate," and their derivative forms mean indicating, based on a governmental entity's familiarity 
with a record series or based on a governmental entity's review of a reasonable sample of a record series, the primary 
classification that a majority of records in a record series would be given if classified and the classification that other 
records typically present in the record series would be given if classified. 
(8) "Elected official" means each person elected to a state office, county office, municipal office, school board or 
school district office, local district office, or special service district office, but does not include judges. 
(9) "Explosive" means a chemical compound, device, or mixture: 
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Legislative intent. 
63G-2-102. Legislative intent. 
(1) In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes two constitutional rights: 
(a) the public's right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's business; and 
(b) the right of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities. 
(2) The Legislature also recognizes a public policy interest in allowing a government to restrict access to certain 
records, as specified in this chapter, for the public good. 
(3) It is the intent of the Legislature to: 
(a) promote the public's right of easy and reasonable access to unrestricted public records; 
(b) specify those conditions under which the public interest in aDowingrestiictions on access to records may outweigh 
the public's interest in access; 
(c) prevent abuse of confidentiality by governmental entities by pemiitting confidential treatment of records only as 
provided in this chapter; 
(d) provide guidelines for both disclosure and restrictions on access to government records, which are based on the 
equitable weighing of the pertinent interests and which are consistent with nationwide standards of information practices; 
(e) favor public access when, in the application of this act, countervailing interests are of equal weight; and 
(f) establish fair and reasonable records management practices. 
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case presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of furtherlitigation. 
(f) Domestic relations cases. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the equitable powers of the courts in 
domestic relations cases. 
Ad vis o ry Co m m itte.e Note s 
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Rule 65A. Injunctions. 
(a) Prel iminary injunctions. \ 
(a)(1) Notice. No prel iminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party. 
(a)(2) Conso l ida t ion of hear ing. Before or after the c o m m e n c e m e n t of the hearing of an application for a 
preliminary injunct ion, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consol idated with 
the hearing of the appl icat ion. Even when this consol idat ion is not ordered, any evidence received upon an 
application for a preliminary injunction which would be admiss ib le at the trial on the merits becomes part of the trial 
record and need not be repeated at the trial. This subdiv is ion (a)(2) shal l be so construed and appl ied as to save to 
the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury. 
(b) Tempora ry restraining orders. 
(b)(1) Notice. No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the adverse party or that party's 
attorney unless (A) it clearly appears from specif ic facts shown by affidavit or by the verif ied complaint that 
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party's 
attorney can be heard in opposi t ion, and (B) the appl icant or the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing 
as to the efforts, if any, that have been made to give notice and the reasons support ing the claim that notice 
should not be required. 
(b)(2) Form of order. Every temporary restraining order shal l be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance and 
shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record. The order shal l define the injury and state why it is 
irreparable. The order shal l expire by its terms within such t ime after entry, not to exceed ten days, as the court 
f ixes, unless within the time so f ixed the order, for good cause shown, is ex tended for a like period or unless the 
party aga ins t whom the order is directed consents that it may be ex tended for a longer per iod. The reasons for the 
ex tens ion shal l be entered of record. 
(b)(3) Priority of hear ing. If a temporary restraining order is granted, the motion for a prel iminary injunction shal l be 
scheduled for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence over all other civil matters except older 
matters of the s a m e character. When the motion comes on for hear ing, the party who obta ined the temporary 
restraining order shal l have the burden to show ent i t lement to a preliminary injunction; if the party does not do so , 
the court shal l d issolve the temporary restraining order. 
(b)(4) Dissolut ion or modif icat ion. On two days ' notice to the party who obtained the temporary restraining order 
without not ice, or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may a p p e a r a n d 
move its d issolut ion or modif icat ion. In that event the court shal l proceed to hear and determine the motion as 
expedi t iously as the ends of justice require. 
(c) Security. 
(c)(1) Requ i rement . The court shall condition issuance of the order or injunction on the giving of security by the 
appl icant, in such sum and form as the court deems proper, unless it appears that none of the parties will incur or 
suffer costs, attorney fees or damage as the result of any wrongful order or injunction, or unless there exists some 
other substant ia l reason for dispensing with the requi rement of security. No such security shal l be required of the 
United States, the State of Utah, or of an officer, agency , or subdivis ion of either; nor shal l it be required when it is 
prohibited by law. 
(c)(2) Amoun t not a l imitat ion. The amount of security shal l not establ ish or limit the a m o u n t of costs, including 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with the restraining order or preliminary injunction, or damages that 
may be awarded to a party who is found to have been wrongfully restrained or enjo ined. 
(c)(3) Jurisdict ion over surety. A surety upon a bond or undertaking under this rule submits to the jurisdiction of the 
court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as agen t upon whom any papers affecting the surety's liability 
on the bond or undertaking may be served. The surety's liability may be enforced on mot ion without the necessity 
of an independen t act ion. The motion and such notice of the mot ion as the court prescribes may be served on the 
clerk of the court who shal l forthwith mail copies to the persons giving the security if their addresses are known. 
(d) Form and scope . Every restraining order and order granting an injunction shall set forth the reasons for its 
issuance. It shal l be specif ic in terms and shal l describe in reasonable detai l , and not by reference to the complaint 
or other document , the act or acts sought to be restra ined. It shal l be binding only upon the parties to the act ion, 
their off icers, agen ts , servants, emp loyees , and at torneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation 
with them who receive notice, in person or through counse l , or otherwise, of the order. If a restraining order is 
granted without notice to the party restrained, it shal l state the reasons justifying the court's decision to proceed 
without not ice. 
(e) Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a showing by the applicant that: 
(e)(1) The appl icant wilt suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues; 
(e)(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed order or injunction may 
cause the party restrained or en jo ined; 
(e)(3) The order or injunction, if i ssued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and 
(e)(4) There is a substant ia l l ikel ihood that the appl icant wilt prevail on the merits of the underlying c la im, or the 
. . . . —- ..__,
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Article I Declaration of Rights 
[Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
Section 11 
Article I, Section 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, wliich shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
wliich he is a party. 
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Attorney fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
78B-5-825. Attorney fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith - Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the 
action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the 
court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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is what the contract defines. 
I asked Mr. Hogan on direct examination as to every 
document that we had attached to our complaint if he was not 
the source of the information, :f the information was not 
something rhat he obtained by virtue of the services he 
rendered pursuant to the contract, and he agreed with me in 
each instance, including the complaint filed in Federal Court. 
The information that he has placed in these materials 
by way of an attack on UTOPIA is uniformly information he would 
not have had but for the fact he entered into the contract, 
made the promise of confidentiality, and then has now chosen 
to breach that promise. 
THE COURT: Well, what is the information that you, 
both, that he has disclosed that's confidential, and that which 
you seek to prevent him from disclosing in the future? 
MR. OLSON: The information is the false accusations 
directed at Mr. Marriott. In particular that somehow he's 
trying to riq a bid in favor of his brother. The evidence is 
-- first of all, is false; but moreover, because of the fact 
that he was on the inside, and because he had access to the 
company by virtue of the services he was rendering, it lends a 
patina to that accusation that once those feathers are out in 
the wind, they're gone. 
That's been a very major concern for this company, 
which is at a crucial point in time in terms of obtaining its 
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bonding for the two -- both trie bonding with respect to the 
long-term bonding for the infrastructure, as well as the work 
that needs to be done from the curb to home. 
THE COt-RT: Your ^u;ge;-.: ;r. here : s that by filing the 
Federal lawsuit, that he necessarily discloses information that 
he is prohibited from disclosing pursuant to his agreement. 
MR. OLSON: That is exactly what he -- it's what he 
testified. He obtained the information through the services 
he rendered. He gave it to his attorney. His attorney wrote 
it into the complaint, and the complaint was then filed. 
Then, as he predicted, as his attorney predicted, 
and as he informed him, the press, following the filings, 
got a hold if it. It's now been published in the Salt Lake 
Tribune, and we don't know what the consequences of that are 
going to be, but when you do that at a crucial time, which he 
acknowledged is a crucial time for the success and survival 
of the company, you create and cause impacts that you have no 
control over. 
This had nothing to do with trying to fix a problem. 
We -- you don't go about fixing a problem such as, say, you 
know, fixing your toilet, by tearing down the house; but that's 
exactly what Mr. Hogar. seems t••;• think is the proper remedy and 
the proper way for him to go about it. 
If, on the other hand, you want to prevent somebody 
from -- you know, if you want some money frim their., you'll say, 
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1 "I'll tear down your house to fix your toilet," and that is not 
2 the way you go about doing things. 
3 The way you go about doing them is if he has a problem, 
4 you first verify whether or not the decision makers know the 
5 information, which has now been proved in spades that they 
6 do know the information that he seems so concerned about. 
7 Secondly, you then verify whether or not the information is 
8 -- or the potential conflict has any meaning in the context of 
9 what's happening in the company. 
10 Here, of course, we now have the benefit of evidence. 
11 We know that that's not "he case. We know that Mr. Marriott 
12 would just as soon this contract not go to Tetrotech; but now 
13 all the accusations are out there, and they have a certain 
14 shine to them because they're being made by somebody who 
15 claims he's a -whistle blower. 
16 All. this is permitted be -- or he claims it's 
17 permitted, notwithstanding the fact he made the promise of 
18 confidentiality, and he's acknowledged that that information 
19 is in his possession solely because he was rendering services 
20 pursuant to the agreement that he signed, that he prepared, 
21 that he promised to abide by. 
22 So the irreparable harm is there. The balance of the 
23 equities -- or I guess you --- we call it the relative weight 
24 of injury, there's nothing that he's inhibited from doing. 
25 I He can sue or. that contract. We naTre not made any motion to 
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dismiss the right -— his right tc seek redress. If he has 
some contractual or quasi contractual right, he's welcome to 
go forward in that regard. 
We would -- you know, we think those are all going 
to be dealt; with as morions for summary -judgments or motions 
to dismiss; but he's welcome to do that. He's already filed 
what's essentially his counterclaim in Federal Court. 
That should be consolidated with this case, and we 
should move forward; but we shouldn't have the gun to our head 
that he's going to disseminate information, endow it with a 
sense of validity because he was with the company and because 
he's essentially doing this in defiance of his confidentiality 
responsibilities, and then have it a loosed to do whatever 
mischief it might do. 
I can't predict what that mischief is going to be. 
This is why you enter into a confidentiality agreement. It's 
as if some member of our Court of Appeals were to become 
unhappy over something and decide that they would openly 
discuss the deliberations of the Court when it reviews an 
opinion from this Court. 
That would be, I'm sure, a matter of great interest 
to the press; but there are reasons why having been permitted 
inside the room, so to speak, you don't get to go outside the 
room and talk about those things. You can, if the documents 
are otherwise available through: GRAMA. One car: seek them, one 
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can obiain them; Out that's written documentation with respect 
to certain subject matters. You ask for it, and if it exists, 
you get it. 
My guess is there's iittie or not hi no relative to this 
problem that is part of a written record. Rather, he's created 
-- he and his attorneys have created essentially a record in 
the aftermath as a threat against the company, and said, "You 
pay us this money or we talk about this." 
THE COURT: Well, what you seem to be suggesting is 
that pursuant to this contract I would prevent Mr. Hogan from 
voicing his concerns, if you will, and his accusations that the 
bidding process, the RFP process and so forth was tainted in 
some way. 
MR. OLSON: I have no prob --
THE COURT: He's prevented from making that accusation, 
with my injunction. Is that -- is that what I'm going to 
prevent him from doing? 
MR. OLSON: He's prevented from making that accusation 
in litigation where it's irrelevant, and he's prevented from 
making that accusation to the press. He's not prevented from 
making — 
THE COURT: Well, I mean, is that what you're asking me 
to do? 
MR. OLSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: In fact, that would be the order, would be 
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you are -- you are enjoined from accusing? 
MR. OLSON: No, the order would be that he is not to 
disclose information obtained while rendering the services, as 
his contract provided. One consequence of that would be that 
he's not to make accusations of this sort outside the confines 
of UTOPIA; but it's only UTOPIA that can respond to these 
anyway. So the only meaningful way you make an accusation of 
this sort is to make it to the board. If he's concerned, let 
him bring it to the board. 
THE COURT: Well, do I manage that? I guess what does 
trouble me is the -- I mean, he's agreed not to -- in fact, 
there's particular -- and I won't cite the language. We have 
the lang -- the actual language, the confidentiality. It 
doesn't say anything about -- you're not -- you're not --
you're prohibited from going public, if you will, in some 
fashion with an accusation that our agency has not been forth-
right in its processes. I mean, is that --
MR. OLSON: There is -- the way one goes about making 
those accusations is you go to the State --
THE COURT: Well, I understand what you're saying is 
the process, but I'm saying in terms of the ability that I 
could -- such an injunction that Mr. Hogan is enjoined from 
accusing individuals connected with the organization or the 
organization itself with wrongdoing, or --
MR. OLSON: Year., that's --
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1 THE COURT: ~ that's what the in]unction would --
2 MR. OLSON: That is, your Honor. If he hadn't -- if 
3 he had simply made the accusation at some point, and not tied 
4 it. to what was essentially a shakedown, I would be in a much 
5 different posture. 
6 This was not approached to us with 'XI have a great 
7 concern, and nothing in this world is going to stop me." It 
8 was, "I'm going to make this accusation because you -- or 
9 you'll pay me $200,000. Plus, you'll let me be the search 
10 team for finding a new Executive Director." 
11 That was how we initially received it. It was not 
12 with the suggestion that this was a sincere effort to right a 
13 wrong. In fact, the evidence has showed abundantly this was 
14 essentially a high level meddling at a crucial and sensitive 
15 time. We need to have the stability of knowing that in the 
16 near future we're able to move forward. 
17 Certainly the point is made and the testimony is 
18 that there is nothing going on here -- or that is going to 
19 go on here. It isn't going to be entirely transparent. The 
20 problem he is pointing at is a non-problem that is a problem 
21 only because his willingness to disregard his promise to hold 
22 things in confidence. He's identified that those things he 
2 3 knows he obtained through the relationship he had. 
24 Let's suppose he had come with that contract, and 
25 we look at thc:t orovisicr: ar:d r.e says, ": car:'t promise to 
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keep these in confidence. I need the flexibility to blow the 
whistle if I need to." Well, then the question becomes, "Do we 
enter into this contract with him or find somebody else?" This 
is the way in which businesses operate so that they could have 
the assurance that when things are discussed and matters are 
handled they're brought within the balance of the business and 
handled in the way in which the business handles things. 
Nobody stopped him from approaching the directors. 
Nobody has prevented him from going to the legitimate sources 
of power within the organization and bringing his concerns. 
The fact is his concerns are improbable, because there is no 
RFP out there. There is nothing but a worry about a worry 
directed at a person who clearly has no interest in having 
Tetrotech even be a contractor. 
I can't explain that to the papers. I can't explain 
that to anybody who might have a feather land on their shoulder 
from this breeze and this broken pillow which is essentially 
what Mr. Hogan is proposing to do. So given that, the only 
thing we can ask the Court to do is to assist us in giving 
meaning to the confidentiality language. 
THE COURT: Well, (inaudible) a factual thing. You 
mean, Mr. Hogan is prevented from if he sees a crime being 
committed during the course of his employment, that he's 
prevented and that he would be enjoined from reporting the 
crime; is that whc re suggesting? 
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MR. OLSON: No, I'm -- I nave noi said that at all. 
In fact, we could craft this very -- very, very simply to say 
that he is not to -- he is not to disclose the information 
that's contained in the documents attached to trie verified 
complaint. Thar that remains under seal and will be for the 
pendency of the litigation. 
That seems to me to be what's really going on here, 
and is certainly what is the direct focus of our concern. 
It doesn't have to be something big and broad, because he, 
himself, has acknowledged what this information consists of, 
and he, himself, has acknowledged that this is what apparently 
he sees the crime being committed, as we might put it. 
THE COURT: The documents would be the notice of expira 
-- I'm not --
MR. OLSON: It would be --
THE COURT: -- what do I have in evidence here in terms 
of the documents •--
MR. OLSON: Well, T:he documents would be --
THE COURT: -- that you want me to keep from him 
disclosing? 
MR. OLSON: The information would be the information 
found in Exhibit ? -- oh, we marked it -- excuse me. It would 
be the information found in P-2, the information found in F-4, 
the information found in P-6, and the information --
THE COURT: Well, the P-2 is the complaint? 
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MR. OLSON: It's the -- it's the draft complaint. p-4 
is the demand letter which has the various allegations. P-6 is 
the followup letter which -- and P-9 which is the Federal Court 
complaint, which basically just takes information in the first 
three, which were attached to the complaint in this action and 
repeats it and amplifies on it. 
THE COURT: Let me ask another question here. The 
other concern that Mr. -- or the other ground Mr. Christensen 
cites to is that under Rule 65(a), there has to be a showing 
here that you are likely to prevail -- or likely -- or that 
there should be further litigation. Likely to prevail or there 
is a need for further litigation, I think is the phrase in the 
rule, of the underlying claim. 
MR. OLSON: Right. 
THE COURT: But that your claim, actually, is not 
claims. They're — it's a request for an injunction. Then a 
declaration. In fact, the relief you request for two things. 
You make two claims. That is, first cause of action, specific 
performance; and second, declaratory relief. You ask for two 
— this relief. A temporary restraining order and then a 
declaration. 
The agreement expires or: fey 13: , 2011. UTOPIA has no 
legal duty to renew the contract. UTOPIA has no legal duty to 
compensate above and beyond the compensation specified in the 
agreement; and UTOFIA owes no other legal duty to Hogan -with 
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respect to the services provided by Hogan to UTOPIA. That is, 
under Rule 65(a), not claims that you would have to show you 
are likely to prevail on. 
MR. OLSON: No, our only claim that reiates to the 
injunction is a claim for a permanent injunction that he 
not disclose the information that is set forth -- well, the 
information that would be subject to his confidentiality 
agreement. 
That is in paragraph 31, where we are entitled to a 
temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent 
injunction specifically to enforce the confidentiality 
agreement. This is an act for specific performance of a 
promise that he made. The only meaningful remedy of law is 
specific-- or remedy of law or equity is a specific performance 
of the promise, because if --
THE COURT: The promise is not to disclose --
MR. OLSON: That's right. 
THE COURT: -- confident -- I see. 
MR. OLSON: That's the promise. So that's the under-
lying claim to which we believe we will prevail on the merits, 
and we believe will prevail or, the merits, your Honor, because 
he made that promise, and we don't believe that the reasons he 
offers for ignoring the promise he made suffice as presented by 
him. 
•>orne I 
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mean, Mr. Cnristen.sen describes a situation that is not before 
this Court. This is not some stranger to UTOPIA, or even some-
body who signed a contract that didn't have such a provision. 
The person before the Court is somebody who prepared and then 
signed the contract that made that promise. It is part of the 
consideration. 
There is no case before this Court where -- or no 
principal of law presented to this Court that under such 
circumstances the person who made that promise can circumvent 
the consequences of that promise in their specific instance. 
There may oe "tnet ir^^r.c-s thai aren't before this 
Court, but we've -- we've heard the evidence today, and the 
evidence before this Court at this time is the information 
that is being disclosed or proposed for disclosure is in fact 
derived from the reiat :.or;sr.ip; 3rd that Mr. Hogati did prepare 
the contract, and that having prepared the contract and having 
signed the contract, he made that promise. 
Here he finds it inconvenient to nis strategy, for 
whatever he thinks he wants to get out of this relationship, he 
finds it inconvenient to keep the promise. He cites a number 
of overriding factors which apparently were not -- or did not 
occur to him at the time that he prepared the contract and made 
the promise, but now are offered. 
They aii come about at a time when he knows and admits 
that his r:qht -- or his :.Cairr. or h:s tnouqnt to disclose all 
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uiar capacity for pressure on the company. 
Therefore he asks the Court :o do this. That's why we moved 
at the time we did, sought to move expeditiously, sought to 
keep) this within the bounds that the contract would otherwise 
contemplate it be kept under. 
That's why the evidence that I adduced from him 
today was aimed at establishing the information he wants to 
disseminate is information that he received in the course of 
the performance of his services under the contract. 
THE COURT: Does the -- such an injunction -- you said, 
"What I would like to have an injunction preventing him from 
disclosing the documents reflected in the exhibits." 
MR. OLSON: Well, it's the information contained in 
the documents which are the exhibits, yes. The ones that 
identified. 
THE COURT: Is that -- is there a problem there with 
your prior restraint? I mean, I've had no evidence here that 
he intends to disclose any of those documents. 
MR. OLSON: They, themselves, say he -- it's the threat 
of disclosure that -- contained in those documents that's the 
reason we brought the action. If we wait until he does it -- I 
mean, I think his filing of the Federal complaint is an attempt 
to moot this entire matter. I believe he did so in defiance of 
the Court, in any event, based on his own testimony that this 
information is information obtained in the course of services. 
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should be enjoined? 
MR. OLSON: Weil, I think rha: at this point --
THE COURT: Which means that you want me to enjoin from 
filing the Federal complaint. 
MR. OLSON: Weil, he's filed the Federal complaint, 
your Honor. We have a pending motion which Judge Stewart 
indicated he would -- they're supposed to respond by tomorrow 
to have that placed under seal. The most we can do there is 
place it under seal, as we asked this Court to place this Court 
under seal. 
So that's a matter we'll take up with Judge Stewart. 
I think at this point that Counsel chose for whatever reason to 
disregard the order, to deem that order as not having the scope 
that I think it has, and to file that complaint. 
THE COURT: Let me ask this so I can fully understand. 
You want me to enjoin all -- everything that was said, anyway, 
everything that was written in the Federal complaint? 
MR. OLSON: I want -~ I believe there's more in the 
Federal complaint than there is ir. this complaint, but I want 
-- for purposes of this motion I would ask the Court to enjoin 
all facts that are set forth in the three matters that are 
attached to the -- to this -- that were attached to the 
complaint in this action. That's all that we had in front 
of the Court. I don't think I can ask for more, and that it 
not be further disclosed. 
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before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is this an accurate copy of the feasibility study that 
you saw? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Ail right. Was this document published? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, move for the admission of 
D-ll. 
MR. OLSON: No objection. 
THE COURT: Received. 
(Exhibit D-ll received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. CHRISTENSEN: Isn't it true that UTOPIA 
disseminates information to the public about its business and 
marketing plans? 
A. There are some that we don't. 
Q. Which ones do you? 
A. I would refer you to Counsel, to be more specific, but 
there are some things that are protected, that are strategic in 
nature. 
Q. So your testimony is that there is information that 
does not have to be disseminated? 
A. There is -- there are -- there is information that's 
not, in your terms, GRAMAble. For example, somebody's opinion, 
or what they think might happen, or his propensity or what 
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1 might occur, people's opinions/ for example. 
2 0- You're saying oral opinions or opinions that are in 
3 someone's head are not subject to GRAMA? 
4 A. I believe that's the case. 
5 Q. All right, but documents that are produced in further-
6 ance of the business arid marketing plans of UTOPIA are subject 
7 to GRAMA, correct? 
8 A. We are a very transparent organization, and typically 
9 people have to GRAMA *; hose documents, yes, sir. 
10 Q. If they sought disclosure, you would comply with that, 
11 correct? 
12 A. Yes, sir. 
13 Q. In fact, isn't UTOPIA trying to market itself as a 
14 transparent organization? 
15 A. We don't market ourselves as transparent. We're 
16 simply a government entity that is required to be transparent. 
17 Q. Let me refer you to an exhibit that was introduced 
18 earlier as Plaintiff's 3. If you can turn now to your tab C. 
19 Do you see that document titled "Notice of Expiration"? 
2 0 A. I do. March 24--. 
21 Q. Isn't it true in this document you state to Mr. Hogan 
22 that a statement to Mr. Pantier was outside of the scope of his 
2 3 professional services agreement? 
24 A. I do. His suggestion, sir, that Mr. Pantier was going 
2 5 J to be fired had nothing to do with his business or in his scope 
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MR. OLSON: Objection, irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. BY MR. CHRISTENSEN: Have you disclosed information 
to the public about your work with UTOPIA as part of your 
employment? 
A. I was encouraged to. Mr. Marriott has done the same--
MR. OLSON: Objection, your Honor, not responsive. 
THE WITNESS: -- on many occasions. So, yes, I was 
encouraged to, and I have. 
THE COURT: Do you have an objection? 
MR. OLSON: I'd move' to strike. It was not a responsive 
-- it's a "yes" or "no" question. Mr. Hoqan has gone through 
a narrative to accuse Mr. Marriott of something rather than 
respond to the question. 
THE COURT: I think that was the nature of the answer. 
I'll strike the last answer. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: All right. 
THE COURT: Your next question, please. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Can I re-ask that question so we get 
a response? 
THE COURT: Well, whatever your next question is. I 
don't manage the case. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'll re-ask the question. 
Q. BY MR. CHRISTENSEN: As part of your work at UTOPIA, 
did vou make disclosure v: the- r.ur.lic about vour work at 
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UTOPIA? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did you do that? 
A. Part of it was encouraged; part of it was required. 
In order for the Cities to vote in favor of bonding, we had to 
present them with the feasibility study, which has more detail 
than I even have in my possession about the -- every detail you 
can imagine about UTOPIA is sitting in that document, which by 
the way has already been reviewed in public -- in the public 
domain and written about in the Salt Lake Tribune. So the 
details are there, and we've had to present them in front of 
City Council in order to get them to vote on the plan to move 
forward. 
Q. All right. Is the RFP process a public process? 
A. It is. 
Q. The information related to the RFP process is 
information you had disclosed to the public in your job at 
UTOPIA? 
A. I guess the ques -- I'm not quite sure. 
Q. I'll ask the question again. What type of information 
have you disclosed to the public in your role in UTOPIA? 
A. Typically it would be -- there wasn't -- there were no 
-- there were no restrictions, and the difficulty is to look at 
the blanket confidentiality clause. It doesn't define what's 
confidentlal. 
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S m c e you have a document here that effectively takes 
all of the information that one would consider confidential, 
and it's already in the public contain. So there is very little 
limitations on what should be or could be out there. 
I don't --- I didn't actively engage in talking to the 
public about any of the information. It was all within, you 
know, respect to this RFP issue was -- was internal; but on a 
routine basis we would put information out there, and not only 
here in Utah. 
It was our objective to actually move this information 
to other communities around the United States. We even went to 
the White House and talked about what we're doing here in Utah. 
People ask us routinely what are we doing here, and we disclose 
it. We've disclosed every detail about the organization you 
can imagine to organizations like Google, that want to know how 
they can replicate what we do. We encourage it. 
Q. Do you know whether the hiring practices of UTOPIA are 
public informa11or.? 
MR. OLSON: Objection, relevance, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer that question. 
THE WITNESS: It's my understanding that everything is. 
So that would be included; the hiring practices would also be 
public. 
Q. BY MR. CHRISTENSEN: What is your intent in filing a 
Federal lav;suit? 
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Former UTOPIA contractor accused of extortion • u ™ * 
Ma»ls:,20ll ffT»7:40fjrn 
By Richard Burwash, ksl.com Contributor 
SALT LAKE CITY — Chris Hogan, a Colorado man retained by UTOPIA as a contractor lo provide consulting services, 
Is being accused of extortion in court documents that were unsealed in Utah's 3rd District Court on Wednesday. Utah 
Telecommunications Open Infrastructure Acjency, or UTOPIA, is a Tiber optic deployer run by a consortium of 16 Ulan 
cities to provide high-speed broadband to their communities, and Hogan provided markeling consulting far the past 
three years. 
Hogan's contract was not renewed last month by UTOPIA 
due to "performance Issues," according to UTOPIA board 
chairman and Mldvale City Manager Kane Loader. On 
March 21 and 24, days after being informed that the 
contract v/as nol going to be renewed, Hogan's Bttorney. 
Steve S. Chrlstensen, sent written notices to UTOPIA 
threatening to file a lawsuit and noting that Hogan would 
bring unfavorable public scrullny to UTOPIA unless specific 
demands oFHogan's were meL Such publicity, according to 
What is,.. UTOPIA? 
The Utah Telecommunication Opsn Infrastructure Agency 
(UTOPIA) la a group of 16 Utah dtios thai joined togethor 
to form a staie-of-thoart fiber-optic notworlt. The notwork 
brings Ttber-to-tht-premiae technology to the cities allowing 
for taster services thai are uninterrupted by copper wiring 
, or shared connections wllh neighbors. , 
fchristpnson, wwrtd "throator, to dactrey tho vmth of UTOPIA." 
Hogan's financial demands totaled 5219,000. including punitive damages and legal fees; but he also made the unusual 
request of demanding that UTOPIA executive director Todd Marriott be terminated, that Hogan be allowed to participate 
in the search and training of a nev/ executive director, and that Hogan be free to establish his own succession plan for a 
"smooth transition" with the organization. 'This offer will remain open until April 4,2011,* concluded Christensen. 
"What Mr, Hogan attempts In proposing this extravagant course go by the names of 
•blackmail' and 'extortion,*" replied UTOPIA attorney David Shaw in an April 4 reply, 
unsealed Wednesday. UTOPIA also responded by filing a suit against Hogan in 
Utah's 3rd District Court to ensure that he would abide by the confidentiality clause 
of his contracL Hogan responded Tuesday by filing a lawsuit In U.S. District Court In 
Utah. This suit accuses Marriott of favoring a neighbor for a potential employment 
position, favoring a company that employed Marriott's brotherfor a bid. and other 
complaints of mismanagement. 
"Any allegations of impropriety by UTOPIA and its management in this suit are 
without merit, and we stand by UTOPIA CEO Todd Marriott and his team," 
responded Loader in a statement from UTOPIA'S board Wednesday. The 
management team at UTOPIA is sound and continues lo grow and operate our 
award-winning fiber optic network," he said. 
"II ts a very sad situation," noted one UTOPIA vendor. "Chris Hogan was a great 
talenL bul In recenl monlhs exhibited erratic behavior lhet ultimately brought him 
down." 
The lawsuit was filed weeks, or perhaps a couple months, before UTOPIA is 
expected to receive a S20 million round of financing later this spring. 
UTOPIA'S 16 members 
-Brigl-iam City 
-Cedar City 
-Cednr Hills 
-Centervilie 
-Layion 
-Lindon 
-Mldvale 
-Murray 
-Oram 
-Payjion 
-Perry 
-Riverton 
-Tremonlon 
-Vineyard 
-Washington 
-West Valley City 
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UTOPIA contractor faces extortion charges 
May 2, 2011 — 10:47am ET | By Sean.Buckley 
Chris Hogan, a former marketing consultant to open access FTTH 
(Fiber to the Home) provider UTOPIA (Utah Telecommunications 
Open Infrastructure Agency), has been accused of extortion. 
At issue is a contract'dispute between Hogan and UTOPIA. After 
UTOPIA decided not to renew Hogan's contract due to "performance 
issues," his attorney Steve S. Christensen threatened to file a 
lawsuit, adding that he would bring "unfavorable public scrutiny" to 
the consortium if it could not meet his demands. 
Sign up for our FREE newsletter for more news like this sent to your inboxl 
Hogan demanded that he be paid $219,000 to cover punitive 
damages and legal fees and wanted Todd Marriot, UTOPIA'S 
executive director, to be fired. In addition, he wanted to help 
UTOPIA find a replacement for Marriot and establish a "smooth 
transition" plan for the company. 
UTOPIA attorney David Shaw said in response, "What Mr. Hogan 
attempts in proposing this extravagant course go by the names of 
'blackmail1 and 'extortion.'" 
Interestingly, Hogan's lawsuit comes as UTOPIA is about to receive 
a much needed $20 million round of funding this spring. 
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UPDATE: Hamilton's lawyer denies charges as ex-delegate's trial 
begins 
. I Former Del Phillip Harnilton, 59, represented parts of James City County and Newport News 
as a Republican. By Frank Green Published: May 02,2011 Former DeL Phillip A. Hamilton's trial on federal 
extortion and bribery charges... 
May 2,20111 timesdispatch.com 
Read more... 
Ex-Detroit Schools Manager Pleads Guilty To Corruption 
Stephen Hill Faces Extortion, Conspiracy Charges DETROIT — A former Detroit Public Schools manager has 
pleaded guilty to corruption, admitting he took kickbacks on a $3.3 million deal for wellness programs. Stephen 
HOI said... 
May 2, 2011 | cHckondetroit.com 
Read more... 
Aspen woman ordered to leave apartment 
ASPEN - An Aspen woman will have to find another place to live after a district judge Friday rejected her claim 
that sexual discrimination was the driving force behind her eviction. Judge Daniel Petre, after listening to severa... 
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Kerala police arrest woman over Sharjah sex racket 
By Ashraf Padanna /Ti±TLvananthapuraiiiPolice in Kerala have arrested the daughter of a-woman wanted in 
connection wilh a sex racket in the Gulf The arrest of Shahiya, the daughter of Saudha, is the first in the case 
registered... 
May 2, 2011 | silobreaker.com 
Read more... 
Former UTOPIA contractor accused of extortion 
, By Richard Burwash, kslcoin Contibutor SALT LAKE CITY — Chris Hogan, a Colorado 
man retained by UTOPIA as a contractor to provide consulting services, is being accused of extortion in court 
documents that were unsealed in... 
May 2,2011 jkslcom 
Read more... 
Seven arrested for betting in Navi Mumbai 
S Ahmed AS, TNN | May 2,2011, 03.03 am 1ST MUMBAI: A cricket betting racket was busted and seven 
people were arrested, includingNaviMumbai-based boolde Atul GovindjiThakkar alias ChMta, on Saturday. 
A&tii^--Qn^a-tipaQ-^.lt....—. , '• " 
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• May 1, 2011 | fadiatiines.com 
Read more... 
Hussey stars in Chennai IPL win 
|g I DLFA 
m 1L Michael Hussey has combined with Snresh Raina to guide fee Chennai Super Kings to a 19-run 
IPL win over Deccan Chargers on Suiiday.The Australian lefl-hander scored 46 in a 60-run stand with Raina as 
the Super Kings posted 165... 
May 1, 20111 silobreaker.com 
Read more... 
Nalzaro: Setup 
I DON'T personally know Lyzanne Labiste, the woman who was entrapped by intelligence operatives for 
alleged extortion last Friday. But I can only sympathize with her present predicament She was a victim of 
another dirty trick... 
May 1,20111 sunstar.com.ph 
Read more... 
Man dressed as clown going to prison for blackmail 
SAN FRANCISCO—Despite the clown outfit, the threat was no joke. A Redwood City man who pofice say 
wore a clown suit to pick *up extortion money from his immigrant relatives has been sentenced to three years in 
prison. 
May 1, 2011 | insidebayarea.com • 
Read more... 
IPL satta racket busted^ 3 held 
NEW DELHI: A cricket betting racket has been busted in Rohini sector 16 by Outer District Police . The 
accused, identified as Satya Prakash (33), Praveen Shaima (45) and Sandeep Khatri (25), were arrested on 
Friday for their... 
May 1,20111 indiatimes.com 
Read more... 
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Texas Digest; Former lawmaker admits to paying off state judge 
SOUTH TEXAS Ex-lawmaker: I paid offjudge A former state lawmaker pleaded guilty Friday to extortion after 
admitting to paying a disgraced South Texas judge for fevorable rulings. Fonner Democratic Rep. Jose Santiago 
"Jim"... 
May 1,20111 statesman com 
Read more,.. 
15 detained for militancy, fake currency racket! 
Updated on Saturday, April 30,2011, 22:17 Srinagar: Fifteen persons, allegedly involved in separate militancy 
related incidents and a feke currency racket, were detained in south Kashmir's Anantnag district over a week. 
rln... 
Apr 30,20111 zeenews.com 
Read more... 
IPL betting rackets busted, eight arrested 
India's News.Net Saturday 30th April, 2011 (IANS) New Delhi, April 30(IANS) Eight men were arrested in 
two incidents for allegedly running cricket hetting rackets during the ongoing Indian Premier League (TPL) cricket 
matches,... 
Apr 30, 20111 indiasnews.net 
Read more... 
Mug Shot Photo Websites And Google Images Equals Online 
Extortion 
How To Remove A Mug Shot Photo From Google Images: New Book Explains A i On April 30,2011 Raegan 
Publishing released an updated edition of their top selling book cHow To Fight Google and Win" which 
features... 
Apr 30,2011 j examiner, corn 
Read more... 
XJLFA facing acute financial crisis: Mrinal Hazarika 
From AMI Guwahati, Apr 30: Pro-talk: United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) leader Mrinal Hazarika has 
said that the faction is feeing an acute shortage of finds. "We have not been gb/en any amount by the 
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- 'government, nor do we... 
Apr 30, 2011 | dailyindia.com 
Read more... 
Jammu and Kashmir policeman among 4 held in sex racket 
A constable of Jammu and Kashmir police was among foil- people arrested for allegedly being involved in a sex 
racket in bordering district of Poonch, official sources here today said. Based on a tip o% state police conducted 
a... 
Apr 30, 2011 | allvoices.com 
Read more... 
Beware: Internet extortion scam targeting doctors 
It has been brought to the American Chiropractic Association's attention that the webstite, 
www.oonplainonline.net, lists numerous doctors of chiropractic, byname, as under investigation for various 
crimes. 
Apr 30, 2011 | chiroeco.com 
Read more,;. 
Five held on extortion charge 
Staff Correspondent BELLARY: The Beflary police, in association with the State Intelligence Department, have 
arrested five suspected naxals on the charge of extortion. Siperiatendent of Police Chandragapta identified the... 
Apr 30,2011 | hindu.com 
Read more... 
Tro-talks Ulfa faction paid to stay off violence1 
GUWAHATI: Assam chief minister Tarun Gogoi on Friday said the Centre was paying off the Arabinda j 
Rajkhowa-led fiction of Ulfa to keep them away from carrying out extortion and anti-national activities. Gogoi j 
said he did not... . j 
Apr 29, 2011 | indiatimes.com j 
i 
Read more... .. j 
Cops go missing after extortion charges 
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•' Two traffic constables facing ciixiinal charges of extortion have reportedly gone missing. Constables Captain 
Singh and Pramod Knmar had allegedly attempted to extort "entry" fee from the driver of a commercial goods 
vehicle... 
Apr 29, 2011 | indiatiines.com 
Read more... - * 
23 arrested on charges of extortion in Meghalaya 
Sliillone;: Twenty—tliree more people have been arrested on charges of extortion and overbading on National 
Highway 62 in Meghalaya. Five persons were arrested when they were collecting money from coal—laden 
trucks at a transport... 
Apr29? 2011 | liiiadu.com 
Read more... 
Serena Williams 
SCROLL DOWN FOR VIDEO*** NEW YORK (AP) - Serena. Williams walked toward 
the line judge, screaming, cursing and shaldng a ball in the official's direction, thi'eateningto Mshove it down" her 
throat. OnnratchpointinthelLS.... 
Apr 29, 20111 huffingtonpostcom '
 ; 
Read more... 
All similar articles: 128 • » 
CIB busts high-tech forgery racket In raid 
ICA.THMANDU: Nepal Police's Central Investigation Bureau on Thursday night busted a racket that specialised j 
in forging ofl&cial documents. Police raided a gambling den in Thapagaun, Katbmandu, and arrested 12 persons 
Meed to... • j 
i 
Apr 29,20111 thehiinalayantimes.corn j 
| 
Read more... • 
__—_
 ? 
j 
Pompton Plains man admits threatening owner of Hawthorne | 
landscaping business j 
... .... ..... . . ; j 
f 
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. 'A 76-year-old Pompton Plains man who is a former associate of the late Genovese capo Anthony 'Tony Pro" 
Provenzano pleaded guilty Friday to a federal extortion charge for threatening the owner of a Hawthorne 
landscaping and... 
Apr 29, 2011 | northjersey.com
 f 
Read more... 
Nalzaro: Red tape in Cebu City Hall 
SOME suppliers are complaining of fee bureaucracy and red tape in Cebu City Hall transactions, especially on 
matters of collection. They even accused some accounting department personnel of "extortion" because their 
vouchers... 
Apr 29,2011 j sunstar.com.ph 
Read more... 
Two Africans held with cocaine 
"
fThe accused have been identified as Zoro Daniel, 36, and Boniface Okoye, 32. The an'ests were a follow up of 
the earlier cocaine racket busted in which foreigners, especially of Nigerian origin, were apprehended/ said 
Deputy... 
Apr 29,2011 | nerve .in 
Read more... 
Licence racket: Police summons 695 gun owners in J&K 
Published: Friday, Apr 29, 2011,20501ST Place: Jammu j Agency: PTI Jammu and Kashmir Police today 
summoned 695 gun licence holders for questionings in connection with the fake licensing racket in the state. 'The 
695 licences... 
Apr 29, 2011 | dnaindia.com 
Read more... 
Extortion: Pat Quinn threatens to withhold sales tax dollars from 
towns 
IU. Gov. Pat Quinn Illinois Gov. Pat Quinn, the erstwhile reformer who twice was Rod Blagojevich's running 
mate, wants to borrow nearly $9 billion to pay off old bills. Raising fee personal income tax by 67 percent— 
before his... 
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" 'Read more... 
Former Del. Phil Hamilton's bankruptcy hearing canceled 
NEWPORTNEWS — Fomier Del. Phil Hamilton's scheduled hearing in U.S. Bankruptcy Court Friday 
moirrino- has been canceled, according to the" court docket. Hamilton, who also faces a federal t'ial Monday in 
Richmond on criminal... 
Apr 29,2011 ) daiJypress.com 
Read more... 
ETA abandons revolutionary tax (Gara, Saint-Sebasiien 
(Guipuzcoa)) 
'ETA informs entrepreneurs of the cancellation of the 'revolutionary tax5", in these neutral terms, 
Gara, a daily close to the Basque independence movement, has announced an end to ETA's extortion of funds 
from Basque... 
Apr 29,20111 presseurop.eu 
Read more... 
• 1 
• 2 
• 3 
• 4 
• 5 
• 6 
• 7 
• 8-
• 
• Topic Menu 
o 
o 
0 
Copyright Violations 
Corruption 
Crime 
o Crimes against Property 
o Crimes against the Person 
° Criminal Justice 
o DriH Crimes 
._www.xrimeiungie.cp.m/_^^ _ „_ _ ._ .... _.. . .?'_10_ 
x\d~ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5/5/201-1- txtortions News Page 2 - Crime Jungle 
o Fraud & Forgeiy 
© Hijacking: 
o Money Laundering 
o C)rganized Crime 
o WaiiCrimes 
Utah Coreceaf Carry Pernmi www.TrainASDi.com 
Classes in Salt Lake, Provo, Oaden Register 
today for only $39,99! 
Conceak'd. Weapons Classes www.Frontsight.com 
In a gunfight those who train, win. Dont bet your 
life on anything else 
Setf D e f e i n S S , for t D d a V www.Shao(inArts.com 
Private and Group instruction Real Skills for Your 
World 
A s k a Crinfh'nat Lawyer Criminal-Law.JuslAnswer.com 
14 Lawyers Are Online! Current Wait Time: 14 
Minutes, 
• Navigate 
0
 Homepage 
° Sitemap 
o About 
wwwxnimejunglexorn/extortiqns-D2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5/5/201.1 portions News Page 2 - Crime Jungle 
amazon.com 
2j_ 
Adele 
New $11.72 
Best S8.91 
Paper Airplane 
Alison Krauss, 
Uni... 
New S11.88 
Best $11.10 
V\^stln£JJ£trt 
Foo Fighters 
New $9.99 
Best $7.99 
So Beautiful or So 
What 
Paul Simon 
New S11.88 
Best $7.44 
So Beautiful or So 
What 
Paul Simon 
New $14.63 
Best $13.79 
Privacy information 
Copyright © 2011 wwwxmejungb.com 
•HmQjijnnie.corn./extortions-p2. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trial court's written orders and 
minute entries 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
o 
v) 
Eric C.Olson (4108) 
Stephen W.Geary (9635) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
eolson(a),lcmckrw. com 
xseary&Janclaw. com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff UTOPIA 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH TELECOMMUNICATION OPEN 
INFRASTRUCTURE AGENCY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. t, 
CHRIS HOGAN, ; 
Defendant. : 
) ORDER 
) Civil No. 110909414 
i Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on Monday, June 13, 2011. Plaintiff was 
represented by Eric C. Olson and Stephen W. Geary. Defendant was represented by Steve S, 
Christensen. The Court heard oral argument on Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and on 
the Order to Show Cause directed to Plaintiff. Having considered the issues, being fully advised 
in the premises and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters the following: 
'nird Judicial District 
JUN 2 3 2011 
SALT LAKE COUNTY I L 
Deputy iferic'" 
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f C) 
ORDER 
1. Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees is DENIED. 
2. The Order to Show Cause directed to Plaintiff is WITHDRAWN. 
DATED this ^ ^ " d a y of June, 2011. 
BY THE CPUI 
Approved as to form: 
CHRISTENSEN THORNTON; PLLC 
Steve S. Christensen 
Craig L. Pankratz 
Attorney for Defendant 
2 
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o n 7^  
Eric C.Olson (4108) 
Stephen W. Geary (9635) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
eolson(a),kmclaw. com 
sjzeary®,kmclaw. com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff UTOPIA 
mm DISTRICT COORT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 7 2011 
SALT LAKE COUNjil 
H u • ifefjoiy c ie tk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH TELECOMMUNICATION OPEN 
INFRASTRUCTURE AGENCY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHRIS HOGAN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 110909414 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on Monday, May 16, 2011. Plaintiff was 
represented by Eric C. Olson and Stephen W. Geary. Defendant was represented by Steve S. 
Christensen. The Court heard oral argument on Defendant's Motion to Seal Exhibit E to 
Plaintiffs Verified Complaint and Motion to Unseal the Records in This Case Subject to the 
Motion to Seal Exhibit E. Having considered the issues, being fully advised in the premises and 
for good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters the following: 
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o 
ORDER 
1. The Order Sealing Records, filed April 18, 2011, is hereby VACATED. 
2. The Verified Complaint and all other documents filed, or to be filed, in this 
litigation, are hereby designated as public records. 
3. Page 2 of Exhibit E to the Verified Complaint, beginning with the first foil 
paragraph, starting, "You further state tha t , . . . , " through the conclusion of the second foil 
paragraph, concluding, " . . . I enclose a copy for your convenience," is STRICKEN, as 
immaterial, and shall not be considered by the Court for any purpose. 
DATED this day of June, 2011. 
BY TJtE COURT 
2 
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UTAH TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPEN 
INFRASTRUCTURE AGENCY 
V. 
CHRIS HOGAN 
The matter is before the court to consider Defendant's Motion to Strike Notice of 
Dismissal. The parties argued the motion on June 13, 2011; the court has considered the motion, 
memoranda, supporting exhibits and argument and gives the following ruling. 
Following hearing on plaintiffs application for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff, 
pursuant to Rule 41 (a)(1) filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the complaint. Defendant 
objected to the notice, arguing that the contested preliminary injunction request represents a 
response to plaintiffs complaint and thus precludes a voluntary dismissal. Further, defendant 
argues that the dismissal, if permitted, should be with prejudice. 
The court is persuaded that Rule 41 permits a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss an action 
before service of a response from the defendant to the complaint. Litigation relative to a 
preliminary injunction is nota "response" to the complaint. The dismissal is without prejudice 
unless plaintiff has "...once dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action 
based on or including the same claim." There appears to be no predicate dismissal of another 
action. 
416 
By. 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 7 2011 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
MINUTE ENTRY Deputy 
Case No. 110909414 
Judge Fratto 
>uiy Clerk 
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
ssc@.ctlawfirm.net 
Craig L. Pankratz (U.S.B. No. 12194) 
cparikratz(£>,ctlawfirm.net 
CHRISTENSEN THORNTON, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3156 
Telephone: (801) 303-5800 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
Attorneys for Defendant Chris Hogan 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH TELECOMMUNICATION OPEN 
INFRASTRUCTURE AGENCY, AKA 
UTOPIA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRIS HOGAN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
Civil No. 110909414 
Judge Joseph C Fratto, Jr. 
This matter came before the Court on Utah Telecommunication Open Infrastructure 
Agency's ("UTOPIA") request for a preliminary injunction to be issued against Chris Hogan 
("Chris"). UTOPIA is represented by Eric C. Olson and Stephen W. Geary of Kirton & 
McConkie. Hogan is represented by Steve S. Christensen and Craig L. Pankratz of Christensen 
Thornton, PLLC. An evidentiary hearing on UTOPIA'S request for a preliminary injunction was 
held on April 26, 2011. Having received evidence, reviewed the file, and received arguments, the 
Court makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order: 
// 
// 
^
DwD l S T R , C T COURT 
DEC I 3 2011 
B y ^ ^ ^ ^ K E COUNTY, 
Deputy! 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Appellee, UTOPIA, is an inter-local cooperative entity and political subdivision of the 
State of Utah whose purpose is to build telecommunications infrastructures within its 
sixteen member cities. Todd Marriott ("Marriott") currently serves as UTOPIA'S 
executive director. 
2. Chris worked for UTOPIA and was designated as an independent contractor. On May 9, 
2009, Chris entered into a contract with UTOPIA to provide it services until May, 2011 
(^he Contract"). 
3. Early in 2011, UTOPIA began working on a five year plan to install infrastructure in the 
streets of its member cities and connect it to homes and businesses. Federal stimulus 
money would fund part of the plan, and $65,000,000 in taxpayer funded bonds would 
fund the remainder. UTOPIA issued a Request for Proposals ("RFP") for bids on a 
contract to lay infrastructure in the streets and another RFP for bids on a contract to 
connect it to homes and businesses. 
4. After the RFPs were issued, Tetra Tech, a company that UTOPIA disfavored, made a 
presentation to secure one of the RFP contracts. When it was suggested that Tetra Tech 
should be involved with UTOPIA, members of UTOPIA'S board laughed out loud. 
5. However, Tetra Tech's representative to UTOPIA was Ryan Marriott—Marriott's 
brother. Ryan Marriott was not working for Tetra Tech when it fell out of favor with 
UTOPIA. In fact, he worked with UTOPIA to secure a sale contract in Clearfield before 
he started workmg for Tetra Tech as its Utah manager. 
6. After Tetra Tech made its presentation on the RFP, UTOPIA decided to consolidate the 
two RFPs into one RFP. UTOPIA intended to award the new RFP to a general contractor 
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who would oversee the entire project. Corning, Inc. ("Corning") expressed interest in the 
consolidated RFP. Corning had just completed a project in Brigham City for UTOPIA. 
So, it was anticipated that Corning would work as the general contractor on the 
consolidated RFP. Even though it had used a different subcontractor, B Jackson, in 
Brigham City, Corning intended to use Tetra Tech as a subcontractor. Individuals within 
Corning questioned why Tetra Tech should replace B Jackson. 
7. Ryan Marriott emailed Jarrod Pantier ("Pantier"), UTOPIA'S Outside Plant Manager and 
the person in charge of the consolidated RFP, about why B Jackson had received the 
contract in Brigham City. In the emails to Pantier, Ryan Marriott blind copied Marriott. 
8. Ryan Marriott, Marriott, and Joseph Rose, a Corning representative, had lunch together. 
After that lunch, Mr. Rose spoke with Chris and told him that the reason why the RFPs 
were consolidated was to hide Tetra Tech's involvement from UTOPIA'S board. 
9. When Chris learned of Ryan Marriott's job with Tetra Tech, Tetra Tech's potential 
involvement with UTOPIA, and the efforts to hide its involvement from UTOPIA'S 
board, he was concerned. He did not want Tetra Tech's involvement in a UTOPIA 
project to betray the public trust or destroy UTOPIA and could not, in good conscience, 
stand by and let UTOPIA receive $65,000,000 of taxpayer money knowing that 
UTOPIA, through Marriott, was possibly engaging in improper conduct. 
10. David Shaw ("Shaw"), general counsel for UTOPIA, appeared to share Chris' concerns. 
Marriott, Shaw, and Chris were eating together when Tetra Tech's involvement with 
UTOPIA came up. Shaw advised Marriott to be transparent about his brother's 
involvement with Tetra Tech. 
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11. After he learned from Mr. Rose that the purpose of the consolidated RFP was to hide 
Tetra Tech's involvement, Chris called Pantier to make sure that the consolidated RFP 
process remained as transparent as possible. He outlined the various options that he 
believed Pantier had and warned, based on statements by Marriott, that Pantier's job 
could be in danger. 
12. On March 16, 2011, Pantier told Marriott about his discussion with Chris concerning 
Tetra Tech. The next day, Marriott called a meeting and confronted Chris about the 
conversation. After the meeting, Marriott and Shaw presented Chris with a termination 
agreement and informed him that his day-to-day involvement with UTOPIA was over. 
Shaw then took Chris to the airport. Marriott locked Chris out of UTOPIA'S offices, 
locked him out of the systems he had used when he worked for UTOPIA, cut off his 
access to anyone within UTOPIA, attempted to evict him from the apartment UTOPIA 
was renting for him, and texted Chris' wife's cell phone the day after he was fired to 
warn Chris to keep his involvement with UTOPIA confidential. 
13. Chris began seeking redress for the wrongful termination of the Contract. He served a 
draft complaint on UTOPIA, sent letters outlining his concerns, demands, and proposed 
resolution of the termination, and offered to enter formal mediation with UTOPIA. He 
indicated that if UTOPIA refused to meet his demands or to negotiate, he would have no 
other choice except to file a lawsuit. He also expressed concern about the effect negative 
publicity from a lawsuit would have on UTOPIA. 
14. In response, UTOPIA denied all of Chris' requests and filed this lawsuit on April 18, 
2011 to prohibit Chris from '^disclosing any information obtained during the course of 
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rendering services under the [Contract].'5 UTOPIA also sought declaratory judgment 
asking this Court to declare 
that (a) the [Contract] expires on May 13, 2011, (b) UTOPIA has no legal 
duty to renew the [Contract], (c) UTOPIA has no legal duty to compensate 
above and beyond that compensation specified in the [Contract], and (d) 
UTOPIA owes no other legal duty to Hogan with respect to the services 
provided by Hogan to UTOPIA. 
15. In its pleadings, UTOPIA did not allege specific information which it sought to keep 
confidential or a specific threat of disclosure of information by Chris. Indeed, this Court 
cannot find that Chris had ever threatened to disclose UTOPIA'S information to a third 
party. Instead, he said that if UTOPIA was not willing to remedy his wrongful 
termination by meeting his demands or negotiating a mutually acceptable resolution, he 
would have no other choice but to file a lawsuit. 
16. UTOPIA based its requests on a provision within the Contract: "[Chris] understands that 
the Services performed for UTOPIA are confidential and [Chris] agrees to maintain such 
confidentiality. This ARTICLE IV. [sic] shall survive the termination of this 
Agreement." The Contract defines "Services" as "sales, marketing, business 
development, operations, IT, and engineering efforts regarding the UTOPIA network." 
Chris inserted this language into the Contract. It was not reviewed by an attorney for 
UTOPIA or by Chris' attorney. 
17. On April 19, 2011, this Court held a hearing to determine whether a temporary 
restraining order ("TRO") should issue and whether to seal the records in this case. It 
issued the TRO, sealed the records, and set an evidentiary hearing for April 26, 2011 to 
determine whether the TRO should be converted to a preliminary injunction. 
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18. After the issuance of the TRO but before the hearing on April 26, 2011, Chris filed a 
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Utah against UTOPIA. 
UTOPIA argued that filing the complaint violated the TRO. 
19. Even though it wanted Chris to keep information about it confidential, UTOPIA does not 
keep the vast majority of its information confidential. Indeed, UTOPIA is required to be a 
"transparent organization," and its information is a matter of public record because it is 
subject to the Government Records Access and Management Act ("GRAMA"). Further, 
before UTOPIA can proceed with or receive funding for its projects, each city council of 
its member cities must approve its proposed actions. To obtain this approval, UTOPIA 
makes presentations to each city council during public city council meetings. 
20. UTOPIA'S representatives, including Marriott and Chris, have made many presentations 
during which they disclose minute details about UTOPIA to government entities and 
private businesses. Marriott and Chris have been interviewed and quoted by various 
media outlets, including the Salt Lake Tribune, explaining many details of UTOPIA. 
UTOPIA also encouraged Chris to discuss the minute details of UTOPIA'S sales, 
marketing, business development, operations, IT, and engineering efforts with everyone 
interested. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. An applicant seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden to prove that it is 
entitled to it under Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah Medical 
Products, Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah 1998). 
2. An injunction is an extreme remedy that "should not be lightly granted." System 
Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983). 
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3. Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65A) outlines the grounds that 
justify the issuance of an injunction. An applicant for an injunction must prove that 
a. "The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues;" 
b. "The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed 
order or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined;" 
c. "The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and 
d. "There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the 
underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits which should be 
the subject of further litigation." 
4. Analyzing the requirements of Rule 65A, UTOPIA is not entitled to a preliminary 
injunction against Hogan. 
a. Under the first requirement of Rule 65 A, this is the type of alleged injury which could 
qualify for a preliminary injunction based on the potential of irreparable harm. 
b. However, the threatened injury to UTOPIA does not outweigh whatever damage the 
proposed order or injunction may cause Hogan. 
i. UTOPIA has not alleged specific information which it seeks to keep 
confidential, 
ii. UTOPIA has not proved that there is a specific threat of disclosure of 
information by Hogan. 
iii. UTOPIA is subject to GRAMA and must prove that any information in its 
possession is private, controlled, or protected information. It has not done so 
in this case. 
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iv. The threatened injury to UTOPIA is that the public will learn about its 
proposed contract involving a company employing UTOPIA'S executive 
director's brother and about UTOPIA firing Hogan for questioning the 
propriety of the proposed contract. 
v. Hogan has said that he will file a lawsuit if UTOPIA does not engage in 
negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable resolution. Although it does not 
expressly say it in its verified complaint, UTOPIA appears to be seeking an 
injunction against Hogan to prohibit him from filing a lawsuit. Every person 
has the right to redress injuries suffered to "his person, property or reputation" 
through the judicial process and cannot be "barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunaJ in this State. . . any civil cause to which he is a 
party." See Utah Const, art. I, § 11. The allegations in Hogan's proposed 
complaint were relevant to support his claim that he was wrongfully 
terminated, 
c. The proposed injunction would be adverse to the public interest 
i. The public has an interest in open disclosure in government. 
ii. Utah law protects individuals who, in the course of working for a public 
entity, speak out about potentially unlawful practices. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
67-21-1, et seq. A public entity cannot retaliate against public employees— 
including independent contractors working for a public entity—when the 
employee "communicates in good faith the existence of any waste of public 
funds, property, or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, 
rule, or regulation adopted under the law of this state, a political subdivision 
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of this state, or any recognized entity of the United States." Id. §§ 67-21-2(3)-
3(1 )(a) (2007 & 2010). 
iii. In addition to Utah law, the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution protects government employees and independent contractors 
working for the government who speak about matters of public concern. A 
government entity cannot take adverse action against an employee or 
independent contractor for speaking to anyone about a matter of public 
concern. Bd of County Comm 'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674-77 (1996). 
iv. UTOPIA is not a private company. It is a political subdivision of the State of 
Utah. As such, it must abide by the United States and Utah Constitutions. It 
must also abide by Utah's statutes that prohibit it from taking adverse action 
against an employee for communicating about suspected waste or a suspected 
violation of the law. Further, how UTOPIA spends public funds and awards 
contracts is a matter of public concern. 
v. UTOPIA classifies every detail about Hogan's employment with UTOPIA as 
"confidential." However, much if not all of this information is subject to 
GRAMA. The public has an interest in disclosure of this information. 
vi. The public has the right to know whether UTOPIA is abiding by constitutional 
and statutory provisions. It also has the right to know how UTOPIA is 
spending public funds. 
vii. The proposed injunction would be in violation of the public's right to know 
about UTOPIA. 
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d. Finally, there is not a substantial likelihood that UTOPIA will prevail on the merits of 
the underlying claim. 
i. Rule 65 A does not create an independent cause of action, 
ii. To obtain a preliminary injunction under Rule 65A, a party must have an 
underlying cause of action, 
iii. UTOPIA has not identified an underlying cause of action. Instead, it is 
seeking the preliminary injunction as a cause of action. 
1. While it asserts that by disclosing "confidential information," Hogan 
will breach his contract with it, UTOPIA has not alleged specific 
information which it seeks to keep confidential. It also has not alleged 
a specific threat of disclosure of information by Hogan. 
2. Further, because it is subject to GRAMA, UTOPIA has not identified 
information that it could classify as confidential. 
iv. In addition to seeking a preliminary injunction as a cause of action, UTOPIA 
has also sought declaratory relief 
1. The authority of a court to grant declaratory judgment related to a 
contract is limited to construing the contract and declaring the rights, 
status, or other legal relations arising under the contract of the parties. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-408 (2008). 
2. UTOPIA'S request for declaratory relief asks this Court to go beyond 
construing the contract and declaring the rights, status, or other legal 
relations arising under the contract of the parties. This is something 
that this Court cannot do. 
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3. Therefore, this Court cannot enter a preliminary injunction based on 
UTOPIA'S request for declaratory relief because the request is not a 
valid request for declaratory relief. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing and for good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED that 
UTOPIA'S request for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. 
DATED the / C day of December, 2011. 
BY TH 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO be sent via first class U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, on the A day of December, 2011, to: 
Eric C. Olson 
Stephen W. Geary 
Adam M. Kaas 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 E. South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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mean, that he has been -- and I'm not going to find whether 
he has or hasn't, but the allegation is, is that he's been — 
he's exceeded authority; he's been insubordinate; he's been 
disruptive; he's made accusations of wrongdoing that are 
unfounded; he's questioning the leadership; he's made threats; 
he's fomenting an arrest and (inaudible). 
That really is not the issue. The issue is, is 
whether he's under his contractual obligation prevented from 
disclosing the information -- certain information. It appears 
that all of the information that he has disclosed, or he 
threatened to disclose, is not prevented by this contractual 
provision. 
To the extent that you have put documents in front of 
me and said, vvWe want to restrain him from disclosing these 
documents," I don't know that: there's been any threat to even 
disclose those documents. 
The third provision is the order injunction at issue 
would not be adverse to the public interest. Here, of course, 
I have to consider that what is to be enjoined to prevent him 
from stating facts that would indicate -- as I say, facts that 
apparently are in -- are really public -- in the public record 
here, that there has been wrongdoing with the plaintiff's -- in 
the plaintiff's organization. 
The case of the CIA outlines a different situation. 
I agree with Mr. Christensen on this point; that this was a 
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publication about information that this person received that 
was con -- completely confidential. It was not done for the 
purpose of -- well, obviously I can't opine ^s to what the 
purpose was, but the purpose of publishing a book, not making 
an accusation. 
So I see a completely different circumstance to the 
extent that that opinion-- that that opinion may have relevance 
to my decision here. The distinction being that we're dealing 
-- and this is a further distinction. 
First of ail, of course, we have the CIA, which is 
a secret organization, as opposed to a public entity that is 
subject to public scrutiny in terms of all of its dealings; 
and even something more, if you will, than a confidentiality 
agreement with a private entity. So we have a public entity 
that's not a secret organization, as is the CIA. 
So I see this as adverse to enjoin him from making 
is claim of wrongdoing, and alleging facts that would support 
that claim adverse to the public interest. Then there is a 
substantial likelihood the applicant will prevail on the 
merits. I dealt with that in the first instance. 
As I say, it does not appear to me, given the way the 
complaint has been fashioned, and the claim made, a declaratory 
relief claim, that the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the 
merits of the declaratory relief claim, which I believe is the 
Predicate to any injunctive relief. 
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For those reasons and each of them, your application 
for a preliminary injunction is respectfully denied. 
MR. OLSON: Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. — 
MR. OLSON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Christensen, if you will draw --I think 
what we will need is proposed findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and the order. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Appreciate your presentations. 
MR. OLSON: Can I just ask one question? 
THE COURT: Oh, wait, there's one more. Before you 
ask that question, there was one more issue, and that was the 
sealing of this file. 1 don't -- we had that on our agenda, 
the further sealing of the file or that issue. I do intend to 
take that up, but given the hour -— and I want to give everyone 
an opportunity to be heard in terms of what may be appropriate 
in terms of sealing this file, when we can -- when might be 
convenient for you to come back for maybe a half an hour, 15 
minutes a side, and I can hear your positions on the sealing of 
this file? Weil, let me throw out a time and date. 
(Court confers with clerk off the record) 
THE COURT: If — is 1:30 tomorrow; would that work 
with your schedules? 
MR. OLSON: I have a m^etina that I know has been set 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-212-
for that time, your Honor. I should be finished --
THE COURT: Later on in the day --
MR. OLSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- would work? What time would work later 
on in the day? 
MR. OLSON: I think that meeting wilj be over by about 
3 or 3:30. 
THE COURT: If we met at A o'clock? 
MR. OLSON: Sure. 
THE COURT: Okay, 4 o'clock, then, tomorrow. That 
would be the 20 -- I keep looking at the wall, I'm sorry --
well, no, I'm looking at the wrong day, aren't I? I'd say 
we're dealing with Wednesday, which is the 27cn, of course. 
Tomorrow you have that meeting. We could still -- could we 
make it at -- well, let's make it at -- is Wednesday or 
Thursday your meeting? Tomorrow is Wednesday. 
MR. OLSON: It's tomorrow afternoon. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's make it, then, Thursday 
at some point. That would be the 28,:,• at 1 : 30 . 
MR. OLSON: That's fine. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry that I confused the time. 
MR. OLSON: That's fine. 
THE COURT: I was looking for the wrong date. 
MR. CHPI STENSEN: Oka". 
THE COURT: So in clarity here, 1:30 Thursday, the 28th 
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to hear your positions and make a determination in terms of the 
further sealing of this, or portions of this file and record. 
Mr. Christensen, you had a question? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: In the order can I indicate that the 
denial of the preliminary injunction cancels the temporary 
restraining order? 
THE COURT: Oh, and that's the other thing. I think 
the further order, of course, is the temporary restraining 
order, consequently, is in the same, vacated. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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1 instance, as to -- well, whether -- this is a contempt for 
2 disobeying the order sealing the file. First, it seems to me 
3 that as a matter of law we have now unsealed the file, and the 
4 motion appears to be moot by that action. 
5 Substantively, however -- well, that's number one. 
6 Number two, I agree with Mr. Christensen, the fact that the 
7 matter is dismissed would not -- quite frankly relevant in 
8 terms of the contempt, if any there be, to sealing the file. 
9 Like I say, it seems to me it's moot because the file has 
10 become unsealed, but it would not become, if you will, moot 
11 because the case had been dismissed. 
12 We often have matters that have been resolved, 
13 disposed of, the file has been closed, but the file remains 
14 sealed, or in a private status or in various statutes, those 
15 remain, regardless of whether the case had been dismissed or 
16 otherwise disposed of. 
17 Number three, whether one can be in contempt -- the 
18 legal question here that's begged by the situation is whether 
19 one can be in contempt by releasing copies, if you will, of 
20 what has been sealed by the Court, if one can be in contempt 
21 of the order sealing the file. 
22 It's an order directed, of course, to the clerk; and 
23 I'm not aware of any authority, nor has any been cited to me 
24 that that type of order works a restraint, because there is a 
25 J difference between sealing the file and restraining others from 
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disclosing any of the information. 
In that distinction is the great difference here. 
We often are -- or not often, fortunately, but I have been 
confronted with situations in which people come in, look at 
files, a mistake has been made and portions of it have not been 
sealed. At least, because if they're sealed, you're not given 
that portion of the file. The question is whether the person 
accessed the file knowing it had been sealed. 
In that case it may be that someone accessing the file 
-- in other words, a clerical error, you were given the file 
rather than sealed — that that would be a contempt of that 
order; but I don't see as a matter of law that the plaintiff — 
or that there can be contempt on the part of the plaintiff by 
— unless otherwise restrained from doing so, talking about 
disclosing copies of what has been sealed. Your motion is 
denied. 
Going on now to the attorney's fees. 
MR. OLSON: One moment, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. OLSON: We have Mayor Winder of the West Valley 
City. I'd like to just let him know he's free to leave. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Can you just announce that generally 
so that the others know? 
MR. OLSON: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's entertain the argument, then, on the 
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didn't make that threat. The Court found that he didn't make 
that threat. So for them to say that they saw a threat in what 
he wrote to them was not objectively supportable. Because 
there wasn't a good faith basis for them to say there was such 
a threat, there wasn't a good faith basis for them to file a 
lawsuit on that basis. 
The second thing is that they -- once they had done 
it, they decided they're going to see the process through and 
make a record. Well, a record of what? I mean, for what? 
That's not -- I mean, starting a lawsuit on the wrong foot is 
not a reason to continue the lawsuit through. Because they 
haven't shown a good faith, legal basis or factual basis to 
bring the lawsuit at all, we ask the Court to award fees on the 
statute, as well. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I think I understand everyone's 
position. I appreciate your efforts. I'm prepared to make a 
ruling. Request for attorney's fees, it's axiomatic, if you 
will. In order to be awarded attorney's fees, you either have 
a law that — or rule that -- a statute or rule that gives you 
the fees, or you have a contract in which the parties have 
agreed to award fees. 
In terms of the preliminary injunction hearing, the 
argument has been that -- of course we're relying on this rule 
-- that in 65(a), which is of course injunctions, that would 
award us attorney fees, as the prevailing party. Specifically 
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under the security requirement by implication, that should give 
us attorney's fees, award us attorney's fees because we did 
prevail. 
Indeed you did prevail, and indeed there is this 
provision regarding the posting of a security; but I think the 
implication that you seek the inference, if you will, from that 
rule, that the prevailing party is entitled to their attorney's 
fees is not merited. This concerns before an injunction is 
issued, that there be a security. Although I can find where 
it says that no such security would be required of various 
parties, and it is — it is contingent on a wrongful order, 
not who's the prevailing party. It is a wrongful order. 
So we're sort of back to, if you will, even by impli 
-- I don't think we get the implication here, but we're back to 
your -- the rules that would indicate and the law that would 
indicate that where a matter has been brought frivolous — as a 
frivolous, or brought in bad faith, that you would be entitled 
to attorney's fees. 
That would be -- actually could be either the 
complaint, because that was brought, or the injunction; but 
it is incumbent on you showing that there has been bad faith, 
or that the action was frivolous. The word "frivolous," of 
course, does not mean that it was without merit. Frivolous 
goes well beyond that. Indeed, the fact that you're not the 
prevailing party does not mean that it's -- the matter was 
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frivolous. 
An implication both in bad faith and frivolous that 
there was no basis for bringing the action, for seeking the 
relief in terms of the injunction, and certainly with bad --
in bad faith is that I'm bringing this action, doing these 
things for ulterior motives, bad reasons, to delay -- to delay-
matters, to harass, to -- and do those sorts of things. So it 
goes well beyond who prevailed. 
In fact, who prevailed is fairly irrelevant in this 
analysis. It really goes to the -- for example, frivolous, 
that there was no -- there was no legal basis at all to bring 
your action. That would be a frivolous action. However, 
without further analysis here, I think all that is concluded 
with the fact that the action was an action based on contract. 
There was a contract, and the contract did have the provisions 
regarding confidentiality. 
So consequently this -- there was a basis for the 
action. My comment regarding the merits of the case -- a 
part of Rule 65(a) is one must determine that you are likely 
to prevail, or that there should be some further litigation. 
My comments went to that. It was not a determination on the 
merits, certainly, of the lawsuit, itself, and the claims made 
in the complaint. 
I would not be able to do that until I heard the case, 
I suppose; but I was obliged, I believe, to make a determi-
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1 nation as to whether -- whether one would prevail -- was likely 
2 to prevail. It seemed to me that really is a matter of law, 
3 given what facts I had -- what I had that the plaintiff was not 
4 likely to prevail, and in fact was precluded, it would seem, 
5 from bringing this action. 
6 That's really a question both of law and fact; and 
7 so it seems to me for these reasons that there be no basis to 
8 award attorney's fees. Rule 65(a) doesn't provide that. There 
9 is no contract in terms of this injunctive relief, that was 
10 sought; and it seems to me that you have to show the burden now 
11 with, of course, the defendant, that the action is frivolous 
12 or brought in bad faith. There's nothing in front of me that 
13 would suggest that. 
14 In fact, the further -- the further indication here, 
15 and I'll comment on this, is that I did comment on the weighti-
16 ness of the action, and the plaintiff then files their notice 
17 to withdraw the action and dismiss the case as relevant in 
18 terms of whether a matter had been brought in bad faith and 
19 frivolous. Your motion is -- for attorney's fees, for those 
20 reasons, respectfully denied. 
21 In some respects, that last comment, if you will, is 
22 the segway to the final motion, which is the objection -- or 
23 the final matter, which is the objection to the notice of 
24 dismissal. 
25 Mr. Christensen. 
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AGREEMENT 
for 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
between 
UTOPIA 
and 
Chris Hogan, Consultant 
This Agreement is made as of the /<Z day of _ /(/(** , 2009 (the 
"Effective Date"), between the Utah Telecommunication Oped Infrastructure Agency, an 
interlocal cooperative agency organized under the laws of the State of Utah ("UTOPIA"), 
and Christopher Hogan, Consultant. 
RECITALS: 
WHEREAS, UTOPIA is in need of professional services (the "Services") as 
further defined herein; and 
WHEREAS, Consultant has substantial experience performing services similar to 
those required by this Agreement; and 
WHEREAS, pursuant to UTOPIA'S Procurement Policy no informal or formal 
procurement process is required to procure Consultant's Services; and 
WHEREAS, UTOPIA wants to retain the Consultant's Services, and Consultant is 
willing to perform the Services. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises contained herein, 
the parties agree as follows: 
AGREEMENT: 
ARTICLE I. SCOPE OF WORK 
Section 1.1. Services 
Consultant shall perform the following services ("Services"): 
1 1 A 
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(a) Generally, Consultant shall be responsible for all sales, 
marketing, business development, operations, IT, and engineering 
efforts regarding the UTOPIA network. 
Section 1.2. Compensation 
Compensation is as outlined in Exhibit A - "Statement of Work" 
ARTICLE II. UTOPIA will compensate Consultant for the Services as set forth. 
Section 2.1. Payment 
UTOPIA will pay Consultant all undisputed invoiced amounts within thirty (30) 
days of UTOPIA'S receipt of invoice. In the event UTOPIA disputes any invoiced 
amounts, the parties will work expeditiously to resolve such dispute, whereupon 
UTOPIA will pay Consultant as agreed upon in such resolution. Late payments on 
undisputed invoices will be subject to a 1% per month late fee. 
ARTICLE III. TERM AND TERMINATION 
This Agreement will be deemed commenced as of the Effective Date and will 
continue for twelve (24) months. 
ARTICLE IV. CONFIDENTIALITY 
Consultant understands that the Services performed for UTOPIA are confidential 
and Consultant agrees to maintain such confidentiality. This ARTICLE IV. shall 
survive the termination of this Agreement. 
ARTICLE V. OWNERSHIP OF DOCUMENTS 
All documents, notes, work papers, formulas, files, research, maps, and other 
records, whether in hard copy, electronic or any other format ("Records"), and all rights 
pertaining thereto of any kind, produced by or in Consultant's possession in connection 
with this Agreement, without limitation, shall become and remain UTOPIA'S property. 
UTOPIA shall have the right to use such Records without restriction or limitation and 
without further compensation to Consultant. All Records created by Consultant shall 
constitute "works for hire" under U.S. Copyright laws and UTOPIA shall retain all rights 
associated therewith. This ARTICLE V. shall survive the termination of this Agreement. 
ARTICLE VI. REPRESENTATIONS, INDEMNIFICATION 
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Section 6.1. Representations. 
Consultant represents and warrants that Consultant is free to enter into this Agreement 
and that Consultant is under no disability, restriction, or prohibition that will interfere in 
any manner with Consultant's full compliance with and performance under this 
Agreement. Consultant warrants that Services will be of good quality and to the 
reasonable satisfaction of UTOPIA. Consultant also warrants and represents that no 
Services provided to the UTOPIA hereunder will infringe or violate any right of any 
person or firm and that UTOPIA may exploit such Services provided hereunder without 
liability or obligation to any person or firm. 
Section 6.2, Indemnification. 
Consultant agrees to indemnify, hold harmless and (at Indemnitee's option) defend 
UTOPIA, its member municipalities and each of their employees, officers, directors, 
contractors, representatives, employees, agents, insurers, attorneys, successors and 
assigns (the "Indemnitees") for, from and against any and all claims, causes of action, 
damages (including, without limitation, all foreseeable and unforeseeable consequential 
damages, injunction and other relief), fines, judgments, penalties, costs, liabilities, losses 
or expenses (Including, without limitation, experts' and consultants' costs, attorneys' fees 
and reasonable investigative and discovery costs) arising prior to, during or after the term 
of this Agreement on account of or in connection with, or directly or indirectly related to: 
(i) the acts or omissions of the Consultant, its agents, servants, employees, contractors, 
guests and invitees (collectively, the "Consultant's Agents'') in the performance of this 
Agreement or the delivery of any Services; fii) the violation of law by the Consultant or 
the Consultant's Agents; (Hi) Consultant's untrue representation or warranty; and fiv) the 
use, reproduction, distribution, sale or other commercialization of Services in violation of 
rights under any patent, copyright, trademark, or other intellectual property right or 
application for the same. Consultant's obligations with respect to indemnification 
hereunder shall remain effective, notwithstanding the expiration or earlier termination of 
this Agreement, as to claims arising or accruing prior to the expiration or earlier 
termination of this Agreement, Consultant shall not be required to indemnify or defend 
any Indemnitee against any injury, loss of life, or damage which is caused by the sole 
negligence or willful misconduct of any Indemnitee. 
ARTICLE VII. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
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Section 7.1. Amendments 
No modifications, amendments or supplements to this Agreement shall be 
effective for any purpose unless in writing, signed by each party. 
Section 7.2. Conflict of Interest 
Consultant covenants that it does not now, nor will it acquire any interest, direct 
or indirect, which may in any manner conflict with Consultant's performance under this 
Agreement unless such conflict is waived in writing by UTOPIA in advance. 
Section 7.3. Employment Status 
Services rendered by Consultant pursuant to this Agreement are not rendered as a 
UTOPIA employee and amounts paid under this Agreement do not constitute 
compensation paid to an employee. The parties expressly agree that Consultant is an 
independent contractor and not an employee of UTOPIA, and as such, Consultant is 
solely responsible for her own employment taxes, worker's compensation premiums and 
similar expenses. UTOPIA assumes no liability for Consultant's actions and Consultant 
agrees to indemnify and hold UTOPIA harmless from and against any third party claims 
brought as a result of Consultant's Services. 
Section 7.4. Assignment of Rights 
The rights of each party under this Agreement are personal to that party and may 
not be assigned or transferred to any other person, firm, corporation or other entity 
without the prior, express, and written consent of the other party. Any transfer stock, 
assets, or any other change in control in the ownership or management of Consultant 
shall be deemed an assignment hereunder and shall require prior, express, and written 
consent of UTOPIA. 
Section 7.5. Applicable Law 
This Agreement and Consultant's obligations and Services hereunder are made 
and must be performed in compliance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws. 
The interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement shall be pursuant to the laws of the 
State of Utah without regard to conflicts of law principles.. 
Section 7.6. Jurisdiction and Venue 
Any dispute arising from or related to this Agreement shall be brought in Third 
Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, if in state court, or the United States 
District Court of Utah, if in federal court. 
4 
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Section 7.7. Time is of the Essence 
The parties acknowledge and agree that TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE in 
Consultant's performance of the Services hereunder. 
Section 7.8. No Authority to Bind 
Consultant expressly acknowledges and agrees that no actions undertaken by Consultant 
in the performance of the Services with respect to any third parties shall be binding upon 
UTOPIA except through UTOPIA'S express written agreement with such third parties. 
Consultant covenants and warrants that it will not represent, expressly or impliedly, to 
any third party that such authority exists. Consultant shall be liable to UTOPIA for any 
third party obligations which may arise as a result of Consultant's violation of this 
Section 7.8. 
Section 7.9. Severability 
In the event that any provision of this Agreement is declared void, invalid or 
unenforceable by a regulatory agency, tribunal or court of competent jurisdiction, the 
remainder of the Agreement shall continue in full force and effect as if the offending 
provision were not contained herein, and the offending provision shall be replaced by a 
mutually acceptable and valid provision which comes closest to the intention of the 
parties underlying the offending provision. If the parties cannot reasonably agree on a 
replacement provision and the offending provision is material to the Agreement, either 
party may terminate the Agreement upon written Notice to the other party, provided that 
all obligations of a party which shall have accrued prior to the date of termination shall be 
fulfilled by the party. 
Section 7.10. Arms' Length Negotiation; Attorney Review; Construction 
The parties mutually acknowledge that the provisions of this Agreement are the 
product of arm's-length negotiations with both parties having essentially equal bsirgaining 
strength, access to legal representation of its choice and opportunity to determine the 
language used herein. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed for or 
against either party. The captions and headings of this Agreement are for ease of 
reference and shall not be deemed to define or limit the scope of any of the terms, 
covenants, conditions or Agreements contained herein or in any exhibit attached hereto. 
As used herein, all words in any gender shall be deemed to include the masculine, 
feminine or neuter gender, all singular words shall include the plural, and all plural words 
shall include the singular, as the context may require. 
Section 7.11. Entire Agreement: 
This Agreement, together with any Statements of Work, exhibits, schedules and 
purchase orders, constitutes the entire Agreement and understanding of the parties 
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concerning the subject matter hereof. It supersedes any and all contracts, arrangements, 
commitments, understandings, dealings, and offers, whether oral or written, heretofore 
made by the parties with reference to the subject matter hereof. 
Section 7.12. Non-Waiver 
Any failure by either party to exercise any of its rights hereunder shall not be 
deemed a waiver of any rights or remedies that such party may have, and shall not be 
deemed a waiver of any subsequent breach or default. 
(Signature Page to Follow) 
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ENTERED INTO as of the Effective Oite written above 
UTOPIA: \ Chris Ho 
~t^. 
Todd Marriott, Executive Director 
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Exhibit A 
Statement of Work 
Version 0.0 
May 12, 2009 
Presented by: 
Chris Hogan 
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Time and materials 
Client name 
Client's 
administrator 
Project name 
Engagement 
duration 
Begin date 
End date 
Utopia 
Todd Marriott 
UTOPIA 
Twenty four (24) months 
May 15,2009 
May 14,2011 
Schedule of rates 
>'• "••'"'"• ' V' ' \ • ' • . " • • ' • • * ; ' Cost ! 
Item description \ Delivery schedule {monthly) i 
Consulting Fee Invoice $11,500 
Payment terms 
Phase Completion date Payments due 
Term May 14,2011 Monthly 
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Statement of work 
Assumptions 
This Statement of Work ("SOW") is made as of May 12, 2009 between Chris Hogan an 
independent telecommunications consultant having his principal place of business at 
3235 Soaring Eagle Lane, Castle Rock, CO 80109 and Utopia with principal offices at 
2175 S. Redwood Road, West Valley City, UT 84119 ("Client") (collectively, "Parties"). 
This project associated with helping Utopia launch its new marketing and business plan 
will be referred to as 'New Market Strategy'. The purpose of this statement of work is to 
define the body of work to be performed in helping Utopia develop and successfully 
implement the New Market Strategy and develop a transition plan to maintain long term 
sustainability. The initial statement of work is defined as a twelve-month consecutive 
period. Subsequent statements of work will be defined by Utopia and Chris defined prior 
to the expiration of the based on an as needed basis and can be either defined as a 
monthly arrangement or longer if deemed necessary by Utopia. Prior to the expiration of 
the initial phase both Utopia and Chris Hogan will agree the length of future statements 
of work. 
Chris Hogan will, with an effective date of May 15, 2009, contract directly with Utopia 
and work under the direct reporting relationship of Todd Marriot, Utopia Executive 
Director and the Utopia Board of Directors. Chris Hogan will primarily work out of the 
Utopia offices in Utah. 
Change management process 
Any changes to the agreed SOW will be agreed in advance of the change implementation 
by both Utopia and Chris Hogan. 
Engagement related expenses 
All expenses incurred as a result of this engagement will be submitted for approval by 
Utopia with all supporting documentation. Expenses relating to the actual New Market 
Strategy will be considered program expenses and outside of this SOW and defined in the 
project budget. 
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Professional services agreement 
This SOW will envelope all Marketing and Operational activities related to building and 
maintaining the growth and development of the UTOPIA organization. Deliverables are 
defined below but not limited to only these listed - as the plan will evolve over time. This 
SOW will include any and all deliverables deemed necessary and agreed by Chris and 
UTOPIA to build and maintain all marketing and operational related activities. 
Marketing 
• Brand 
• Media and Collateral development 
• Community Partner Development 
• Channel Partners 
• Media Plan development and execution 
• PR Plan 
• Portal Development and Implementation 
• Service Provider recruitment and management 
• Project Budget 
• Sales Development 
• Create a sales strategy for both the residential, business, and long haul 
categories. Hire and manage the sales/channel teams 
Operational Development 
• NOC 
• Engineering 
• IT 
Organizational development 
Business Development 
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Acceptance and authorization 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto each acting with proper authority 
have executed this Statement of Work, under seal. 
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News article in which Shaw admits 
that UTOPIA disclosed the 
documents used to write the KSL 
article to UTOPIA shareholders 
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Deseret News 
Story mayor wrote under false name sparks lawsuit 
ByJaredPage 
Deseret News 
Published: Friday, Nov. 18, 2011 12:24 a.m. MST 
SALT LAKE CITY — The attorney for a former UTOPIA executive has informed the municipal 
fiber-optic network and West Valley City of his intent to file a defamation lawsuit against them 
over a news story Mayor Mike Winder wrote under a fake name. 
Attorney Steve S. Christensen said an article written by Winder under the pen name Richard 
Burwash and published on KSL.com on May 1 contains inaccurate statements about his client, 
Chris Hogan, and that Hogan "has suffered harm because of them." 
Hogan also alleges that UTOPIA, West Valley City and Winder conspired to make public a series 
of sealed court documents in an effort to damage Hogan's reputation. 
Winder also will be named in the lawsuit, Christensen said. Because UTOPIA and West Valley 
City are public entities, they have 90 days to refute the claims before they're filed with the court. 
Dave Shaw, general counsel for UTOPIA, called the allegations "patently false." Winder declined 
to comment Thursday on the pending legal action. 
Last week, Winder admitted to Deseret News editors that he created a false identity to write news 
stories about West Valley City through Deseret Connect, a freelance contributor network through 
which stories are submitted to its media partners. 
The mayor previously pretended to be Burwash to get stories published in the Oquirrh Times, a 
weekly newspaper covering West Valley, Magna and Kearns. The Salt Lake Tribune also 
published a photograph credited to Burwash. 
Since admitting to the deception, Winder has resigned his position as director of public affairs for 
The Summit Group, a Salt Lake City-based marketing and communications firm. 
On Wednesday, the Utah Telecommunications Open Infrastructure Agency put its professional 
relationship with The Summit Group "on hiatus" as a result of the Winder/Burwash incident. 
The May 1 story was one of four Burwash articles published through Deseret Connect. In it, 
Winder — as Burwash — wrote that Hogan was being accused of extortion, citing court 
documents the author claimed were unsealed on April 27. 
Court records show that the documents remained sealed until May 16, more than two weeks after 
Burwash submitted the article through Deseret Connect. That raised questions among defense 
attorneys about how Burwash obtained his information. 
Jacob Hancock, an editor for Deseret Connect, said he was contacted by a private investigator 
looking for Burwash about a week after the UTOPIA story was posted on KSL.com. 
Hancock said that was about the same time Burwash informed him via email he was moving to 
London and wouldn't be able to continue writing for Deseret Connect — at least for the near 
future. 
Winder says he wasn't aware that attorneys were trying to locate Burwash when he made up the 
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Winder later said the reason he shipped off Burwash and stopped using the pen name was that 
he learned from Deseret Media Companies President and CEO Mark Willes that the company 
didn't approve of the practice. 
Still, Burwash's Deseret Connect account was active until at least June 5, when he informed 
editors he hoped to "resume some sort of coverage of the various local (political) campaigns in 
the fall." 
Two days later, Winder was among those subpoenaed by the defense in connection with the 
lawsuit in 3rd District Court. Christensen said a subpoena also was sent out on Burwash, "but 
that was a dead end. We couldn't find him." 
Christensen said he didn't know Burwash was actually Winder until the mayor went public with the 
news last week. 
Shaw said that's also when UTOPIA found out about Winder's double identity, which he says 
makes Hogan's claims of conspiracy against UTOPIA invalid. 
"At the time, we had no knowledge that Mayor Winder was Mr. Burwash," he said. 
Shaw said he shared the court documents with UTOPIA stakeholders, including Winder, as West 
Valley City is the network's largest participating municipality. He said UTOPIA "did not have any 
knowledge" that the information would be used in a news article. 
Winder said he wrote the story because he was "frustrated by what was going on" with media 
reports about a federal lawsuit in which Hogan alleged he was fired for pointing out potential 
conflicts of interest at UTOPIA. Hogan served for two years as a consultant over the network's 
sales, marketing, business development and engineering efforts. 
"One side of the story wasn't being told," Winder said Thursday, "and I had a mechanism for 
telling the story." 
Both lawsuits are still active. 
Despite not knowing Burwash was Winder, Shaw says, "the factual basis of the story is correct." 
Four days after the story was posted on KSL.com, former Deseret News managing editor LaVarr 
Webb emailed Deseret News and Deseret Connect editors with concerns about the story being 
one-sided. 
Noting that he's a friend and former neighbor of Hogan, Webb expressed concern that Hogan 
was being "treated unfairly, especially by UTOPIA leaders." 
"I'm concerned because the story included factual errors and lacked any sort of balance," he 
wrote. 
Deseret News editors opted not to run the story, and it since has been removed from KSL.com. 
In addition to Winder's ties to the story as mayor of West Valley City, UTOPIA was a client of his 
employer at the time, The Summit Group. 
Winder said no one at The Summit Group was aware that he was the author of the news story 
until last week. 
Spokeswoman Julie Paulson said UTOPIA on Wednesday put its contract with The Summit Group 
"on hiatus." 
"Given the circumstances, we thought that would be best for all parties," she said. 
Paulson also admitted that Winder used her Deseret Connect account in June to attempt to 
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One source interviewed in the story said he had not spoken with Paulson and instead had talked 
with "Mike," who represented himself as a Deseret News reporter. Paulson also had not identified 
herself as a UTOPIA employee. 
She said Winder "thought it would be a good idea to ghostwrite some stories for (UTOPIA.)" 
Paulson said she gave Winder permission to set up the freelance writer account using her 
information, but that Winder wrote the article. 
Winder claims the news story was "a collaboration." 
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